This is a book not easy to review. First of all - great expectations concerning unknown data from Russian archives and from records from Axis forces captured by the Sovients are not met. Numbers and losses are rarely reported, correlations of forces are hard to grasp an even harder to follow, the maps come in very differing stiles and are sometimes hard to read because of the size of the letters. The campaigns are described on an operational level but adored with a lot of biographical details of leaders (a host of leaders but dealt with in a concise way). The authors prove their thesis that the Soviet forces tried hard to stand and fight in 1942 and paid a heavy price for doing so but were in most cases able to get away short of destruction. And even better than in 1941 the Soviet Union was able and willing to build and field new or refurbished forces and always in excess to the Axis' capacity to destroy them. Obvious mistakes are few and do not dimish the value of the book. Without the substantial backup with other sources and maps I wouldn't recommend this work and it is certainly not David M. Glantz (and J. House) at his best.
Eine Person fand diese Informationen hilfreich.
War diese Rezension für Sie hilfreich?