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Immediately upon its posthumous publication in 1953, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations was hailed as a masterpiece, and the ensuing years have confirmed this initial assessment. Today it is widely acknowledged to be the single most important philosophical work of the twentieth century.
In this definitive new en face German-English edition, Wittgenstein experts Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte have incorporated significant editorial changes to earlier editions of Philosophical Investigations in order to reflect more closely Wittgenstein's original intentions. Notable revisions include the placement of Wittgenstein's notes - Randbemerkungen - into their designated positions in the text, some corrections to the originally published German text, and the numbering of all the remarks in what was Part 2 and is now named Philosophy of Psychology - A Fragment. Extensive modifications and corrections have also been made to G. E. M. Anscombe's original English translation. Detailed editorial endnotes have been added to illuminate difficult translation decisions and to identify references and allusions in Wittgenstein's original text.
Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende
Peter Hacker is the author of the four-volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 1980-96) the first two volumes co-authored with G. P. Baker (Second Editions, 2003, 2009) and of Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell, 1996). He has also written extensively on philosophy of mind, including Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003) and History of Cognitive Neuroscience (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), co-authored with M. R. Bennett, and Human Nature: The Categorial Framework (Blackwell, 2007), the first volume of a trilogy on human nature.
Joachim Schulte edited the authoritative critical-genetic edition of Wittgenstein's Philosophische Untersuchungen (2001). He is author of Wittgenstein: An Introduction (1989), Chor und Gesetz: Wittgenstein im Kontext (1990), Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology (1993), and of many dozens of philosophical papers.
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"Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus." TLP 5.1361
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." "The Blue Book" p6 (1933)
"We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer." TLP 6.52 (1922)
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts."
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions."
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107
"The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the future." (said in 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979)p183
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything.---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!....This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: "Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human understanding - understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall."--Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein'
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively describe the two systems of thought (fast and slow thinking now central to psychology). He explained how behavior only is possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness self, time and space are innate true-only axioms. He also discussed many times what is now known as Theory of Mind, Framing and cognitive illusions and can thus be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist. He described the psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in EP decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. He examined in thousands of pages and hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not describable in language, this being possible only for behavior with a public language (the impossibility of private language). He described and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the computational theory of mind, long before practical computers. He invented truth tables and predicted paraconsistent logic. He decisively laid to rest skepticism and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of the mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since.
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like him). "Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein.
Had W lived into his 80's he would have been able to directly influence Searle (the other modern genius of descriptive psychology), Symons, and countless other students of behavior. If his brilliant friend Frank Ramsey had not died in his youth, a highly fruitful collaboration would almost certainly have ensued. If his student and colleague Alan Turing had become his lover, one of the most amazing collaborations of all time would likely have evolved. In any one case the intellectual landscape of the 20th century would have been different and if all 3 had occurred it would almost certainly have been very different. Instead he lived in relative intellectual isolation, few knew him well or had an inkling of his ideas while he lived, and only a handful within philosophy have any real grasp of his work today. He could have shined as an engineer(he patented helicopter designs which anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine engine, a mathematician (he sketched out a proof of Euler's theorem, since shown to be valid, and grasped the psychological foundations of math , incompleteness, infinity etc., as no one else has to this day), a physiologist (he did wartime research in it and designed a heartbeat monitor), a musician (he played instruments and had a renowned talent for whistling), an architect (the modernist house he designed and constructed for his sister still stands), or an entrepreneur (he inherited one of the largest fortunes in the world but gave it all away). It is a miracle he survived the trenches and prison camps (while writing the Tractatus) in WW1, many years of suicidal depressions (2 brothers succumbed to them), avoided being trapped in Austria and executed by the Nazis (he was partly Jewish), and that he was not persecuted for his homosexuality and driven to suicide like his friend Turing. He realized nobody understood what he was doing and might never (not surprising as he was half a century ahead of psychology and philosophy, which only recently have started accepting that our behavior evolved like our body.)
