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The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion Taschenbuch – 2. Mai 2013
Englisch Ausgabe
von
Jonathan Haidt
(Autor)
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'A landmark contribution to humanity's understanding of itself' The New York Times
Why can it sometimes feel as though half the population is living in a different moral universe? Why do ideas such as 'fairness' and 'freedom' mean such different things to different people? Why is it so hard to see things from another viewpoint? Why do we come to blows over politics and religion?
Jonathan Haidt reveals that we often find it hard to get along because our minds are hardwired to be moralistic, judgemental and self-righteous. He explores how morality evolved to enable us to form communities, and how moral values are not just about justice and equality - for some people authority, sanctity or loyalty matter more. Morality binds and blinds, but, using his own research, Haidt proves it is possible to liberate ourselves from the disputes that divide good people.
- Seitenzahl der Print-Ausgabe528 Seiten
- SpracheEnglisch
- HerausgeberPenguin
- Erscheinungstermin2. Mai 2013
- Abmessungen19.8 x 12.9 x 2.93 cm
- ISBN-109780141039169
- ISBN-13978-0141039169
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Produktbeschreibungen
Pressestimmen
A landmark contribution to humanity's understanding of itself ― The New York Times
If you want to know why you hold your moral beliefs and why many people disagree with you, read this book -- Simon Baron-Cohen ― author of The Essential Difference
A truly seminal book -- David Goodhart ― Prospect
A tour de force - brave, brilliant, and eloquent. It will challenge the way you think about liberals and conservatives, atheism and religion, good and evil -- Paul Bloom ― author of How Pleasure Works
Compelling . . . a fluid combination of erudition and entertainment -- Ian Birrell ― Observer
Lucid and thought-provoking . . . deserves to be widely read -- Jenni Russell ― Sunday Times
If you want to know why you hold your moral beliefs and why many people disagree with you, read this book -- Simon Baron-Cohen ― author of The Essential Difference
A truly seminal book -- David Goodhart ― Prospect
A tour de force - brave, brilliant, and eloquent. It will challenge the way you think about liberals and conservatives, atheism and religion, good and evil -- Paul Bloom ― author of How Pleasure Works
Compelling . . . a fluid combination of erudition and entertainment -- Ian Birrell ― Observer
Lucid and thought-provoking . . . deserves to be widely read -- Jenni Russell ― Sunday Times
Buchrückseite
In The Righteous Mind, psychologist Jonathan Haidt answers some of the most compelling questions about human relationships:
Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende
Jonathan Haidt is a social psychologist and the Thomas Cooley Professor of Ethical Leadership at New York University's Stern School of Business. He is the author of The Righteous Mind and The Happiness Hypothesis.
Produktinformation
- ASIN : 0141039167
- Herausgeber : Penguin; 1. Edition (2. Mai 2013)
- Sprache : Englisch
- Taschenbuch : 528 Seiten
- ISBN-10 : 9780141039169
- ISBN-13 : 978-0141039169
- Abmessungen : 19.8 x 12.9 x 2.93 cm
- Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 11,475 in Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Bücher)
- Nr. 576 in Religion & Glaube (Bücher)
- Nr. 967 in Film, Kunst & Kultur (Bücher)
- Nr. 1,287 in Psychologie & Hilfe (Bücher)
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Spitzenbewertungen aus Deutschland
Derzeit tritt ein Problem beim Filtern der Rezensionen auf. Bitte versuche es später erneut.
Rezension aus Deutschland vom 27. Juli 2023
Der Titel hält was er verspricht und Haidt schreibt ebenso informativ wie lesbar. Ein tolles Buch. Übrigens sind auch die anderen Bücher und Artikel von Haidt sehr lesenswert.
Rezension aus Deutschland vom 13. April 2022
This book makes several points:
First, moral judgements are based on intuitive/emotional reactions followed by seemingly rational justifications. This should be unsurprising to anyone even if they have not read any of the popular books that say this in one way or another. The concrete proof using "weird" questions ("is it wrong to have sex with a dead chicken?") is interesting anyway.
Second, Haidt proposes a framework of 6 fundamental aspects of morality that most humans have. Some of these aspects are obvious (care/harm), others less (respect to authority) and one (sanctity) appears like it is just used for everything that does not fit into the other categories, making it hard to grapple with. Haidt also claims that liberals draw only on 3 of these 6 aspects whereas conservatives use all of them which explains their better results in elections. I find this claim interesting but do not trust it too much. In particular, I do not think this framework provides an advantage over the more general assumption that other people just have different values than you do. It is probably good for academia, but in the real world it is likely a bit of a crutch.
Third, Haidt explains the existence of different moral systems (and people choosing different systems) as a combination of evolutionary and cultural adaptations. This explanation makes sense and is probably correct. The points that evolution moves faster than commonly assumed and coevolves with culture were particular gems.
He also gives pretty much the only positive description of human tribal instincts I have read so far, which I found quite refreshing.
He finishes by examining the different ideologies from a pragmatic/utilitarian centrist position and concludes that all of them have their merit - both the arguments and the conclusion should be obvious to anyone except fanatical partisans. But there are probably more of these in the US than in Germany, which is why I find this book less important for our political situation.
Contrary to what other reviews have said, he does not try to be too neutral. He examines the different ideologies, not the particular political parties and explicitly says that he dislikes the current state of the Republican party. It is just a bit subtle.
Overall, this is a good book and I would recommend reading it, especially to Leftists that cannot understand conservatives but are not fanatical enough to reject anything that contradicts their own views.
First, moral judgements are based on intuitive/emotional reactions followed by seemingly rational justifications. This should be unsurprising to anyone even if they have not read any of the popular books that say this in one way or another. The concrete proof using "weird" questions ("is it wrong to have sex with a dead chicken?") is interesting anyway.
Second, Haidt proposes a framework of 6 fundamental aspects of morality that most humans have. Some of these aspects are obvious (care/harm), others less (respect to authority) and one (sanctity) appears like it is just used for everything that does not fit into the other categories, making it hard to grapple with. Haidt also claims that liberals draw only on 3 of these 6 aspects whereas conservatives use all of them which explains their better results in elections. I find this claim interesting but do not trust it too much. In particular, I do not think this framework provides an advantage over the more general assumption that other people just have different values than you do. It is probably good for academia, but in the real world it is likely a bit of a crutch.
Third, Haidt explains the existence of different moral systems (and people choosing different systems) as a combination of evolutionary and cultural adaptations. This explanation makes sense and is probably correct. The points that evolution moves faster than commonly assumed and coevolves with culture were particular gems.
He also gives pretty much the only positive description of human tribal instincts I have read so far, which I found quite refreshing.
He finishes by examining the different ideologies from a pragmatic/utilitarian centrist position and concludes that all of them have their merit - both the arguments and the conclusion should be obvious to anyone except fanatical partisans. But there are probably more of these in the US than in Germany, which is why I find this book less important for our political situation.
Contrary to what other reviews have said, he does not try to be too neutral. He examines the different ideologies, not the particular political parties and explicitly says that he dislikes the current state of the Republican party. It is just a bit subtle.
Overall, this is a good book and I would recommend reading it, especially to Leftists that cannot understand conservatives but are not fanatical enough to reject anything that contradicts their own views.
Rezension aus Deutschland vom 11. Februar 2023
Der Titel ist vielversprechend. Leider wird darauf im Buch nur gelegentlich eingegangen. Stattdessen erfährt man viel ueber den Autor und seine grossartige Arbeit im Bereich der Moral-Philosophie. Weniger Selbstdarstellung, ein fluessigerer Schreibstil und etwas Humor hätte dem Werk gut getan,
Rezension aus Deutschland vom 7. März 2022
Haidt indentifies six moral foundations and shows how those of us who value fairness, fighting oppression and caring for the weaker members of society may fail to grasp what motivates those who also see moral value in authority, loyalty and sanctity. And vice versa. Frustrating debates often take place at the level of conclusions and neglect to look for the foundational ideas which produce the conclusion, thus missing out on a solid chance for civil discourse. Haidt writes well and the book is not just illuminating, it’s also a great read.
Rezension aus Deutschland vom 22. Juli 2022
Excellent and intersting view on people and society. Some things leave space open, but in general very guiding and thoughtful.
