- Gebundene Ausgabe: 400 Seiten
- Verlag: Penguin Press; Auflage: New. (9. April 2013)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 1594204802
- ISBN-13: 978-1594204807
- Vom Hersteller empfohlenes Alter: Ab 18 Jahren
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 23,9 x 15,5 x 3,6 cm
- Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 2 Kundenrezensionen
- Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 167.347 in Fremdsprachige Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Fremdsprachige Bücher)
The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (Englisch) Gebundene Ausgabe – 9. April 2013
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The New York Times:
“Superb…the best account yet.”
“[An] indispensable CIA history.”
The Hindu (India):
Dexter Filkins, author of The Forever War:
"The story of how the CIA got back into the killing business is as chilling and dramatic as a spy novel--except it’s true. Mark Mazzetti has laid out an extraordinary tale, tracking the spies as they track the terrorists. The Way of the Knife is as close as you'll ever get to the real thing."
Jane Mayer, staff writer, The New Yorker; author of The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals:
"The Way of the Knife provides a stunning, inside account of the CIA's transformation after 9/11 from an intelligence agency into a global clandestine killing machine. Mazzetti, who is one of America's best national security reporters, has written a frightening, must-read book."
Thomas E. Ricks, author of Fiasco and The Generals:
"The United States fought three wars after 9/11: Iraq, Afghanistan and the one in the shadows. This is an authoritative account of that that third war, conducted by the CIA and military Special Operators in Yemen, East Africa and, most of all, Pakistan. If you want to understand the world we live in, you need to read it."
“The definitive history of how the intelligence agency became something much more like a paramilitary wing—de-evolving, in a sense, back to the days when the agency's adventurism influenced foreign policy around the world. It's a fascinating expose of what information the U.S. was not collecting—and how an attempt to fill the gap fell through oversight mechanisms and complicated geopolitics in Pakistan.”
San Francisco Chronicle:
“A highly engaging account that should please the curious and experts alike. Mazzetti manages to give a fresh reading to such oft-told stories as the bureaucratic jousting among White House, CIA and Pentagon officials over killer drones, secret prisons, ‘harsh interrogations’ and going global with military assassins.”
“The new American way of war is here, but the debate about it has only just begun. In The Way of the Knife, Mr Mazzetti has made a valuable contribution to it.”
The New Republic:
“Essential background reading… there are many signs that the novel ‘military-intelligence complex’ that Mazzetti describes is becoming unacceptably controversial at home and abroad.”
"Mazzetti's is an assiduously compiled account that strings together some of the missing parts in the puzzle… The Way of the Knife is a tale full of intrigues."
The New York Times Book Review:
“A fascinating, trenchant, sometimes tragicomic account.”
The Age (Australia):
"An astounding tale that melds the immediacy of fiction with the authority of fact."
The Washington Post:
“[A] deeply reported and crisply written account… While The Way of the Knife recounts the important shifts in the architecture of the U.S. military and intelligence communities, it also reveals the many eccentric characters who emerged during this.”
Los Angeles Times:
“Mazzetti finds new details and tracks the ominous blurring of traditional roles between soldiers and spies, the lush growth of a military-intelligence complex, and what the shift portends for the future....a valuable addition to a canon that is exposing America's use of lethal operations far from declared war zones."
“[A] fine account… Mazzetti describes in compelling detail the agency’s turf battles with the Pentagon, its awkward relations with its Pakistani counterpart, and its reliance on a motley collection of freelancers and private contractors.”
“Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Mark Mazzetti’s The Way of the Knife makes for an incisive guide to what he terms the 'shadow war' being waged in multiple countries around the world, away from prying eyes....[W]ith crisp, precision reporting, Mazzetti lays out a chronology of how one thing led to another after al-Qaeda’s asymmetric attacks in 2001 and the ruinously bloody and inconclusive invasions that followed exposed glaring weaknesses in both the American military and its intelligence services.”
“A well-reported, smoothly written book for anyone who wants to understand contemporary American military might and the widespread hatred for the U.S. that has been the result.”
Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende
MARK MAZZETTI is a national security correspondent for The New York Times. In 2009, he shared a Pulitzer Prize for reporting on the intensifying violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and Washington’s response, and he has won numerous other major journalism awards, including the George Polk Award (with colleague Dexter Filkins) and the Livingston Award, for breaking the story of the CIA's destruction of interrogation videotapes. Mazzetti has also written for the Los Angeles Times, U.S. News & World Report, and The Economist. He lives in Washington, D.C.Alle Produktbeschreibungen
Welche anderen Artikel kaufen Kunden, nachdem sie diesen Artikel angesehen haben?
Leider handelt ein großer Teil des Buches aber nicht von den wirklichen Einsätzen, die die CIA und JSOC gegen Islamisten durchgeführt haben, sondern sehr oft geht es um den Konkurrenzkampf zwischen CIA, JSOC und Pentagon, Intrigen und privaten "conctractors", die seit 9/11 staatliche Aufgaben übernommen haben.
Für meinen Geschmack liegt das Hauptaugenmerk zu sehr auf den bürokratischen Abläufen, die zu bestimmten Phänomenen der Kriegsführung geführt haben, als auf den tatsächlich durchgeführten Missionen mit all ihren Erfolgen aber auch Fehlschlägen. Manche Kapitel muten als richtige "Füllkapitel" an, weil es über Seiten keine neuen Informationen gibt und die Darstellung sich im Kreis dreht. Vielleicht liegt es aber auch daran, dass ich mich sehr intensiv mit der Materie befasse und deshalb keinen großen empirischen Mehrwert aus dem Buch ziehen konnte. Dennoch, es ist gut recherchiert und auch gut verständlich geschrieben, aber aufgrund der genannten "Mängel" sind vier oder fünf Sterne meiner Auffassung nach nicht gerechtfertigt. Für jeden Einsteiger zum Thema aber mit Sicherheit ein hochinteressantes Buch! Wer die Thematik seit Jahren intensiv verfolgt hat, wird keine bahnbrechenden, neuen Erkenntnisse aus dem Buch gewinnen können, aber sie zumindest gut recherchiert und zusammengefasst
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Who knew that the now-famous Navy SEAL Team 6 which took out Osama Bin Laden was temporarily inducted into the CIA just before the mission ("sheep-dipped" is the insider term), because Pakistan is, on paper, an ally, and the US military cannot - by law - engage in such missions. Or that all of the spectacular drone strikes taking out other Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders - seemingly military actions - were made by the CIA (and that the CIA now conducts tactical military operations all over the world). Conversely, much of the intelligence-gathering done on Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other threats is now done by US military Special Operations forces, not the CIA. To further complicate the lines of responsibility, there has been an exponential increase in private intelligence-gathering firms used by the US government.
It is a sometimes confusing, often breathtaking story (especially the inside stories on many kill operations), as to how our country now wages war and the politics behind it. Though this quantum shift away from the highly-visible and costly invade-and-occupy military tactics of recent years, towards this stealthy "way of the knife" method has been effective, it also has caused many problems. I highly recommend the book.
Mark Mazetti traces the philosophy of the CIA over the past fifty years as follows: In the 1960s, the CIA was allowed to carry out assassinations overseas as part of its job. In the 70s, President Ford reversed all that, forbidding the CIA from being a killing machine and instead making it focus on intelligence gathering and spying as its primary job. However, 9/11 changed all that yet again, with the CIA getting into the business of tracking down Islamic extremists, incarcerating and torturing them overseas. The adverse reaction to this practice and the Congressional indictments that followed, made them choose the silver bullet of killing terrorists abroad again through remote-controlled drones without opting for on-the-ground assassination squads. In doing so, the American government has outsourced the basic functions of spycraft to private contractors, making the American way of war morph from clashes between tank columns - into the shadows, outside the declared war zones. In the process, the constraints on who can be killed, where they can be killed and when they can be killed have been conveniently blurred.
