am 25. August 2013
Ich habe dieses Buch gekauft, weil es von anderen Autoren immer wieder erwähnt wird. Da will man dann doch mitreden können!
Der Autor illustriert an vielen überzeugenden Beispielen wie neue Technologien (er nennt sie "disruptive") etablierte Firmen zu Fall bringen können, wenn sie "zur rechten Zeit" kommen und auf Kundeninteresse (von neuen Kunden, die es so bisher nicht gab) stossen. Leider hat auch Christensen kein Geheimrezept, wie man die disruptiven Technologien erkennt, bevor sie etabliert sind. Im Rückblick ist das alles immer einfach ;-)
Ich würde dieses Buch jedem Entrepreneur empfehlen!
am 6. Juli 2005
Professor Clayton M. Christensen's excellent book is a classic of strategy literature. The innovator's dilemma is that doing the right things can lead to failure. Sometimes it is wrong to listen to customers, invest in the highest return opportunities and do all of the things that made a successful company succeed. Clearly written, amply documented, provocative and challenging, this book is indispensable for anyone in business. If it has a shortcoming, it is that it focuses more on the dilemma than on resolving it and it does not offer specific remedial prescriptions. However, Christensen has authored or co-authored two other books that attempt to remedy that deficiency. We heartily recommend this book, which remains the leader of the three. It has the potential to change the way managers think about business - any business.
am 8. Mai 2000
In the space of a few months, I've bumped into a half-dozen corporate planners who've told me, "Drop everything you're doing and run--do not walk--to your nearest bookseller and get Clayton Christenson's The Innovator's Dilemma." Investigating further, I found that, in the industry press, Christenson's book is viewed as The New Gospel. Now having read the thing, I can see what all the fuss is about; by the final chapter, the counterintuitive idea that (under clearly specified conditions) "rigorous pursuit of your customer's interest can indeed sink your firm" seems as inevitable as the sunrise. Moreover, reading Christenson now, as Wall Street lurches through the Era of Dot.Com/Madness, it's easy to believe the book, and Chapter Nine in particular, has served a hefty percentage of recent internet start-ups as a template for mapping the market and assessing whether the technology offered is sufficiently disruptive. (Christenson's use of the term "technology" is process-related and more than just the latest widget). As a public sector drone, I was further impressed that Christenson's analytic approach is broadly, if metaphorically, applicable to a range of organizations--non-profit, non-commercial, public--trying to keep from being overrun by the forces of change. Some critics have pooh-poohed Christenson's analysis as old wine in a new bottle--"what's the big deal about successful firms having difficulty dealing with the low end of their markets?" etc.--but the lucid writing, clear plan, well-sprung analytic framework (particularly the integration of "value networks" and "technology trajectories"), and compelling marshaling of case material make this an enjoyable, often revelatory, and, yes, innovative dissection of how great firms become undone by new technologies.
am 27. April 1998
The Innovator's Dilemma offers a compelling explanation forwhy large and well-respected firms lose their dominant positionswithin a market, following what Christensen styles as 'disruptive innovation'.
Innovation takes two forms: sustaining and disruptive. Competition in oligopolistic markets is manifest in continuous product improvement, or sustaining innovation. This contrasts with a disruptive innovation, which fundamentally changes a product's nature, offering new functionality, although often at the expense of performance.
Typically, when disruptive innovation occurs, incumbents will reject the new technology; where markets do exist for such innovative products, they tend to be small and offer slim margins. Despite this, the book cites evidence of upstart firms with a low cost configuration and lower profit expectations, which have successfully exploited these marginal opportunities.
Refinement of the innovative product to a standard acceptable to traditional customers coupled with additional functionality enables the niche player to compete head on with established firms. They do so by pricing aggressively. Market incumbents typically respond by quickly incorporating the innovative technology into their products, only to find that they are able to make little impact in the developing new market (weak brand name) and cannibalise their existing customer base at lower margins. A new technology standard has been set.
The few firms that have survived a disruptive innovation have embraced the new technology early and recognised the need for a different approach to operation within the market. This demands a different corporate mentality and ultimately, organisational design, which is only possible by establishing a virtually autonomous and sometimes geographically separate subsidiary. Eventually, this may reverse acquire the parent.