Rezension aus Deutschland vom 8. Februar 2013
jonathan haidt ist einer jener psychologen, die weit über die alt anerkannten expertengebiete hinausdenken. ihm geht es nicht ums blinde stochern im unbewussten. er will herausfinden, was an unseren intuitionen und handlungen ererbt und was erlernt ist. die alten frage "nature against nurture" neu aufgelegt, ist das nicht. haidt recherchierte bei verhaltens- und gehirnforschern wie bei ethnologen und gen-experten. das ergebnis:
die grundlage unseres moralgefühls verdanken wir nicht elternhaus und schule, sondern unserem urmenschlichen, genetisch bedingten drang zur gerechtigkeit. und warum hat sich der über jahrtausenden unseren genen eingeprägt? weil sich unsere urahnen ohne ihn gegenseitig umgebracht hätten statt sich in schwieriger umgebung zu helfen. ohne den wunsch nach gerechtigkeit und den willen sie durchzusetzen, sagt haidt, hätten sich die urclans nie von familiengröße zu dörfern, städten und staaten zusammengeschlossen. und ohne ein starkes moralgefühl könnten wir auch heute nicht überleben.
spannend! (und, übrigens, sehr gut zu lesen und zu verstehen!)
die grundlage unseres moralgefühls verdanken wir nicht elternhaus und schule, sondern unserem urmenschlichen, genetisch bedingten drang zur gerechtigkeit. und warum hat sich der über jahrtausenden unseren genen eingeprägt? weil sich unsere urahnen ohne ihn gegenseitig umgebracht hätten statt sich in schwieriger umgebung zu helfen. ohne den wunsch nach gerechtigkeit und den willen sie durchzusetzen, sagt haidt, hätten sich die urclans nie von familiengröße zu dörfern, städten und staaten zusammengeschlossen. und ohne ein starkes moralgefühl könnten wir auch heute nicht überleben.
spannend! (und, übrigens, sehr gut zu lesen und zu verstehen!)
Rezension aus Deutschland vom 5. Juni 2018
Ein ärgerliches Buch. Haidts Moral Fondations Theory is voller Fehler: mindestens 3 der von ihm untersuchten Dimensionen von Moral haben bei näherem Hinsehen wenig mit Moral zu tun, etwa die ‚Reinheit‘. Die untersuchten Dimensionen sind auch nicht unabhängig, nach Grey korellieren ‚Harm‘ und ‚Purity‘, die scheinbar unabhängigsten Dimensionen, mit r= 0,87!
Ex falso quodlibet, damit werden alle weiteren Kapitel obsolet: Haidt versucht eine evolutionstheoretische Begründung der unterschiedlichen Moralsysteme von Liberalen und Konservativen. Die Forschung zeigt aber, das es bei moralischen Themen immer um ‚Harm‘, ‚Fairness‘, und ‚Unterdrückung‘ geht, bei Liberalen und Konservativen. Diese ticken gleich. Zuerst proklamiert Haidt unterschiedliche Moralsysteme (Konservative sind hier angeblich von Vorteil, weil sie alle 6 Dimensionen in gleicher Ausprägung haben, Liberale nur 2 Diemsnionen berücksichtigen), und liefert dann Rezepte, wie sich die beiden Gruppen wieder besser verstehen können. Die Ergebnisse sind wertlos.
Aergerlich auch die Berufung auf die unter Evolutionstheoretikern umstrittene Theorie der Gruppenselektion, um damit (auch sonst aüsserst schwach) für die Religion als nützlichen Irrläufer der Evolution zu argumentieren. Kritik am ‚New Atheism‘ gibt es wesentlich fundiertere.
Dass Haidt in den Staaten als wichtiger Intellektueller herumgereicht wird, sagt einiges über die Qualität der psychologischen Forschung. An einer europäischen Uni ginge das als Diplomarbeit nicht durch.
Ex falso quodlibet, damit werden alle weiteren Kapitel obsolet: Haidt versucht eine evolutionstheoretische Begründung der unterschiedlichen Moralsysteme von Liberalen und Konservativen. Die Forschung zeigt aber, das es bei moralischen Themen immer um ‚Harm‘, ‚Fairness‘, und ‚Unterdrückung‘ geht, bei Liberalen und Konservativen. Diese ticken gleich. Zuerst proklamiert Haidt unterschiedliche Moralsysteme (Konservative sind hier angeblich von Vorteil, weil sie alle 6 Dimensionen in gleicher Ausprägung haben, Liberale nur 2 Diemsnionen berücksichtigen), und liefert dann Rezepte, wie sich die beiden Gruppen wieder besser verstehen können. Die Ergebnisse sind wertlos.
Aergerlich auch die Berufung auf die unter Evolutionstheoretikern umstrittene Theorie der Gruppenselektion, um damit (auch sonst aüsserst schwach) für die Religion als nützlichen Irrläufer der Evolution zu argumentieren. Kritik am ‚New Atheism‘ gibt es wesentlich fundiertere.
Dass Haidt in den Staaten als wichtiger Intellektueller herumgereicht wird, sagt einiges über die Qualität der psychologischen Forschung. An einer europäischen Uni ginge das als Diplomarbeit nicht durch.
Spitzenrezensionen aus anderen Ländern
Gregory J. Casteel
5,0 von 5 Sternen
Brilliant! (Yet it still leaves me slightly disappointed)
Rezension aus den Vereinigten Staaten vom 26. April 2012
This is an unusually difficult review for me to write, because I have somewhat mixed feelings about this book. I wanted to love it; and I actually did end up loving it a whole lot, but not quite as much as I was hoping to for some reason. I'm a political scientist with a background in sociology and a strong interest in psychology; so, as you might imagine, I've always had a fascination with social psychology in general and political psychology in particular. I haven't yet had the opportunity to teach a course on political psychology; but I've wanted to for some time now. I devour everything I can get my hands on that deals with the underlying psychology of political affiliation, political decision making, and political violence. In the course of my study of the subject I have encountered the work of moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt on several occasions (if you search online you can find videos of him giving talks on his subject of expertise; and he also has a website -- YourMorals.org -- that deals with his work); and I've been intrigued and impressed with his unique approach to understanding political affiliation, as well as with his calls for greater civility and a willingness to compromise in the political arena. So, when I saw that he had written a book on political psychology, I simply had to read it. I began reading with very high hopes. Not only was I expecting this book to unlock the mysteries of why some people are "conservative" and others are "liberal"; but I was also hoping that this would be the ideal text to assign my students if I ever taught a course on political psychology. Haidt's book lived up to my hopes and expectations in some ways, but not in others. I would definitely recommend it to political psychology students; but I'm not sure that I would want to use it as the primary text for teaching the subject.
I really did love this book; but as I was reading it I kept getting the nagging feeling that something about it was just a bit off -- something that I couldn't quite put my finger on. Now I don't want to leave the wrong impression; so I want to say up front that this is a wonderful, well-written, thought-provoking book that everyone ought to read. I've given it five stars because I genuinely believe it's worthy of the highest possible rating. Haidt's theory of political affiliation is original -- one might even say radical -- flying in the face of much of the conventional wisdom within the social and behavioral sciences; but if you are willing to consider Haidt's argument with an open mind, it actually makes a whole lot of sense. So, when I say that something about this book felt a bit off to me, please don't interpret this as a criticism of Haidt's theory, his approach to the subject, or his writing style. This is a book that you really ought to read, and that you will probably enjoy. That said, I still felt slightly dissatisfied after reading it; but it was hard to say exactly why.
After some reflection, I think that my dissatisfaction was due to three things. First, I felt that Haidt's argument was a bit anticlimactic. Haidt spends most of the book laying the foundations for his theory of political affiliation; and the theory he finally presents is, at least in my view, quite compelling. But, after all that setup, I was expecting more of a discussion of how this theory can be applied to help us understand why different people hold such radically differing views on such a wide range of political issues. But Haidt skimped on the application of his theory. The main insight that Haidt gives us into why some people are liberal while others are conservative or libertarian is that a combination of nature and nurture has predisposed some people to build their morality primarily on just three core principles -- care, liberty, and fairness -- while predisposing other people to build their morality on six principles -- care, liberty, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity -- and still others to build their morality on a single principle -- liberty. As I'm sure you've guessed, those in the first group become liberals, those in the second group become conservatives, and those in the third group become libertarians. This is certainly an important insight; but I was hoping for more. For example, I wish Haidt had given us a bit more insight into how the three liberal values shape liberal policy positions, how the six conservative values shape conservative policy positions, and how the lone libertarian value shapes libertarian policy positions. He did briefly discuss some of the differences between liberal, conservative, and libertarian views of the economy; but he didn't really have all that much to say about the myriad other policy issues that liberals, conservatives, and libertarians routinely fight over -- e.g. abortion, equal pay, gay marriage, affirmative action, collective bargaining, voter access, immigration reform, taxes, entitlements, gun control, civil liberties, criminal justice, drug laws, military spending, the conduct of foreign policy, the appropriate use of military force, etc. Haidt's theory does provide a framework that can help us to understand why liberals, conservatives, and libertarians might take different positions on these issues; but he doesn't spell it out for us issue by issue. I really wish he had. I think it would have been very useful, and would have made his excellent book even better.
