- Gebundene Ausgabe: 287 Seiten
- Verlag: Yale University Press (14. Mai 2013)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 0300190522
- ISBN-13: 978-0300190526
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 17,8 x 3,2 x 25,4 cm
- Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 3 Kundenrezensionen
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When the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence (Englisch) Gebundene Ausgabe – 14. Mai 2013
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"[King] is dabbling in the financial equivalent of the horror genre. Perhaps even scarier, his is the stuff of nonfiction."--Michael J./i>--Michael J. Casey "The Wall Street Journal "
""When the Money Runs Out" sets out well the problems facing advanced economies." --David Smith, "The Sunday Times"--David Smith"The Sunday Times" (12/01/2013)
"A 'powerful' and 'convincing' book.Overall, asCharles Moore notes in The Daily Telegraph, 'it s alarmingly difficult to disagree' with this book." Matthew Partridge, "Money Week."--Matthew Partridge"Money Week" (06/28/2013)"
Stephen King, chief economist at HSBC, has just published an interesting and well-written book "When the Money Runs Out." Paul Ormerod, "City AM"
--Paul Ormerod"City am" (07/03/2013)"
In this book, HSBC s chief economist describes a real-life economic horror story, picking over the bones of the global financial crisis with the professional detachment of a forensic scientist examining the scene of a crime. The conclusions are clear and compelling. By the end, we know whodunit, how it was done and why, without resort to economic jargon there are few acronyms, no equations and no charts. Instead we are offered policy prescriptions that ring true uncomfortably so . . . The book should appeal to a wider audience than economists. The author is a newspaper columnist as well as a professional economist, and it shows in the crisp and easy style of his prose. I recommend it heartily. Erik Britton, "Management Today"--Erik Britton"Management Today" (09/01/2013)"
[King] is dabbling in the financial equivalent of the horror genre. Perhaps even scarier, his is the stuff of nonfiction. Michael J./i>--Michael J. Casey "The Wall Street Journal ""
A welcome reminder of the role [literature] has played in our lives, and of its indubitable destiny to continue to do so. Jon Morris, "PopMatters"--Jon Morris "PopMatters ""
"When the Money Runs Out"sets out well the problems facing advanced economies. David Smith, "The Sunday Times"--David Smith"The Sunday Times" (12/01/2013)"
"For many, the financial crisis is a temporary interruption in the rise of western prosperity that is due to easily remedied policy mistakes. The Keynesians believe this, as do anti-Keynesians on the free-market right. King argues, instead, that the future is not what it used to be. We have made promises to ourselves we cannot afford to keep. The argument is important, even if, like me, you are not persuaded." --Martin Wolf, Financial Times.--Martin Wolf"Financial Times" (06/29/2013)
"A 'powerful' and 'convincing' book. Overall, as Charles Moore notes in The Daily Telegraph, 'it's alarmingly difficult to disagree' with this book."--Matthew Partridge, Money Week.--Matthew Partridge"Money Week" (06/28/2013)
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In the West, persistent progress is most often perceived as a given. This West's economic tenet was best reflected in the beliefs of persistent increases in asset prices relative to the size of economies before 2007-2008. These beliefs went hand in hand with substantial increases in debt during this period (pp. 62-63; 66-67; 130-131; 134-135; 139). However, many of the factors behind the continuous increase in Western living standards in the second half of the 20th century seem to be one-offs. Think for example about healthcare, social security systems, world trade, financial innovation, quality of education, the further increase in women's labor participation, or the sharp decline in back-breaking housework (pp. 11-13).
Growth in most of the Western industrialized world has been anemic since the beginning of the 21st century. Mr. King identifies four key drivers behind this underwhelming performance:
1) The negative effects of the success of emerging nations on Western growth;
2) The over-investment in the U.S. housing market in the 2000s after the collapse of the 1990s technological revolution in 2000;
3) The financial crisis of 2007-2008;
4) The arrogance of Western policy-makers who thought after the last-named crisis that they were smarter than their Japanese counterparts. Their collective underperformance is especially striking compared to the performance of their Asian counterparts in the aftermath of the late 1990s Asian crisis (pp. 28-34; 58; 67; 192-204; 209).