PI was not published until 1953, 2 years after his death and can be viewed as two quite different books. Part one is from his middle or W2 period and Part two is from his final or W3 period (and PI overlaps extensively with his books LWPP1 and 2 and RPP1 and 2), when his ideas crystallized into a unique and amazingly deep and prescient description of behavior not yet fully appreciated by even his most ardent admirers. Although W wrote thousands of pages and is the most discussed philosopher in modern times, only a few have any real grasp of what he did and how it anticipates in detail many of the latest advances in psychology and philosophy (descriptive psychology). It is essential to first read some of the commentaries on his work by others. One of the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume "Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty" is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein, psychology, philosophy and life, since it explains the unconscious, axiomatic structure of animal behavior. Next I would suggest the extensive writings of Peter Hacker and of Daniel Hutto, especially his "Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy"(2004). And certainly, the books by Budd and Johnston (see my reviews). However (in my view) like all analyses, they fall short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advances in describing behavior by failing to put them in a broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt in skeletal outline here. Finally, all of Searle should be read, with special attention to MSW (see my reviews). Though Searle does not say and seems to be unaware, his work follows directly from that of W.
To say that Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said. I find most of Searle foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W's philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 Primary Language Games (PLG's) of counting as extended into the endless System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. I will also note that nobody who promotes Strong AI, CTM, DST or Functionalism seems to be aware that W's Tractatus is the most striking and powerful statement of their viewpoint ever penned (behavior as the logical processing of facts--i.e., information processing). Decades later he described in great detail why CTM was an incoherent description of mind that must be replaced by psychology (or you can say this is all he did for the rest of his life).
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior of all time and this is his most famous work. He shows that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see "On Certainty" for his final extended treatment of this idea) and that our conscious ratiocination emerges from unconscious machinations. His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others. This book, and arguably all of W's work and all useful discussion of behavior, is a development of or variation on these ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human behavior, is the need to separate the automatisms from the effects of culture. Though few philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this, it can be seen as the major problem they are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider W's work and most of his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions vs dispositions--see below), but nature and nurture.
What he laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. Few realize that his works are a vast and unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few in philosophy who have more or less understood him have not carried the analysis to its logical (psychological) conclusion, nor realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (TOM, framing, the two selves of fast and slow thinking etc.,--see below). His heir apparent, John Searle (S), refers to him periodically and his work can be seen as a straightforward extension of W's, but he does not really get that this is what he is doing. Other leading W analysts such as Hutto, Horwich, Hacker and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but (in my view) stop short of putting him in the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs.
I suggest regarding his corpus as the pioneering effort in EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves and the multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd period works and reading backwards to the proto-Tractatus. It seems clear that, insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of behavior ought to translate easily into one another. Thus the recent themes of "Embodied Mind" and "Radical Enactivism" should flow directly from and into W's work. However few follow his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even redoubtables like Hutto, Searle and Hacker (see below and my reviews) have to be heavily filtered to see that this is true, and even they do not get how completely W has anticipated the latest work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (potential acting).
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics--the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of examples of language use in context, exposing the many varieties of language games and the relationships between the primary games of true-only unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of slow thinking that are the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view not only lets me understand W, but cuts like a hot knife through the frozen butter of all discussions of behavior. To repeat Dobzhansky's famous comment: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution." And nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.
The failure of even the best thinkers (with a few possible exceptions) to fully grasp W's significance is partly due to the limited attention "On Certainty" (OC) and his other 3rd period works have received, but even more to the inability to understand how profoundly our view of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature (all of them being descriptive psychology), alters once we accept this evolutionary point of view. The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the default of the second self of slow thinking conscious S2,(which is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of S1). S1 is more or less equivalent to "mirroring"(Goldman), "neural resonance"(Gallagher), "biosemantics"(Millikan), and "biosemiotics"(Hutto). Steven Pinker's brilliant `The Blank Slate: the modern denial of human nature' is highly recommended preparation, even though it is now dated and limited in various ways, and he has no clue about Wittgenstein, and hence of what can be regarded as the first and best really deep investigation into the foundations of human nature. Also, he seems not to grasp that the Blank Slate view is an expression of the cognitive illusions that constitute our mental life.
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of Thought: language as a window into human nature") that language is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other "Language of Thought" of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is not just the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, but speech is the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology and computation (now we say Computational Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). And so, speech is the mind, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). As with his other aphorisms I suggest one should take seriously his comment that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind.
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the automaticity of our personality, the impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure of behavior. System 1 is our involuntary fast thinking, true only, nonpropositional, untestable mental states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts (including S1 Truths and UA1-Understanding of Agency1), while the evolutionarily later S2 is slow thinking, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2, dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. A useful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which in some cases can be False). He recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of introspective access to our "inner life" (e.g., "The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459).