Second, while I admired his efforts to treat liberals, conservatives, and libertarians with equal respect, and not to treat conservatism as if it were some sort of mental disorder (as many political psychologists are wont to do), I ultimately felt that he went a little too far in his efforts to be "fair and balanced", and ended up glossing over some of the biggest moral failings on the right (e.g. sexism, racism, homophobia, religious bigotry, jingoism, xenophobia, demagoguery, anti-intellectualism, and science denialism) in the interest of portraying conservative values as being just as legitimate as liberal values. Besides, the conservatism that Haidt found worthy of praise was old-fashioned Tory conservatism -- a cautious, genteel, intellectual form of conservatism based on the ideals of serious thinkers like Edmund Burke, who mainly just wanted to preserve society against the sort of chaos that often accompanies radical change -- which bears little resemblance to the "red meat" conservatism that prevails on the American right today. So, when Haidt advises us to pay attention to what conservatives have to teach us about what it takes to maintain a healthy, functioning society, he's really talking about old-school conservative intellectuals of the center-right, like George Will and Colin Powell, not the dogmatic culture warriors of the far-right, like Rush Limbaugh and Sarah Palin. In fact, Haidt has relatively little to say about the conservatism represented by the evangelical Religious Right or the Tea Party movement, where ideological zeal often manifests itself as an ugly form of demagoguery. It's almost as if he wants to sweep this under the rug so he can sell the idea that mutually respectful civil discourse and bipartisanship are actually possible in this day and age. I think this book would have been better if Haidt had stuck to trying to explain partisanship rather than trying to find a cure for it.
And third, although I found Haidt's argument quite compelling, there are certain aspects of it that might alienate some readers, causing them to simply reject Haidt's conclusions out of hand without much critical thought. The last thing I would ever want to do in a classroom is to alienate any of my students so they stop listening to what I have to teach. So I'm more than a little reluctant to assign a highly controversial text that many students will likely have a knee-jerk reaction against. Why might this book be controversial? For one thing, Haidt's theory draws heavily on evolutionary psychology, which is rejected by many on both the right and the left. Many progressives decry evolutionary psychology as "politically incorrect" because it argues that much of human behavior -- including such things as gender differences, xenophobia, and aggression -- may be innate parts of human nature that can never be changed by social engineering. Many conservatives, on the other hand, reject evolutionary psychology because they don't believe in Darwinian evolution at all. So Haidt's use of evolutionary psychology may be enough to cause some readers to reject his argument outright. In addition to this, he bases much of his argument on the evolutionary principle of "group selection" -- a theory that has been pretty firmly rejected by biologists for several decades now, but which Haidt argues ought to be reconsidered. But perhaps the most controversial part of Haidt's argument is his treatment of religion. Haidt himself is an atheist; so he makes no pretense of actually believing that any religion is "true". He looks at religion purely from a psychological and sociological perspective in an attempt to figure out what function religion has played in human society throughout history. Yet he forcefully rejects the anti-religious fervor of the so-called "New Atheism" popularized over the past decade by Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and the late Christopher Hitchens, among others, with its assertion that religion is a dangerous "meme" -- a "virus of the mind" -- that is inherently harmful to human wellbeing. Haidt devotes an entire chapter to refuting the New Atheists' claims about religion, arguing that religion has actually been a force for good in the world which serves to strengthen social bonds and discourage individual selfishness, and that religion is actually a product of natural selection. So, his treatment of religion is unlikely to win Haidt any friends from among either the devoutly religious or the fervently irreligious. And, on top of all this, Haidt defends conservative values that many liberals find abhorrent, arguing that they are just as vital to the wellbeing of society as are liberal values. So, suffice it to say that this iconoclastic book is liable to alienate many different people for many different reasons. Haidt butchers a lot of sacred cows in these pages. So, I suspect that plenty of folks will simply reject everything that he has to say out of hand. While I am an advocate of open-minded critical inquiry, I'm also a pragmatist. I know that many of my students are not going to be as open-minded as I would like them to be; so, as an educator, I have to be sensitive to this if I want to help them learn. A little controversy in the classroom can be healthy; but too much can derail the entire lesson plan. I wouldn't want the class to get sidetracked by debates over tangential issues that are not directly relevant to the subject I'm trying to teach. So, if I were to teach a course on political psychology, I would be a bit hesitant to use this book as the main text for fear that students would get too distracted by some of its more controversial elements. However, I would consider using this book as a supplemental text, and would definitely put it on the recommended readings list.
Anyway, these three problems are relatively minor, and do not detract from the overall quality of the book. They simply leave me ever-so-slightly dissatisfied, perhaps because my expectations were unreasonably high. I would certainly recommend Haidt's book. I really do feel that it deserves to be read and talked about. There's no doubt in my mind that it deserves a five-star rating. But I'm afraid that the five stars I give it will have to come with an asterisk.
I really did love this book; but as I was reading it I kept getting the nagging feeling that something about it was just a bit off -- something that I couldn't quite put my finger on. Now I don't want to leave the wrong impression; so I want to say up front that this is a wonderful, well-written, thought-provoking book that everyone ought to read. I've given it five stars because I genuinely believe it's worthy of the highest possible rating. Haidt's theory of political affiliation is original -- one might even say radical -- flying in the face of much of the conventional wisdom within the social and behavioral sciences; but if you are willing to consider Haidt's argument with an open mind, it actually makes a whole lot of sense. So, when I say that something about this book felt a bit off to me, please don't interpret this as a criticism of Haidt's theory, his approach to the subject, or his writing style. This is a book that you really ought to read, and that you will probably enjoy. That said, I still felt slightly dissatisfied after reading it; but it was hard to say exactly why.
After some reflection, I think that my dissatisfaction was due to three things. First, I felt that Haidt's argument was a bit anticlimactic. Haidt spends most of the book laying the foundations for his theory of political affiliation; and the theory he finally presents is, at least in my view, quite compelling. But, after all that setup, I was expecting more of a discussion of how this theory can be applied to help us understand why different people hold such radically differing views on such a wide range of political issues. But Haidt skimped on the application of his theory. The main insight that Haidt gives us into why some people are liberal while others are conservative or libertarian is that a combination of nature and nurture has predisposed some people to build their morality primarily on just three core principles -- care, liberty, and fairness -- while predisposing other people to build their morality on six principles -- care, liberty, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity -- and still others to build their morality on a single principle -- liberty. As I'm sure you've guessed, those in the first group become liberals, those in the second group become conservatives, and those in the third group become libertarians. This is certainly an important insight; but I was hoping for more. For example, I wish Haidt had given us a bit more insight into how the three liberal values shape liberal policy positions, how the six conservative values shape conservative policy positions, and how the lone libertarian value shapes libertarian policy positions. He did briefly discuss some of the differences between liberal, conservative, and libertarian views of the economy; but he didn't really have all that much to say about the myriad other policy issues that liberals, conservatives, and libertarians routinely fight over -- e.g. abortion, equal pay, gay marriage, affirmative action, collective bargaining, voter access, immigration reform, taxes, entitlements, gun control, civil liberties, criminal justice, drug laws, military spending, the conduct of foreign policy, the appropriate use of military force, etc. Haidt's theory does provide a framework that can help us to understand why liberals, conservatives, and libertarians might take different positions on these issues; but he doesn't spell it out for us issue by issue. I really wish he had. I think it would have been very useful, and would have made his excellent book even better.
Second, while I admired his efforts to treat liberals, conservatives, and libertarians with equal respect, and not to treat conservatism as if it were some sort of mental disorder (as many political psychologists are wont to do), I ultimately felt that he went a little too far in his efforts to be "fair and balanced", and ended up glossing over some of the biggest moral failings on the right (e.g. sexism, racism, homophobia, religious bigotry, jingoism, xenophobia, demagoguery, anti-intellectualism, and science denialism) in the interest of portraying conservative values as being just as legitimate as liberal values. Besides, the conservatism that Haidt found worthy of praise was old-fashioned Tory conservatism -- a cautious, genteel, intellectual form of conservatism based on the ideals of serious thinkers like Edmund Burke, who mainly just wanted to preserve society against the sort of chaos that often accompanies radical change -- which bears little resemblance to the "red meat" conservatism that prevails on the American right today. So, when Haidt advises us to pay attention to what conservatives have to teach us about what it takes to maintain a healthy, functioning society, he's really talking about old-school conservative intellectuals of the center-right, like George Will and Colin Powell, not the dogmatic culture warriors of the far-right, like Rush Limbaugh and Sarah Palin. In fact, Haidt has relatively little to say about the conservatism represented by the evangelical Religious Right or the Tea Party movement, where ideological zeal often manifests itself as an ugly form of demagoguery. It's almost as if he wants to sweep this under the rug so he can sell the idea that mutually respectful civil discourse and bipartisanship are actually possible in this day and age. I think this book would have been better if Haidt had stuck to trying to explain partisanship rather than trying to find a cure for it.