Like too many of their Western alter egos, the U.S. central bankers alongside politicians suffer from what Mr. King calls a collective delusional `optimism bias' (p. 89). Year after year, they claim they have unlocked the secrets of future economic success, but ultimately fail to deliver on their forecasts. Quantitative easing and other associated macroeconomic quick fixes redistribute the spoils of past economic success and failure rather than kick start a real recovery (pp. 67-68; 71-77; 79-84; 89-90; 115; 118-120; 181; 218).
Furthermore, these quick fixes undermine the trust that people have to have in each other and their public and private institutions for powering economic growth (pp. 147; 149). As trust in institutions shrinks, the gap between our entitlements and our new, stagnant economic reality is widening under the pressure of income inequality, the ageing of the population, and the declining trust between (foreign) creditors and debtors (pp. 54; 158-177; 217-221; 243-245).
Like most Western countries, the U.S. has not shown a willingness to accept a temporary, sudden loss in living standards as an inevitable consequence of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. An obvious sense of entitlement stands in the way between this reduction in living standards and a subsequent real recovery (pp. 178; 204). Neither austerity nor stimulus can solve this conundrum without much hard work and considerable self-sacrifice (pp. 67; 205-206; 211; 220; 238).
The widespread lack of trust and the sub-par economic growth that most of the Western industrialized world is experiencing, have far-reaching consequences:
1) Entrepreneurial spirit evaporates, replaced by a battle for the spoils driven by a culture of entitlement that pervades the public and private sectors, healthcare, or the elderly;
2) Infrastructure projects get further slashed because they benefit future rather than current voters;
3) In the absence of a concomitant rise in prosperity, reforms are too often perceived as a zero-sum game and therefore opposed;
4) Lack of sustained economic growth leads to ever-increasing social fracturing, resulting in more racism, sexism, and other undesirable `-isms' (pp. 40-43; 48; 50; 149; 181; 226-229).
Mr. King makes a number of recommendations to tackle the structural problems that threaten all our economic futures:
1) Force rating agencies to issue a judgment on not only those who issue debt, but also those who acquire it;
2) Vote for a fiscal union that would go hand in hand with a monetary union in the Eurozone;
3) Establish a government's process that would automatically reduce the deficit year by year with an automatic suspension in years of economic contraction. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 in the U.S. accomplished it during the late 1980s and early 1990s;
4) Introduce a new social contract between the generations. This compact means continued support for education, infrastructure, and children's health, as well as a serious reduction in public spending elsewhere, including a substantial reduction in, say, defense spending and / or social benefits;
5) Implement a monetary policy that focuses on nominal GDP targeting, i.e., a policy that focuses on the rate of growth of nominal activity, not on stabilizing the inflation rate;
6) Encourage labor and capital mobility;
7) Impose macro-prudential rules on banks, treat national branches of international banks as subsidiaries, and stop the cross-subsidization of services;
8) Encourage education about the financial world (pp. 234-235; 237-239; 242; 244-245; 247-250; 256-259).
In summary, Mr. King warns his readers that the current malaise is not a cyclical dip, but a structural challenge that requires a drastic rethinking about our future.
Of particular interest are his historical analyses of past fiscal crises around the world and how they were solved or exacerbated by government action. He offers several scenarios in which he explores the social consequences of creditors to governments turning off the lending taps, forcing debtor governments to suddenly renege on the promises they have made to pensioners and the poor. He concludes by offering some counterintuitive solutions which seem unlikely to be adopted by governments and central bankers still locked into the mindset that inflation is an evil which must be tamed at all costs.
What I didn't like about this book is that it makes no mention of the fact that, as a result of information technology and automation, the growth and employment game really seems to have changed. A return to growth, if it can be engineered, no longer guarantees a robust employment market with well-paying jobs for the mass of people. Owners of businesses which can be automated will be sorely tempted to add server computers and robots rather than workers who misbehave, call in sick and engender payroll taxes and insurance costs. What I fear the most is the day when people realize that, not only are things not going to get any better for most of us in the future, but that, for most of us, living standards are going to have to drop as we compete with Indian, Chinese and Brazilian workers abroad and automation at home. I heard a joke the other day. The factory of the future will have only two permanent, on-site employees: a man and a dog. The man is there to feed and clean up after the dog. The dog is there to bite the man or anyone else who tries to touch the robots.