W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again his whole corpus can be regarded as the effort to make them clear. After all, what exactly is the alternative? W showed over and over that standard ways of describing behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much of descriptive psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, etc.) are either demonstrably false or incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding "language philosophy" as a separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since language is just another name for the mind. W famously said "The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a `young science' --but he was not antiscientific--cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted "Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten the philosophers task. Imagining possibilities." (LWPP1, 807). So, he is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out that our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology and that all discussions of higher order behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating ways to examine our innate axiomatic psychology, but all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, which remains unchanged. The true-only axioms most thoroughly explored in `'On Certainty'' are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background", which we now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operates by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent works of Trivers and others for a popular intro to IF or Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution" for a pro intro.
Beginning with their innate automated responses to the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but `theorem' is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands. This dramatically changes ones view of human nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of Agency (UA a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and worms if UA is suitably defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However as I note here W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 2 versions-the fast unconscious UA1 and the Slow conscious UA2 and of course these are multifaceted phenomena.
Likewise the Theory of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any rational educated person before the end of the 19th century. One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all that is relevant to it into our innate background via the inexorable workings of EP. The logical (psychological) necessity of this was laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out).
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the consequences of an S1 `mistake' are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions.
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work), are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception (including UA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes in many examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes" (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations" (which refer to abilities or possible actions), are not mental states, and do not have any definite time of occurrence. But disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing" have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use, which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic System 1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), and their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out and which can become true or false (`I know my way home').
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP).
One of W's recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UA (but of course he did not use these terms), which is the subject of major research efforts now. I recommend consulting the work of Ian Apperly, who is carefully dissecting UA1 and 2 and who has recently become aware of Hutto, since Hutto has now characterized UA1 as a fantasy (or rather insists that there is no `Theory' nor representation involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this between 60 and 80 years ago.
Another point made by W was that our conscious mental life is epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not describe nor determine how we act. It is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is the unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most strikingly borne out by the latest experimental psychology, some of which is nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two Selves', but of course there is a huge volume of recent work). It is an easily defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W.
Among the leading exponents of W's ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the `Two Selves' operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc. ) is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH), who teaches at the same University as DMS. His approach is called `Radical Enactivism' and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W's 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this). He is also author of the best deconstructions I know of Dennett's preposterous claim to be following in W's footsteps (in fact Dennett is just repeating most of the classic mistakes in grandiose fashion and hasn't a clue about W) and of Fodor's LOT and other nonsense. One ought to read Searle too, and the title of his review of Dennett's book says it well "Consciousness Explained Away". Unlike most scholars, Hutto has put his papers (though often just proofs) free online at [...].
Here, as throughout W's works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from mostly unedited and handwritten German notes, with "Satz" being incorrectly rendered as "proposition"(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to our nonfalsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct "sentence", which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as "these are my hands" or "Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million years ago".
The view that even the brightest philosophers do not really grasp the context in which they are operating is perhaps most strikingly illustrated when they attempt to define philosophy. In recent years I have seen such definitions by two of those I hold in highest regard--Graham Priest and John Searle, and of course they mention truth, language, reality etc., but not a word to suggest it is a description of our innate universal axiomatic psychology and its extensions which W made very clear.
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible.
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First, this is a scholarly edition. It presents the German text and the English translation on facing pages. The copy text, if you will, for the translation is that of G.E.M. Anscombe, but it is revised by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Wittgensteinians study LW’s writings word by word, and some of the translation choices have been disputed. The book also contains endnotes and a substantial index. Considering the accumulated elements of apparatus and the density of the text, the price is a bargain. This is, after all, one of the most important books of 20thc philosophy.
It is, of course, quite skeptical of the philosophic enterprise. LW believed that the ‘problems’ of philosophy were essentially self-created and result from the constraints posed by language. That which we cannot speak of, LW argued, was what was truly important. The rest was a series of muddles. The book consists of two parts, the second renamed “Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment.” The first consists (crudely speaking) of an extensive set of observations on language and communication, the second on perception and behavior. These observations are stated with great lucidity though we can feel the weight of reflection that stands behind them. We can also feel the weight of previous philosophic opinion, though LW is very sparing in his mention of other philosophers. His immediate predecessors are mentioned and he cites both Plato and Augustine (quoting the latter in Latin). He mentions William James, but on his predecessors he tends to remain silent. When he reflects on causality, e.g., he does not engage directly with Hume, though it is clear that Hume is in his thoughts. He anticipates much contemporary neuroscience, in, e.g., his discussion of the problems of ‘consciousness’, but he does not provide extensive references.