And third, although I found Haidt's argument quite compelling, there are certain aspects of it that might alienate some readers, causing them to simply reject Haidt's conclusions out of hand without much critical thought. The last thing I would ever want to do in a classroom is to alienate any of my students so they stop listening to what I have to teach. So I'm more than a little reluctant to assign a highly controversial text that many students will likely have a knee-jerk reaction against. Why might this book be controversial? For one thing, Haidt's theory draws heavily on evolutionary psychology, which is rejected by many on both the right and the left. Many progressives decry evolutionary psychology as "politically incorrect" because it argues that much of human behavior -- including such things as gender differences, xenophobia, and aggression -- may be innate parts of human nature that can never be changed by social engineering. Many conservatives, on the other hand, reject evolutionary psychology because they don't believe in Darwinian evolution at all. So Haidt's use of evolutionary psychology may be enough to cause some readers to reject his argument outright. In addition to this, he bases much of his argument on the evolutionary principle of "group selection" -- a theory that has been pretty firmly rejected by biologists for several decades now, but which Haidt argues ought to be reconsidered. But perhaps the most controversial part of Haidt's argument is his treatment of religion. Haidt himself is an atheist; so he makes no pretense of actually believing that any religion is "true". He looks at religion purely from a psychological and sociological perspective in an attempt to figure out what function religion has played in human society throughout history. Yet he forcefully rejects the anti-religious fervor of the so-called "New Atheism" popularized over the past decade by Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and the late Christopher Hitchens, among others, with its assertion that religion is a dangerous "meme" -- a "virus of the mind" -- that is inherently harmful to human wellbeing. Haidt devotes an entire chapter to refuting the New Atheists' claims about religion, arguing that religion has actually been a force for good in the world which serves to strengthen social bonds and discourage individual selfishness, and that religion is actually a product of natural selection. So, his treatment of religion is unlikely to win Haidt any friends from among either the devoutly religious or the fervently irreligious. And, on top of all this, Haidt defends conservative values that many liberals find abhorrent, arguing that they are just as vital to the wellbeing of society as are liberal values. So, suffice it to say that this iconoclastic book is liable to alienate many different people for many different reasons. Haidt butchers a lot of sacred cows in these pages. So, I suspect that plenty of folks will simply reject everything that he has to say out of hand. While I am an advocate of open-minded critical inquiry, I'm also a pragmatist. I know that many of my students are not going to be as open-minded as I would like them to be; so, as an educator, I have to be sensitive to this if I want to help them learn. A little controversy in the classroom can be healthy; but too much can derail the entire lesson plan. I wouldn't want the class to get sidetracked by debates over tangential issues that are not directly relevant to the subject I'm trying to teach. So, if I were to teach a course on political psychology, I would be a bit hesitant to use this book as the main text for fear that students would get too distracted by some of its more controversial elements. However, I would consider using this book as a supplemental text, and would definitely put it on the recommended readings list.
Anyway, these three problems are relatively minor, and do not detract from the overall quality of the book. They simply leave me ever-so-slightly dissatisfied, perhaps because my expectations were unreasonably high. I would certainly recommend Haidt's book. I really do feel that it deserves to be read and talked about. There's no doubt in my mind that it deserves a five-star rating. But I'm afraid that the five stars I give it will have to come with an asterisk.
Namafe
4,0 von 5 Sternen
Thought provoking book, but don't get too lured
Rezension aus den Vereinigten Staaten vom 21. April 2012
5/2/12: Okkaaayyy, I decided to give my original, rather negative review a complete overhaul, take out the cynicism and bitterness after all, and bump it up from three to four stars. Not so much because I now believe that my initial critique is invalid, but because I realized that this book somehow does what Haidt say's his intention is, it did help me strive for more understanding, patience, and tolerance.
It did so because it had me thinking, reasoning, debating, and yes, evolving for weeks. I am not quite sure if that is part of Haidts intention, even if he says so. I perceived the book more as an appeal to stop thinking too much and trust my instincts instead (like in: to dumb down somewhat), and that's my main problem with this book. Putting more trust in ones instincts might be a good advice in general (as in being less cerebral and getting some stuff done instead), yet I don't think it is a good idea when it comes to politics. Not with all the sound bites, over promises, scare tactics and mud slinging in nowadays politics that might corrupt our instincts.
About the book: Haidt tries to explain why conservatism is more appealing to the broader audience then liberalism. Conservatism is more in tune with emotions and intuition (the elephant part of our human personalities), while liberals address thought and reason (the elephants rider). But because, according to Haidt, the rider doesn't have control over the elephant, and the riders only purpose is to help the elephant justify his actions (like a PR agent), liberals have a harder time to get their messages across. He also claims that conservatism is based on a broader spectrum of morality than liberalism, by putting more emphasis on motions like loyalty, authority, and sanctity, not just 'do no harm' and fairness. He also points out how humans are part chimp, part bee, and that we thrive within groups (beehives), and put personal interests aside for the sake of the group, which can result in extraordinary achievements. Conservatism lines up with this tribal instinct by promoting strong binds to family, community (church), and country (patriotism).
Haidt explains how he discovered that conservatives are 'on to something', because they tend to be happier with life and 'get more stuff done'. He thinks that left and right balance each other out for the greater good, that both sides should show more tolerance and respect, and that fundamentally both sides are not that different in their goals and values as it seems.
Here is where I disagree:
Conservatives are generally happier and get more stuff done, Haidt says. Conservatives know how to activate the beehive switch, which turns selfishness into groupishness, enabling humans to achieve great things. I think he sneaks in a bit of judgement here. Beehives are good and useful, but in my opinion the whole argument sounds less pleasant if you replace the beehive with an anthill or termite colony. Germans made that discovery after world war II. Post war german historians came to the conclusion that german citizens didn't exercise their moral responsibilities to take a more critical look at their 'beehive', turning a blind eye for the sake of self serving groupishness. So I believe it is the responsibility of each and every individual to make sure that the 'beehive' doesn't turn into a wasp nest. Because our national hive is wide spanning and complex, we need the help of the rider to make such assessments.
Haidts elephant/rider analogy sounds convincing at first glance, but it doesn't make all that much sense to me on second thought. If the riders only job is to act as a PR agency for the elephant, with the only purpose to justify any kind of action the elephant takes, but otherwise having no say in were the elephant goes, than what's in it for the rider?? If an an elephants strength and power cannot be directed and channeled in any meaningful way, it is pretty much useless to the rider, so why would he bother? I believe Haidt got it wrong here. Also, elephants in the wilderness don't look for a rider, why would they? Unless they find a good reason, but elephants don't reason, riders do. Riders have the ability to foresee the potential advantage in domesticating an elephant. Riders have imagination, elephants don't.
If an elephant rider team is to be of any use or purpose, one of them has to take the lead and be in control, and how can that not be the rider?
But here is my biggest complaint: I don't think you can have a multiset of different rules or moralities without having a master rule. In Christianity most people would agree that to be the Golden Rule ('do upon others...', or Do No Harm/Fairness). Non religious people might rather think of Kant's categorial imperative. Haidt is saying it is not only tolerable but also justified to apply different sets of moralities in any given circumstance, I respectfully disagree with that. For rules or moralities to serve any kind of purpose or meaning, you need a reference point (like true North on a compass), hence the name Golden Rule. So while loyalty, authority, sanctity as moralities are of value no doubt (like West, South and East on the compass), they only retain their value as long as they don't breach the Master Rule/Golden Rule (or can be crosschecked against true North). How else would one ever claim moral integrity? Impossible if one keeps contradicting themselves, by following one of the rules, while in doing so breaking another.
It's like adhering to the speed limit while running a red light.
A good example for such a double standard would be somebody to expect their preschooler to master behavior skills like sharing, waiting your turn, looking out for others, apologizing, not to bully or hit; and than cry out in outrage when the president considers to offer an apology to foreign nations for past controversies (like in offering the olive branch). If he did so or not, or if he had a reason to do so or not is besides the point, its about moral conduct, and consistency thereof. The same applies to 'historical car crashes' like communism, the French revolution (fought in the name of reason), or the crusades, the Inquisition, and the 30 year war (fought in the name of religion), just to name a few. In none of these events True North (the Golden Rule, Do No Harm/Fairness) was being tracked, it was never really about reason or religion, but rather about power and control.
In my opinion, running red lights at a reasonable speed is not too big of a deal with only 3 cars in town, but becomes a recipe for disaster with 7 billion cars (or elephants) all over the place. And some nukes too boot, and who knows how long we are able too keep them out of angry elephant's (as in alienated nations) trunks? Do we really want to try to find out? Yes, some elephants undeniably seem to suffer from a form of 'mad cow disease', and hopefully can be taken out the way Bin Laden was handled, instead of spooking the whole herd into a stampede (think 'the axis of evil').
How to keep families, communities or nations together without conservative impulses? I think there are many cultural impulses that are worth conserving but are not controversial; take traditions like Thanks Giving or Christmas for example, or the sports we play, or music, from enjoying geographic landmarks like national parks or mountain ranges to the skyline of NYC, all the way to Disney Land, Coca Cola and Apple. The list is endless. There is so much to love about America, and to be proud of as an American. But I think wether or not we are the shining beacon on the hill is not on us to decide, it's on the rest of the world to judge that. To put it another way: A little more leading by example, less of 'do as I say, not as I do'.
As for our tribal instincts I would suggest that elephants in need of a well deserved break from the rider could go to a football game and yell and howl all they want to support their team, or find a similar outlet of that nature. But when it comes to politics in the domestic or - even more important - the international arena, one should make sure to bring a well trained, good natured elephant. And whoever we send there by our vote should be able to handle their elephant well (and know how to read traffic lights). Only then the rider can do his real job and engage in a meaningful debate.