The Innovator's Dilemma provides an interesting perspective on a seemingly recurrent problem. It does so in a fashion that is both insightful and easy to read. The main themes in the book are qualified with numerous examples and some rudimentary analysis, whilst avoiding being unduly repetitive.
am 22. Juni 2014
Buch und Beispiele sind über 20 Jahre alt, aber für alle diejenigen, die mit Innovation, Disruption z.B. bei Medien, Digitalisierung, Industrie 4.0 zu tun haben, wertvolles Fundament für Strategie- und Organisationsentwicklungsentwicklung. Die Beispiele, Methoden und Branchenanalysen lassen sich ohne Probleme auf jedes andere Business-Segment heute übertragen. Und ich habe bisher kein Werk gefunden, bei dem in ähnlicher Weise fundiert und analytisch - und nicht nur an der Oberfläche kratzend - das Thema Innovation und Disruption erarbeitet wird.
am 16. Juli 1998
Starts by turning the idea of "good management" completely on its head. OK - if you can prove it. I'm not sure yet that Christensen has proven his points; I've only read the book twice. But he makes sense. Alot of the roadblocks I've encountered personally in bring innovative practices or technologies into organizations start to make sense in light of Christensen's analysis. Read this book!
am 9. März 1999
Clayton Christensen refuses to accept the simple explanation of why large, incumbent firms often lose market share to new technologies -- poor management. Instead, he persuasively argues that good management very capably advances sustaining technologies -- technological advances that improve the performance of their proven products -- but fails to advance disruptive technologies.
This distinction of sustaining and disruptive technologies provides powerful insights. The author shows in case after case how the disruptive technology is initially inferior to the established technology, and consequently has nothing to offer the established customers. Those customers effectively drive the resource allocation decisions of well managed firms and cause them to focus on further improvements to their proven and money making products. Eventually, these proven products are developed beyond the needs of the market and create a vacuum at the lower end of the market.
Meanwhile, smaller organizations push the disruptive technology, find new markets where some unique attribute of the new technology creates value, and begin their own experience curve. Over time the disruptive technology is improved in features, reliability and value to the customer, and often penetrates the lower end of the traditional technology's market.
The lessons Christensen draws about how large and successful firms can develop disruptive technology will prove valuable to everyone running a business. The small firm trying to develop a new product or new approach can think about whether their product/approach is disruptive or sustaining, and will learn that their probability of success in penetrating an existing market with a sustaining technology is small, but 37% of the new entrants with disruptive technology survive. Even more reassuring to these pioneers is the dismal record of established firms to see and embrace the distruptive technology before the entrants are too far ahead to catch.
Overall a fascinating read.
am 26. Februar 2000
Does no-one read anymore? Despite all the assembled love notes to Clayton Christen here, it would seem not. Because this book is a typical re-hash of old ideas in dressed-up tech-friendly clothing.
F'rinstance, the idea that prior market leaders are often swept away in new waves of market innovations is as old as Schumpeter. Christensen adds some nice historical frisson to the story -- good for trotting out at Friday beer bashes and impressing management -- but nothing more. It has been documented before (and more entertainingly) in books about NeXT, Digital, Apple, IBM, and others. Even Computer Wars, Morris and Ferguson's more recent vintage book hits the same notes -- and you'd don't have to go back more than a decade to find that one.
Anyway, nice stories, but this is the kind of opportunistic and wildly over-applicable theorizing that gives rise to too many conferences. Whoops, too late.
am 8. August 2012
This is a great book.
It does an interesting analysis of how innovation can dramatically change a business.
Many solid companies went down by not taking this into consideration.
The book proposes means to detect such kinds of innovation and to take action early enough to not only avoid going down, but also empower your company with this power.
am 26. April 2000
Much of the focus on this book and its popularlity has been on innabilities of companies to adapt to major tech shifts and the great data to support this (though I wish there was a more accessible example outside of the disk drive industry that was as well researched). I would contend that there is a profound gem hidden early in the book regarding the concept of 'value networks'. (I'm sure some org behavior folks have thought about this but few people in the strategy -- esp. mgmt or change consulting -- have taken this to heart.) Organizations are a network of structural relationships between stakeholders (employees, suppliers, investors, customers, et al) that is highly inflexible (this is what creates the consistency necessary large orgs and their quality expectations, requirements). When organzations try to do something new, this network of relationships often keeps change in check. Forget the tech angle, this is about companies, momentum and inflexibility and how most companies can't change or dramatically evolve without leadership that recognizes that the entire network must be primed to accepted radical transformation and its requisite ambiguity (e.g., GE and Gerstner or Maytag and Lloyd Ward). Totally worth trudging through the numbers.