At a number of points (a very small number of points) he states his aims and his conclusions with great specificity:
“Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language” (#109).
“What I want to teach is: to pass from unobvious nonsense to obvious nonsense” (#464).
“A whole cloud of philosophy condenses into a drop of grammar” (#315).
“What is your aim in philosophy? – To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (#309).
He is (expectedly) hard on psychology:
“The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by its being a ‘young science’; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings . . . . For in psychology, there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. . . . The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have the means of getting rid of the problems which trouble us; but problem and method pass one another by” (II, #371).
There are other memorable passages which I will allow the reader to discover for him- or herself.
I would describe this book as a necessary read for anyone interested in the history of philosophy and the course of modern thought. Even if one is not prepared to dissect it in detail, it is a pleasure to watch a brilliant mind at work, tracing an outline of thought that has been immensely influential.
First, the geeky stuff on the translation and editing. Like the Anscombe translation, this one with Hacker and Schulte joining their efforts to Anscombe's, presents the original German and the English translation on facing pages. As a reader with a spotty knowledge of German, this gives me the opportunity to refer to the original where the English seems obscure, ambiguous, or just plain impenetrable. If you're a student of Wittgenstein, Hacker and Schulte have helpfully addressed numerous, controversial aspects of Anscombe's translation -- many of these, such as the difficulty with the German "Satz" (translated relative to context by "sentence" or "proposition", two very different English words) and "Seele" ("soul" sometimes but "mind" others by context in English), are discussed in their Preface.
If you are a quasi-casual reader, many of these points of translation are probably less important than overall readability. And I think Hacker and Schulte have improved readability, updating the feel of Wittgenstein's writing, which is often colloquial, to something more modern.
They've also added over 20 pages of sometimes helpful footnotes, where additional information about the translation or about Wittgenstein's thoughts are enlightening. And they've recast "Part II" of the Investigations itself as "Philosophy of Psychology -- A Fragment" -- their reasoning for that is given in their Preface.
Like most great philosophical texts, no matter how many times I read the Investigations, it's different each time, and I feel foolish for having understood so little the previous time. The new translation offers a great excuse to give it another read.
There are many themes to pick up, including the great variety of linguistic behavior (as contrasted with naive views of language as representing or naming, or with Wittgenstein's own view in the Tractatus), the illusions of distinctive mental activities (such as "meaning" a word while uttering it, or translating the inner to the outer or public), and the general theme of philosophical problems arising when "language goes on holiday".
It's the last that continues to grab my attention, persistently through readings, with different remarks jumping out of the text each time. The simple view is that Wittgenstein thinks ordinary language (what we all say and do in practical contexts every day) is fine as it is, but that it's when we detach ordinary language from those practical contexts that we get in trouble. We fall into perplexing philosophical quandaries, supposing ourselves to really wonder whether the external world or other minds exist, or whether objects are material or ideal.
But philosophical exercises of language are exercises of language, after all. It's not as though we can simply say, "Don't do that" when philosophers speak, and point out that they've left the "ordinary" behind. It's not a simple mistake, and the line between the "ordinary" and the "philosophical" is crossed sometimes without special notice. And it's not even the exclusive province of professional philosophers (amateurs seem even more impressed than the professionals sometimes by their own metaphysical musings).
Certainly, there is more to say about the mistake that philosophers, amateur and professional, make. In particular, there is Wittgenstein's distinction between empirical remarks (remarks about facts in the world) and grammatical remarks (by contrast, remarks about how we speak or are to speak about those facts in the world). The philosopher mistakes the one for the other, thinking that, for example, by adopting what we call an idealist grammatical position (when we talk of objects in the world, we are really talking of mental or ideal objects) we have really discovered something about the objects and not just made a statement about how we should speak of them. Much more to say on this, of course -- which is why a short review is so presumptuous. In fact, it's Wittgenstein's thoughts on why we fall victim to such a misunderstanding that I puzzle most about.
And, of course, just the fact that this translation is originaly made by Anscombe, friend of Wittgenstein, one of which was given the responsability of publishing his work in case that he died, that just makes the book trustrable. So, after the sequel of
revisions, we have now this one, the best improved of all.