Bottom line: When it comes to politics, Haidt, in essence, is asking for more of the same, just at a lower volume. That is a good start, but it leaves me dissatisfied. After listening to a book introduction on NPR, I was expecting more. He basically tells us, look, it is what it is, let's all be nice, and move on. I wish he would have provided some inspiration what COULD be achieved if all of us would try to become more of an 'elephant whisperer', not only in our personal lives, but on a global scale. People, families, communities, governments, nations, all those entities are elephants. Haidt misses out on that opportunity.
But than again, if lowering the volume helps calming down spooked elephants, so the rider gets to spend less time finding excuses for the good beast, and more time for some serious soul searching, while blending out the sound bites and mud slinging, than maybe that's all that can be asked for.
It did so because it had me thinking, reasoning, debating, and yes, evolving for weeks. I am not quite sure if that is part of Haidts intention, even if he says so. I perceived the book more as an appeal to stop thinking too much and trust my instincts instead (like in: to dumb down somewhat), and that's my main problem with this book. Putting more trust in ones instincts might be a good advice in general (as in being less cerebral and getting some stuff done instead), yet I don't think it is a good idea when it comes to politics. Not with all the sound bites, over promises, scare tactics and mud slinging in nowadays politics that might corrupt our instincts.
About the book: Haidt tries to explain why conservatism is more appealing to the broader audience then liberalism. Conservatism is more in tune with emotions and intuition (the elephant part of our human personalities), while liberals address thought and reason (the elephants rider). But because, according to Haidt, the rider doesn't have control over the elephant, and the riders only purpose is to help the elephant justify his actions (like a PR agent), liberals have a harder time to get their messages across. He also claims that conservatism is based on a broader spectrum of morality than liberalism, by putting more emphasis on motions like loyalty, authority, and sanctity, not just 'do no harm' and fairness. He also points out how humans are part chimp, part bee, and that we thrive within groups (beehives), and put personal interests aside for the sake of the group, which can result in extraordinary achievements. Conservatism lines up with this tribal instinct by promoting strong binds to family, community (church), and country (patriotism).
Haidt explains how he discovered that conservatives are 'on to something', because they tend to be happier with life and 'get more stuff done'. He thinks that left and right balance each other out for the greater good, that both sides should show more tolerance and respect, and that fundamentally both sides are not that different in their goals and values as it seems.
Here is where I disagree:
Conservatives are generally happier and get more stuff done, Haidt says. Conservatives know how to activate the beehive switch, which turns selfishness into groupishness, enabling humans to achieve great things. I think he sneaks in a bit of judgement here. Beehives are good and useful, but in my opinion the whole argument sounds less pleasant if you replace the beehive with an anthill or termite colony. Germans made that discovery after world war II. Post war german historians came to the conclusion that german citizens didn't exercise their moral responsibilities to take a more critical look at their 'beehive', turning a blind eye for the sake of self serving groupishness. So I believe it is the responsibility of each and every individual to make sure that the 'beehive' doesn't turn into a wasp nest. Because our national hive is wide spanning and complex, we need the help of the rider to make such assessments.
Haidts elephant/rider analogy sounds convincing at first glance, but it doesn't make all that much sense to me on second thought. If the riders only job is to act as a PR agency for the elephant, with the only purpose to justify any kind of action the elephant takes, but otherwise having no say in were the elephant goes, than what's in it for the rider?? If an an elephants strength and power cannot be directed and channeled in any meaningful way, it is pretty much useless to the rider, so why would he bother? I believe Haidt got it wrong here. Also, elephants in the wilderness don't look for a rider, why would they? Unless they find a good reason, but elephants don't reason, riders do. Riders have the ability to foresee the potential advantage in domesticating an elephant. Riders have imagination, elephants don't.
If an elephant rider team is to be of any use or purpose, one of them has to take the lead and be in control, and how can that not be the rider?
But here is my biggest complaint: I don't think you can have a multiset of different rules or moralities without having a master rule. In Christianity most people would agree that to be the Golden Rule ('do upon others...', or Do No Harm/Fairness). Non religious people might rather think of Kant's categorial imperative. Haidt is saying it is not only tolerable but also justified to apply different sets of moralities in any given circumstance, I respectfully disagree with that. For rules or moralities to serve any kind of purpose or meaning, you need a reference point (like true North on a compass), hence the name Golden Rule. So while loyalty, authority, sanctity as moralities are of value no doubt (like West, South and East on the compass), they only retain their value as long as they don't breach the Master Rule/Golden Rule (or can be crosschecked against true North). How else would one ever claim moral integrity? Impossible if one keeps contradicting themselves, by following one of the rules, while in doing so breaking another.
It's like adhering to the speed limit while running a red light.
A good example for such a double standard would be somebody to expect their preschooler to master behavior skills like sharing, waiting your turn, looking out for others, apologizing, not to bully or hit; and than cry out in outrage when the president considers to offer an apology to foreign nations for past controversies (like in offering the olive branch). If he did so or not, or if he had a reason to do so or not is besides the point, its about moral conduct, and consistency thereof. The same applies to 'historical car crashes' like communism, the French revolution (fought in the name of reason), or the crusades, the Inquisition, and the 30 year war (fought in the name of religion), just to name a few. In none of these events True North (the Golden Rule, Do No Harm/Fairness) was being tracked, it was never really about reason or religion, but rather about power and control.
In my opinion, running red lights at a reasonable speed is not too big of a deal with only 3 cars in town, but becomes a recipe for disaster with 7 billion cars (or elephants) all over the place. And some nukes too boot, and who knows how long we are able too keep them out of angry elephant's (as in alienated nations) trunks? Do we really want to try to find out? Yes, some elephants undeniably seem to suffer from a form of 'mad cow disease', and hopefully can be taken out the way Bin Laden was handled, instead of spooking the whole herd into a stampede (think 'the axis of evil').
How to keep families, communities or nations together without conservative impulses? I think there are many cultural impulses that are worth conserving but are not controversial; take traditions like Thanks Giving or Christmas for example, or the sports we play, or music, from enjoying geographic landmarks like national parks or mountain ranges to the skyline of NYC, all the way to Disney Land, Coca Cola and Apple. The list is endless. There is so much to love about America, and to be proud of as an American. But I think wether or not we are the shining beacon on the hill is not on us to decide, it's on the rest of the world to judge that. To put it another way: A little more leading by example, less of 'do as I say, not as I do'.
As for our tribal instincts I would suggest that elephants in need of a well deserved break from the rider could go to a football game and yell and howl all they want to support their team, or find a similar outlet of that nature. But when it comes to politics in the domestic or - even more important - the international arena, one should make sure to bring a well trained, good natured elephant. And whoever we send there by our vote should be able to handle their elephant well (and know how to read traffic lights). Only then the rider can do his real job and engage in a meaningful debate.
Bottom line: When it comes to politics, Haidt, in essence, is asking for more of the same, just at a lower volume. That is a good start, but it leaves me dissatisfied. After listening to a book introduction on NPR, I was expecting more. He basically tells us, look, it is what it is, let's all be nice, and move on. I wish he would have provided some inspiration what COULD be achieved if all of us would try to become more of an 'elephant whisperer', not only in our personal lives, but on a global scale. People, families, communities, governments, nations, all those entities are elephants. Haidt misses out on that opportunity.
But than again, if lowering the volume helps calming down spooked elephants, so the rider gets to spend less time finding excuses for the good beast, and more time for some serious soul searching, while blending out the sound bites and mud slinging, than maybe that's all that can be asked for.
N. Andreassen
2,0 von 5 Sternen
Interesting tools, disciminately used, lead to numerous false or faulty conclusions
Rezension aus den Vereinigten Staaten vom 14. Februar 2017
Roughly the first one-third of this book I found compelling: Haidt argues that our moral decisions are based on quick, gut reactions and that our arguments and rationales about our ethics come later, essentially as apologetics. I’ve long believed such is the case and enjoyed seeing that offered up here as “science.” Haidt also presents intellectual tools that I will definitely be using; and that alone makes this book worth perusal (the acronym "WEIRD" was new to me abd is a gem). However, the down side is huge: Haidt’s examples of his theories are difficult to believe, and therefore his conclusions, in particular, can’t stand scrutiny.
To begin with, Haidt divides ethics into three kinds, which he labels “autonomy morals,” “community morals,” and “divinity morals.” He ventures to explain how these differ and yet all have validity, as well that how they’re seen as relatively more or less important to different cultures and communities. So far, so good: that model offers a way of discussing morality with others—although, since it’s also solidly relativistic, it’s not likely to open many channels to hard-line zealots. Haidt’s model is, in other words, more useful for talking about people, especially with intellectuals, than it is for talking with people, especially those whose values differ from one's own. And yet it’s that bridging of the polarities for which Haidt intends this book to be useful. Strike one.
