Many accounts of the Yom Kippur War have been written. But this is the first behind-the-scenes look at the Northern Command preparations for war during that fateful summer, when the Syrian army in the north, together with the Egyptian army in the south, coordinated a blitzkrieg offensive against Israel.
This book offers fresh insight into the pre-war debate that raged between the Northern Command and the Intelligence Branch that believed Syria was not looking for war. For the first time, the reader will be privy to the decision-making details that threatened to overpower the IDF Command. The Generals, who were in command, describe in their own words the pivotal battles that changed the course of the war, as well as the disastrous effects of the “hindsight evaluation” after the war was won reverberated throughout the corridors of power.
The four contributors of this book were assisted by a team of researchers and other army commanders, under the direction and coordination of Military Historian, Brig. Gen. (Res.) Dr Dani Asher.
Major General (res.) Yitzhak Hofi, “Haka”, the Northern Commander in Chief, Maj. Gen. (res.) Uri Simchoni, Head of Command Operations, Brig. Gen. (res.) Avraham Bar David, Head of Artillery, and Col. (res.) Hagai Mann, the command’s Intelligence officer, have combined their knowledge of the day-to-day events to recount the preparations and management of the war, its success and failures, and its repercussions that resonate even today.