The author says that the challenge of Al-Qaeda has led the Pentagon, the CIA and the US Govt into paradoxical and inconsistent positions. The Clinton administration, though opposed to the CIA carrying out the assassination of Osama bin Laden through hit-squads, was okay with killing him through Tomahawk missiles. In the same way, President Obama, though a liberal, finds no contradiction in embracing and expanding the killing program through the drones, which has resulted in the deaths of substantial number of civilians, non-combatants and even allies, apart from suspected terrorists.
Mark Mazetti clearly believes that the CIA should not stray away from its primary mission of spying and gathering intelligence. He attributes this 'straying' as the reason for the CIA getting blind-sided by the Arab Spring events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2010-12. Though it is tempting to agree with this, I remember reading in Tim Werner's book, 'The Legacy of the Ashes', about the CIA getting blindsided by many world events even before 9/11. For example, the CIA did not foresee India going for an atomic blast in 1998. Nor did they foresee the sudden collapse of Communism in 1990-92 or even the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1991. The CIA has the image of an all-powerful God-like entity in the eyes of developing countries. However, in reality, it is probably just a massive bureaucracy struggling to make sure that its left-hand is aware of what the right-hand is doing.
I found the chapters on the CIA's role in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia quite absorbing and revelatory. The sections on Pakistan show that the US got quite fed up with the 'double game' of the ISI and the Pak army, resulting in giving full rein to the CIA to violate the country's borders. Years before the assault on Osama bin Laden in 2011, the Navy Seals had landed inside Pakistan and conducted operations in Damadola in the Bajaur agency without the Pak army ever being aware of it. This seems to have given the confidence for the later invasion to kill OBL. The US never informed President Musharraf of special operations that were carried out inside Pakistan. During the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, the CIA slipped in many covert officers into Pak without the ISI's knowledge under the cover of relief efforts. The book paints a dismal picture of Pak-US relations at all levels. There are fascinating accounts of how the CIA pursued al-Shabab in Somalia and killed the American citizen Anwar al-Aulaki in Yemen.
After reading the book, I am compelled to think that this spree of 'killing by remote control' could end dangerously, similar to making the atomic bomb and waging cyber-warfare. The atomic bomb was seen as a way to bring fascism to its end in Japan without loss of of American lives. But the nuclear weapon has since proliferated and has come to threaten all of us. Similarly, internet viruses like Stuxnet were deployed towards a 'bloodless' destruction of Iran's nuclear program. But, it also got out of control, resulting in more cyber espionage and state-sponsored viruses threatening the highly-networked infrastructures of the advanced industrial nations. We are likely to see in future many countries following the 'US lead' in waging war (without declaring war) and killing citizens of another country through remote controlled drones, exacerbating tensions among nations and power-blocks.
It is possible that the US has let another dangerous genie out of the bottle.
The book also analyzes the relationship between the discrediting of the CIA's detention program and the rise in targeted killing. It then traces the Pentagon's deliberate attempts to develop a global counterterrorism force with the authorities and capabilities to rival the CIA's covert actions, and the fascinating blend of competition and cooperation that has emerged in recent years.
The Way of the Knife is a must read for anyone interested in the history of drones, the evolution of U.S. special forces and military-intelligence convergence.
Turns out Davis had been hired by CIA for a manhunt in Pakistan. The CIA was no longer a traditional espionage service - it now was also a killing machine. Author Mazzetti also claims that since 9/11 the Pentagon has also added spying to its repertoire, especially using small numbers of clandestine Special Ops forces on the ground. (Most of Seal Team 6's time in Osama's house was spent vacuuming up every electronic device and written document available.) Unfortunately, this new kind of war has also created enemies, while obliterating them. It has also lowered the bar for carrying out killing operations around the world, and led to hiding terrorists in secret jails and subjecting them to brutal interrogations.
During Panetta's CIA tenure, he authorized 216 CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, killing at least 1,196. Yet, per Mazzetti, few were al-Qaeda leaders - most were lower-level members of the Taliban in Pakistan. Meanwhile, the CIA missed Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.