Following the three types of morals, Haidt introduces six “flavors” that theoretically trigger moral responses from people. Among these are a concern for caring/nurturing versus doing others harm; and a deference to authority versus a concern for self-actualization. These six categories (I’ve only listed two) seem far less useful tools to me and, more importantly, I found myself balking at Haidt’s poor attempts to exemplify them. By the middle of this book, I was reading with discomfort and agitation, feelings which I associate with being handed insufficient evidence, with the misinterpretation of data, and with bad conclusions. Accordingly, I am persuaded that Haidt is doing exactly what, in this book, he warns us other researchers do: validate their own preconceptions, based on have skewed their research. Such, at any rate, is my gut reaction.
Haidt identifies himself as a Liberal politically, yet shows little or no understanding of liberal thinking—which is interesting, but also extremely disturbing: whatever happened to “Know thyself”? He insists here that Liberals are single-mindedly concerned with the caring vs. avoiding harm trigger and that they all but ignore both “community morals” and “divinity morals.” Haidt is wrong about this, which is why he can’t come to grips with the Liberal mind (including, presumably, his own mind). He asks why Liberals—who, in his view, essentially worship individual autonomy—can’t understand or appreciate, e.g., an enterprising businessman’s strong desire for material wealth as a clear expression of that enterprising businessman’s need for more personal autonomy. Haidt can’t answer that question precisely because he considers Liberal morality one-dimensional. His question can, however, be answered, simply and easily, by assuming instead that Liberals are human beings who possess both “community morals” and “divinity morals” in abundance. From that more logical perspective, a liberal might see a “greedy businessman” as “unfair,” not simply to the autonomy of a few other individuals, but rather to Humanity as a whole, and even the planet as a whole—that is, “unfair” based on “community morals” and on “divinity morals” rather than 100% on “autonomy morals." Liberals do in fact also have “divinity morals,” even ift Haidt can’t see them. Since he's a social conservative (i.e. and e.g., he's a published author with a Ph.D.) Haidt evidently recognizes “divinity morals” only if they're housed within some firmly established (big R) Religion. Haidt thus can't’t speak to, for instance, the “divinity” of the endangered Monarch butterfly as an element of perceived “Creation” or “Nature” and as evidence, therefore, of an awareness of all things containing a spark of the divine, for instance. To come at this point from another angle, it’s equally valid to ask why the “Conservative” has no desire to “conserve” an endangered species—but Haidt doesn’t ask the alternative question, and thus flops. The whole picture, in short, is far more complex than Haidt presents it here; and his answers don’t satisfy because he fails to explicate the whole. Notice, please, that I’m not arguing the “rightness” or “wrongness” of either the Liberal or the Conservative position; I’m simply arguing that Haidt evidently considers “Liberals” less complicated than are “Conservatives” and that this misapprehension explains most of his unsolved dilemmas.
Haidt’s research is mostly questionnaire based, but his questions appear, to me, transparent in their aims and also to encourage self-fulfillment of his prophesies. (Granted, he doesn’t offer his entire research instrument here, so it’s possible that the questions he chose to include in this book are simply the most obvious.) For one example, Haidt asked participants whether they’d be willing to stick an empty syringe needle into a child’s arm, in exchange for various, increasing sums of money. Haidt presumes in this case that participants who said they wouldn't stick the hypothetical hypo were (1) telling the truth (but I’ll set that point aside as ubiquitous); (2) reacting to the question on the basis of a Liberal’s care/harm trigger—that is, they were all responding to the overriding concern he assumes that Liberals share for the welfare of a child, based on 100% "autonomy morals” thinking; and (3) liable to be motivated by money. None of those assumptions are entirely valid.
Speaking for myself, for example, while I felt that I would not stick in the hypo, I’m well aware that (1) money has never been an especially big motivator for me—in fact, the larger the sum offered, the less likely I’d be to “give in” because the larger the sum offered, the more I’d doubt my motives and so become increasingly hesitant; and (2) my initial or gut reaction to the question was that I’m simply not qualified to use the needle (that is, in retrospect, I know ack the education and experience—I’ve never stuck a needle into anyone before) so my first concern was apparently that I lack the authority to use the needle: I wouldn’t do it, because I don’t know how—and thus it’s clear to me, in retrospect, that my reaction sprang, not from a concern for the welfare of a hypothetical child, but my from basic respect for authority: I felt unwilling to risk taking onto myself the authority I should defer to qualified medical practitioners. (Again, this isn’t a gut response now but an analysis of a gut response). In short, even though I, like Haidt claims to be, am relatively liberal socially and politically, I’m responding in this case to “community morals” rather than to the “autonomy morals” that Haidt asserts must obsess me; whereas he can see “deference to authority” active only in, for instance, the military. I in fact react to in this particular case of, ahem, playing doctor. Granted, yes, I do also experience that liberal desire to protect the imaginary child’s autonomy and to see it remaining unharmed. But my first perceived reaction was an unwillingness to elevate myself to a status—that of a practitioner—which I hadn’t earned and didn’t deserve. In sum, I came away from this single example feeling that Haidt's morals model excludes me, or my niche, from further consideration. And, since I’m a human being, that exclusion rankled. Multiply that example by the hundred more in the book, and you get the flavor of it: this book’s a bulldozer, forcefully pushing ideas at us.
A final example: Haidt compares words used commonly in Unitarian sermons (which he calls “Liberal” sermons) to words found more often in “conservative,” Southern Baptist sermons. Not surprisingly, he again finds contrasts that reflect a Liberal concern for nurturing and caring versus conservative concerns for, e.g., justice. However, Haidt is wrong: (1) Parishioners don’t write the sermons they hear, so the words of a sermon don’t necessarily reflect a congregation’s morals or concerns. In fact, a sermon might be written so as to challenge to a congregation’s normal concerns, i.e., "for its own good." (2) Haidt ignores parishioners’ motives for attending church in the first place! People go to church to find community, right? So it necessarily follows that Liberals attending Unitarian churches are responding to the very same “community morals” that Haidt denies they possess, which once again makes him wrong. And, of course, at least some Unitarians might attend church to feel closer to their conception of God, which necessitates that some Unitarians must also possess at least some small measure of “divinity morals.” In summary, anyone attending any church anywhere in America is, in fact, responding to “community morals,” and to “divinity morals” as well. Any person who truly lacked bot would be far more likely not go to church at all, but to stay at home doing something far more solipsistic. Thus, the “two types of sermons” comparison doesn’t uphold Haidt’s thesis; and furthermore, (3) millions of people don’t go to any church (or temple, etc.) and yet still feel a profound spiritual connectedness to things, which motivates their behaviors in highly significant ways. Churches, per se, in the final analysis, don’t indicate “divinity morals” so much as they do an awareness of established authority; and moreover, one can argue that the designation “divinity” is a misnomer here to begin with, intended to skew the results in favor of particular theologies. Again, I’m not arguing for or against an “established” religion. I’m simply saying that Haidt’s analysis is prejudicial and too narrow. In fact, the “Liberal” Haidt describes in this book—a person devoid of both feelings of external grandeur and mystery, and who doesn’t place much value on a shared community, is not a very common type of human animal; whereas Liberals, let’s face it, are fairly common.
To begin with, Haidt divides ethics into three kinds, which he labels “autonomy morals,” “community morals,” and “divinity morals.” He ventures to explain how these differ and yet all have validity, as well that how they’re seen as relatively more or less important to different cultures and communities. So far, so good: that model offers a way of discussing morality with others—although, since it’s also solidly relativistic, it’s not likely to open many channels to hard-line zealots. Haidt’s model is, in other words, more useful for talking about people, especially with intellectuals, than it is for talking with people, especially those whose values differ from one's own. And yet it’s that bridging of the polarities for which Haidt intends this book to be useful. Strike one.
Following the three types of morals, Haidt introduces six “flavors” that theoretically trigger moral responses from people. Among these are a concern for caring/nurturing versus doing others harm; and a deference to authority versus a concern for self-actualization. These six categories (I’ve only listed two) seem far less useful tools to me and, more importantly, I found myself balking at Haidt’s poor attempts to exemplify them. By the middle of this book, I was reading with discomfort and agitation, feelings which I associate with being handed insufficient evidence, with the misinterpretation of data, and with bad conclusions. Accordingly, I am persuaded that Haidt is doing exactly what, in this book, he warns us other researchers do: validate their own preconceptions, based on have skewed their research. Such, at any rate, is my gut reaction.
Haidt identifies himself as a Liberal politically, yet shows little or no understanding of liberal thinking—which is interesting, but also extremely disturbing: whatever happened to “Know thyself”? He insists here that Liberals are single-mindedly concerned with the caring vs. avoiding harm trigger and that they all but ignore both “community morals” and “divinity morals.” Haidt is wrong about this, which is why he can’t come to grips with the Liberal mind (including, presumably, his own mind). He asks why Liberals—who, in his view, essentially worship individual autonomy—can’t understand or appreciate, e.g., an enterprising businessman’s strong desire for material wealth as a clear expression of that enterprising businessman’s need for more personal autonomy. Haidt can’t answer that question precisely because he considers Liberal morality one-dimensional. His question can, however, be answered, simply and easily, by assuming instead that Liberals are human beings who possess both “community morals” and “divinity morals” in abundance. From that more logical perspective, a liberal might see a “greedy businessman” as “unfair,” not simply to the autonomy of a few other individuals, but rather to Humanity as a whole, and even the planet as a whole—that is, “unfair” based on “community morals” and on “divinity morals” rather than 100% on “autonomy morals." Liberals do in fact also have “divinity morals,” even ift Haidt can’t see them. Since he's a social conservative (i.e. and e.g., he's a published author with a Ph.D.) Haidt evidently recognizes “divinity morals” only if they're housed within some firmly established (big R) Religion. Haidt thus can't’t speak to, for instance, the “divinity” of the endangered Monarch butterfly as an element of perceived “Creation” or “Nature” and as evidence, therefore, of an awareness of all things containing a spark of the divine, for instance. To come at this point from another angle, it’s equally valid to ask why the “Conservative” has no desire to “conserve” an endangered species—but Haidt doesn’t ask the alternative question, and thus flops. The whole picture, in short, is far more complex than Haidt presents it here; and his answers don’t satisfy because he fails to explicate the whole. Notice, please, that I’m not arguing the “rightness” or “wrongness” of either the Liberal or the Conservative position; I’m simply arguing that Haidt evidently considers “Liberals” less complicated than are “Conservatives” and that this misapprehension explains most of his unsolved dilemmas.
Haidt’s research is mostly questionnaire based, but his questions appear, to me, transparent in their aims and also to encourage self-fulfillment of his prophesies. (Granted, he doesn’t offer his entire research instrument here, so it’s possible that the questions he chose to include in this book are simply the most obvious.) For one example, Haidt asked participants whether they’d be willing to stick an empty syringe needle into a child’s arm, in exchange for various, increasing sums of money. Haidt presumes in this case that participants who said they wouldn't stick the hypothetical hypo were (1) telling the truth (but I’ll set that point aside as ubiquitous); (2) reacting to the question on the basis of a Liberal’s care/harm trigger—that is, they were all responding to the overriding concern he assumes that Liberals share for the welfare of a child, based on 100% "autonomy morals” thinking; and (3) liable to be motivated by money. None of those assumptions are entirely valid.
Speaking for myself, for example, while I felt that I would not stick in the hypo, I’m well aware that (1) money has never been an especially big motivator for me—in fact, the larger the sum offered, the less likely I’d be to “give in” because the larger the sum offered, the more I’d doubt my motives and so become increasingly hesitant; and (2) my initial or gut reaction to the question was that I’m simply not qualified to use the needle (that is, in retrospect, I know ack the education and experience—I’ve never stuck a needle into anyone before) so my first concern was apparently that I lack the authority to use the needle: I wouldn’t do it, because I don’t know how—and thus it’s clear to me, in retrospect, that my reaction sprang, not from a concern for the welfare of a hypothetical child, but my from basic respect for authority: I felt unwilling to risk taking onto myself the authority I should defer to qualified medical practitioners. (Again, this isn’t a gut response now but an analysis of a gut response). In short, even though I, like Haidt claims to be, am relatively liberal socially and politically, I’m responding in this case to “community morals” rather than to the “autonomy morals” that Haidt asserts must obsess me; whereas he can see “deference to authority” active only in, for instance, the military. I in fact react to in this particular case of, ahem, playing doctor. Granted, yes, I do also experience that liberal desire to protect the imaginary child’s autonomy and to see it remaining unharmed. But my first perceived reaction was an unwillingness to elevate myself to a status—that of a practitioner—which I hadn’t earned and didn’t deserve. In sum, I came away from this single example feeling that Haidt's morals model excludes me, or my niche, from further consideration. And, since I’m a human being, that exclusion rankled. Multiply that example by the hundred more in the book, and you get the flavor of it: this book’s a bulldozer, forcefully pushing ideas at us.
A final example: Haidt compares words used commonly in Unitarian sermons (which he calls “Liberal” sermons) to words found more often in “conservative,” Southern Baptist sermons. Not surprisingly, he again finds contrasts that reflect a Liberal concern for nurturing and caring versus conservative concerns for, e.g., justice. However, Haidt is wrong: (1) Parishioners don’t write the sermons they hear, so the words of a sermon don’t necessarily reflect a congregation’s morals or concerns. In fact, a sermon might be written so as to challenge to a congregation’s normal concerns, i.e., "for its own good." (2) Haidt ignores parishioners’ motives for attending church in the first place! People go to church to find community, right? So it necessarily follows that Liberals attending Unitarian churches are responding to the very same “community morals” that Haidt denies they possess, which once again makes him wrong. And, of course, at least some Unitarians might attend church to feel closer to their conception of God, which necessitates that some Unitarians must also possess at least some small measure of “divinity morals.” In summary, anyone attending any church anywhere in America is, in fact, responding to “community morals,” and to “divinity morals” as well. Any person who truly lacked bot would be far more likely not go to church at all, but to stay at home doing something far more solipsistic. Thus, the “two types of sermons” comparison doesn’t uphold Haidt’s thesis; and furthermore, (3) millions of people don’t go to any church (or temple, etc.) and yet still feel a profound spiritual connectedness to things, which motivates their behaviors in highly significant ways. Churches, per se, in the final analysis, don’t indicate “divinity morals” so much as they do an awareness of established authority; and moreover, one can argue that the designation “divinity” is a misnomer here to begin with, intended to skew the results in favor of particular theologies. Again, I’m not arguing for or against an “established” religion. I’m simply saying that Haidt’s analysis is prejudicial and too narrow. In fact, the “Liberal” Haidt describes in this book—a person devoid of both feelings of external grandeur and mystery, and who doesn’t place much value on a shared community, is not a very common type of human animal; whereas Liberals, let’s face it, are fairly common.
Olivier F.
5,0 von 5 Sternen
Une belle découverte
Rezension aus Frankreich vom 18. Oktober 2023
J’avais commencé à écouter la version audible de cet ouvrage. Son écoute m’a passionnée par l’exposé de la démarche de ce scientifique qui partage aussi ses doutes, ses succès, ses échecs, ses découvertes. Deux dimensions dans cet ouvrage: sur le contenu et sur la vie intellectuelle de son auteur de son intérêt pour la philosophie à son doctorat, ses premiers postes de chercheurs, ses collaborations internationales, etc. Avec une rare authenticité et presque un « roman policier » ou l’auteur nous amène à rechercher les indices (ici des évidences expérimentales) pour découvrir la vérité scientifique.
Robert Jacoby
3,0 von 5 Sternen
Wide-ranging if lopsided view of myopic (left-right dichotomy) behaviors and thinking
Rezension aus den Vereinigten Staaten vom 29. August 2021
Haidt has an interesting model (moral foundations theory) and explains and expounds its rightness here. If you believe that all humans share only six moral foundations and that the world is divided pretty much into liberals and conservatives, then this model can work for you. If you believe morality is more nuanced (Has Haidt really never heard of The Political Compass? Does he really not know that Independents in the U.S. are the largest political voting block, outnumbering both Democrats and Republicans?), well... The left-right dichotomy is a tired trope, and the political spectrum is vastly more complicated than that in America. Does Haidt lump people into two polar opposite groups to better compare and contrast? Perhaps. Perhaps he's being purposefully provocative, too. The use of "good people" in the book title is never explained, so I'm still wondering who Haidt thinks are "good people." Like me, you might find yourself while reading this book often scratching your head with myriad "What about?"-isms.
A foundational (pun intended) problem with Haidt and the way he thinks is that he's a hardcore liberal. It's important that he doesn't hide who he is, and I'm grateful for that; he describes himself and fellow professors this way: "All five of us were politically liberal, yet we shared the same concern about the way our liberal field approached political psychology. The goal of so much research was to explain what was wrong with conservatives." (p. 185) This is important for readers to understand Haidt's biases in everything he writes. At best, Haidt's statement is an adolescent and malformed view of the world; at worst, you're using your limited and lopsided view of the world to poison minds and society. Unfortunately, it's who Haidt is, and it colors everything he writes about and interprets. Later on in the book he lets his guard down even more, and it's both funny and perverse, to me, because by the end of the book he still doesn't recognize his biases.
There's a ton of interesting tidbits to be picked up while reading the book:
Haidt on conservative out-group compassion: "It [conservative caring] is not universalist; it is more local, and blended with loyalty." (p. 158). This claim strikes me as false and actually misleading. Just take a look at any number of Christian outreach organizations worldwide doing outreach outside of their communities and states and countries.
"Devout Chrisitans are often lampooned by secular liberals as uptight, pleasure-fearing prudes." (p. 176). Here and elsewhere Haidt seems to me to be the sneaky, devilsih kid with the stick poking at the lion's cage and tittering about it. And yet informed people understand: "Why Church Attendees have the Best Sex of Any Demographic in the U.S." (Peter Haas, Feb. 3, 2015, citing a population study by the Population Research Center at the University of Chicago)
In his research Haidt found that conservatives have a broader moral sense than liberals. In other words, conservatives have moral concerns that liberals do not recognize as moral concerns (p. 179). That explains a lot, particularly in life-and-death situations such as abortion and euthanasia.
Republicans understand moral psychology; Democrats don't. (p. 181)
Increase similarity, not diversity (p. 277). I was shocked he suggested this.
Other interesting links to Haidt's research include:
Conservatives are less likely than liberals to compromise their morals (Laber-Warren, Unconscious Reactions Separate Liberals and Conservatives, Scientific American, Sept. 1, 2012)
Liberals are more likely than conservatives to exaggerate the differences between them (Graham, Nosek, Haidt. The Moral Stereotypes of Liberals and Conservatives: Exaggeration of Differences across the Political Spectrum, PLOS One, Dec. 12, 2012)
Religion is a team sport chapter. His take on suicide bombers fails to convince. His In Sum section grossly misrepresents: "You [taking a "belonging" and Darwinian approach] see that religious practices have been binding our ancestors into groups for tens of thousands of years. That binding usually involves some blinding--once any person, book, or principle is declared sacred, then devotees can no longer question it or think clearly about it" (p. 317). I hardly know what to make of this: What "religious practices" is he talking about that have been "binding our ancestors into groups for tens of thousands of years"? And how does "binding" lead to "blinding" exactly? If you're talking about Christianity, it's been splintered into a thousand pieces exactly *because* adherents were *not* blinded but seeking some "better" or "more exact" truth! Adherents were trying to un-blind themselves and in that process they were un-binding themselves.
"Genes contribute, somehow, to just about every aspect of our personalities [and not just IQ]" (p. 323). I was surprised Haidt even touched this third rail of research.
Later in the Haidt lets his guard down again and honestly shares: "As a life-long liberal, I had assumed that conservatism = orthodoxy = religion = faith = rejection of science. It followed, therefore, that as an atheist and a scientist, I was obligated to be a liberal." (p. 337) I don't think that Haidt still understands what he's saying here; he's confessing to his illiberalism, his closed-mindedness.
A bit further Haidt quotes from liberal columnist Michael Feingold: "Republicans don't believe in the imagination, partly because so few of them have one, but mostly because it gets in the way of their chosen work, which is to destroy the human race and the planet. ... Republicans, whose goal in life is to profit from disaster and who don't give a hoot about human beings, either can't or won't. Which is why I personally think they should be exterminated before they cause any more harm." (p. 335) What an appalling and detestable thing to write! But it's how many liberals think! Imagine now if a Republican or conservative or Independent or *anyone* other than a liberal called for the extermination of the Democrat party. If you can't imagine this, then you're likely a liberal (as found in Haidt's own research).
Most unfortunate is that by the end of the book as Haidt is wrapping everything up, he misses the boat entirely on what his own research shows. Clearly, his moral foundations theory shows that liberals are limited in their morality; liberals have a lopsided morality, hyperfocusing on two or three moral foundations and basically ignoring the other three (see Fig. 12.2 The Liberal Moral Matrix). A few pages later in Fig. 12.4 Haidt shows the findings for the Social Conservative Moral Matrix. Here we see a balanced and evenly distributed moral foundations across all six of Haidt's moral foundations. I'd say that counts as a "better approach" to life, don't you? Not according to Haidt. He ignores it. But he does say that both sides can "learn from" one another. It's stupefying.
To the end Haidt shows his bias: "the diversity and crowding of big cities makes them more creative and interesting places for many people..." (p. 340-41) But not for Thoreau, Thomas Muir, or Annie Dillard.
All in all, this was a decent good book to read, and I can recommend it for those who've read widely across different fields and understand real-world complexities more than what's offered here.
I liked it
3/5 Goodreads
4/5 Amazon
A foundational (pun intended) problem with Haidt and the way he thinks is that he's a hardcore liberal. It's important that he doesn't hide who he is, and I'm grateful for that; he describes himself and fellow professors this way: "All five of us were politically liberal, yet we shared the same concern about the way our liberal field approached political psychology. The goal of so much research was to explain what was wrong with conservatives." (p. 185) This is important for readers to understand Haidt's biases in everything he writes. At best, Haidt's statement is an adolescent and malformed view of the world; at worst, you're using your limited and lopsided view of the world to poison minds and society. Unfortunately, it's who Haidt is, and it colors everything he writes about and interprets. Later on in the book he lets his guard down even more, and it's both funny and perverse, to me, because by the end of the book he still doesn't recognize his biases.
There's a ton of interesting tidbits to be picked up while reading the book:
Haidt on conservative out-group compassion: "It [conservative caring] is not universalist; it is more local, and blended with loyalty." (p. 158). This claim strikes me as false and actually misleading. Just take a look at any number of Christian outreach organizations worldwide doing outreach outside of their communities and states and countries.
"Devout Chrisitans are often lampooned by secular liberals as uptight, pleasure-fearing prudes." (p. 176). Here and elsewhere Haidt seems to me to be the sneaky, devilsih kid with the stick poking at the lion's cage and tittering about it. And yet informed people understand: "Why Church Attendees have the Best Sex of Any Demographic in the U.S." (Peter Haas, Feb. 3, 2015, citing a population study by the Population Research Center at the University of Chicago)
In his research Haidt found that conservatives have a broader moral sense than liberals. In other words, conservatives have moral concerns that liberals do not recognize as moral concerns (p. 179). That explains a lot, particularly in life-and-death situations such as abortion and euthanasia.
Republicans understand moral psychology; Democrats don't. (p. 181)
Increase similarity, not diversity (p. 277). I was shocked he suggested this.
Other interesting links to Haidt's research include:
Conservatives are less likely than liberals to compromise their morals (Laber-Warren, Unconscious Reactions Separate Liberals and Conservatives, Scientific American, Sept. 1, 2012)
Liberals are more likely than conservatives to exaggerate the differences between them (Graham, Nosek, Haidt. The Moral Stereotypes of Liberals and Conservatives: Exaggeration of Differences across the Political Spectrum, PLOS One, Dec. 12, 2012)
Religion is a team sport chapter. His take on suicide bombers fails to convince. His In Sum section grossly misrepresents: "You [taking a "belonging" and Darwinian approach] see that religious practices have been binding our ancestors into groups for tens of thousands of years. That binding usually involves some blinding--once any person, book, or principle is declared sacred, then devotees can no longer question it or think clearly about it" (p. 317). I hardly know what to make of this: What "religious practices" is he talking about that have been "binding our ancestors into groups for tens of thousands of years"? And how does "binding" lead to "blinding" exactly? If you're talking about Christianity, it's been splintered into a thousand pieces exactly *because* adherents were *not* blinded but seeking some "better" or "more exact" truth! Adherents were trying to un-blind themselves and in that process they were un-binding themselves.
"Genes contribute, somehow, to just about every aspect of our personalities [and not just IQ]" (p. 323). I was surprised Haidt even touched this third rail of research.
Later in the Haidt lets his guard down again and honestly shares: "As a life-long liberal, I had assumed that conservatism = orthodoxy = religion = faith = rejection of science. It followed, therefore, that as an atheist and a scientist, I was obligated to be a liberal." (p. 337) I don't think that Haidt still understands what he's saying here; he's confessing to his illiberalism, his closed-mindedness.
A bit further Haidt quotes from liberal columnist Michael Feingold: "Republicans don't believe in the imagination, partly because so few of them have one, but mostly because it gets in the way of their chosen work, which is to destroy the human race and the planet. ... Republicans, whose goal in life is to profit from disaster and who don't give a hoot about human beings, either can't or won't. Which is why I personally think they should be exterminated before they cause any more harm." (p. 335) What an appalling and detestable thing to write! But it's how many liberals think! Imagine now if a Republican or conservative or Independent or *anyone* other than a liberal called for the extermination of the Democrat party. If you can't imagine this, then you're likely a liberal (as found in Haidt's own research).
Most unfortunate is that by the end of the book as Haidt is wrapping everything up, he misses the boat entirely on what his own research shows. Clearly, his moral foundations theory shows that liberals are limited in their morality; liberals have a lopsided morality, hyperfocusing on two or three moral foundations and basically ignoring the other three (see Fig. 12.2 The Liberal Moral Matrix). A few pages later in Fig. 12.4 Haidt shows the findings for the Social Conservative Moral Matrix. Here we see a balanced and evenly distributed moral foundations across all six of Haidt's moral foundations. I'd say that counts as a "better approach" to life, don't you? Not according to Haidt. He ignores it. But he does say that both sides can "learn from" one another. It's stupefying.
To the end Haidt shows his bias: "the diversity and crowding of big cities makes them more creative and interesting places for many people..." (p. 340-41) But not for Thoreau, Thomas Muir, or Annie Dillard.
All in all, this was a decent good book to read, and I can recommend it for those who've read widely across different fields and understand real-world complexities more than what's offered here.
I liked it
3/5 Goodreads
4/5 Amazon
