Review from previous edition Amusing, persuasive. conversational and engaging. John Gilbey, Times Higher Education Supplement Engaging and approachable book. John Gilbey, Times Higher Education Supplement
Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende
Kees van Deemter is Reader in Computing Science at the University of Aberdeen.
Definieren von Intelligenz ist eine schwierige Aufgabe; eines der besten ist die Fähigkeit, richtig zu folgern mit unsicheren, unvollständig und sogar widersprüchliche Eingaben. Nur wenige Dinge im Leben sind absolute außer natürlich für die Veranstaltung nach AUFTRITT, so Umgang mit Unsicherheit oder Unbestimmtheit ist eine Tatsache des Lebens. Ausdruck Unsicherheit in einer Weise, wo eine formale oder automatisierte Argumentation kann auf die Daten angewendet werden, ist eine schwierige Aufgabe; Versuche, so verschiedene Systeme angewendet zu tun: wie Fuzzy-Logik, manchmal mit ausgezeichnetem Erfolg und zu anderen Zeiten die Ergebnisse enttäuschend waren. Dies ist ein Buch, in dem ich nicht einverstanden mit einer der Räumlichkeiten, wenn das Niveau der Präsentation, die für die Massenpublikum, ist akzeptabel. In der Werbe-Flyer wird die Aussage "Untersucht eine einfache, aber oft unbemerkt Aspekt unseres Lebens. - Die Unbestimmtheit inhärent in vielen unserer Ausdrücke und Begriffe" Ich begegne und Vagheit müssen mit auf einer täglichen Basis zu tun, sowohl persönlich als auch beruflich, und ich bin sicher nicht einzigartig. Kaum ein Tag vergeht, an dem ich am Ende nicht die Anpassung an eine Situation erschwert aufgrund der inhärenten Ungenauigkeit der menschlichen Ausdrucksformen. Meine anderen Kritiken sind von der Länge des Buches und der fort Angabe verschiedener Szenarien mit inhärenten Unbestimmtheit basiert. Der intelligente Leser bereits von der Wirklichkeit der Unsicherheit in der Welt bewusst, einfach häufen immer mehr Beispiele tut nichts, um die Prämisse zu verstärken.Lesen Sie weiter... ›
M. Henri De Feraudy
- Veröffentlicht auf Amazon.com
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe
This is a particularly well written introduction to a certain part of the philosophical literature on vagueness. The author refutes the idea that vagueness is a fault and presents a certain number of different approaches to the problem explaining the advantages and disadvantages of each. You can read this book in bits. I have training in formal logic, so my view is perhaps a little biased, but all in all I have rarely seen a book by a philosopher in which the author bends over backwards trying to explain subtle concepts and succeeds like this one. My only niggle is the chapter on Artificial Intelligence which in my opinion spends just a little too much time (for my liking) introducing the subject before getting into the approaches to vagueness. I was expecting to see Dempster-Shafer theory discussed and didn't find it.
Not only will you read about vagueness, but you should be better prepared to read works on analytic philosophy, in particular a good crash course on formal logic is given, but I'm not the best judge as to how clear that is, as I know much of that. I'm also glad to see he talks about the work of the great Hans Kamp who does very original and useful work in logic.
This is a fun book on a subject which is disquieting. It might well challenge some of your basic views on reasoning. I have a good friend to whom I read parts of this over the phone, it's that well written. It's interesting that the author is not just a philosopher by training but also works in a computer science department of a university. This might explain why the book is clear: he has a goal of making software deal with vagueness.
A reasonably interesting topic but I found that with a background in technical writing and statistics there was not that much for me that was new or surprising. The author often belaboured the same points, so it could have been shorter, and the introduction to symbolic logic was top heavy with symbols which could have been off putting - as Roger Penrose once quipped, every equation added to a book drops the readership in half. I was also hoping for something that was a bit more philosophical, along the lines of Douglas Walton's Fallacies Arising from Ambiguity.
For Van Deemter the sorites (heap) paradox is emblematic and he uses it a great deal. Briefly it is a paradox relating to small differences. It is the misconception that if one small change makes no difference then a lot of small changes will not make a difference, such as the loss of a single hair, one at a time, leading to baldness. At some point a threshold is crossed and the word “bald” starts to become applicable. Chapter 4 discusses the case of “Old Number One”, a 1929 Bentley race car, that exemplifies the old paradox of the Ship of Theseus (which surprisingly the author omits). Buyer A wanted the “original” car, but over time the various pieces had been replaced, one at a time, so he sued the seller, claiming that he had been cheated. Even though there was a continuity of provenance, there was little if anything of the original vehicle remaining. Similarly, the cells in your body replace themselves over a 10 year period - yet you are still recognizably and legally you.
The main themes were that both language and measurement are imprecise and there are good reasons for both, which the author does an admirable job of summarizing, particularly in Chapter 11 “When to be Vague”. Vagueness usually means less to remember and easier to verify as long as we understand the context. The “tallest house” in a small set can be quickly verified by eye, rather than measuring the 22.8 meter building. About $500 is a better estimate for a repair job than $475.50, when there may be unknown problems lurking in the plumbing, and a politician would be wise not to be over specific in her promise of what she will do in order to lower the cost to her reputation should she be unable to accomplish it. Low commitments are easier to fulfill than higher ones, and a certain degree of ambiguity can be a strategic asset - while voters may be led astray by their own assumptions, ambiguous statements allow for plausible retreat. Nor should laws or mission statements be too specific, in order to deal with future contingencies; the example used is laws against “indecency” which are flexible to local sensibilities and the times.
It's not a bad book and I may keep it to drag off the shelf and point to a chapter and say “this is what I mean – read this”, or it may wind up donated to a book sale when I need some shelf space.
This topic is very interesting as it has considerable bearing on aspects of human reasoning. The book covers a number of mathematical approaches to the vague way we reason informally. Van Deemter's exposition is clear and the math is not overly difficult.
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Format: Gebundene Ausgabe
I enjoyed reading this book, however I found parts of it unconvincing for two reasons. Firstly, at no time is the basis of the sorites paradox questioned i.e. that a heap is defined by the quantity of items in it. If you don't accept that initial premise the 'paradox' doesn't work. From a Wittgensteinian perspective what heaps have in common is simply a family resemblance. Different mounds of things appear to us to have a family rsemblance so we apply the same word to them even though they may differ in substance (bricks vs manure) or size ( a heap of dust vs a heap of ore). Conversely the same number of the same thing may or may not form a heap depending on its structure: 64 bricks neatly stacked into a 4x4x4 cube would not generally be a heap ( a stack maybe), while the same number of bricks scattered over a field would not be considered to be a heap either. Yet the same number of bricks piled up in a totally disorderly way probably would be considered a heap of bricks. What this shows is that the underlying premise of the paradox doesn't coincide with how we actually use the word, so its conclusion is dubious rather than paradoxical. Secondly, the paradox of perfect perception on p.178 doesn't appear to be a genuine paradox at all since its second premise is dubious and conclusion 3 is doubtful as well since if you hear two sounds then C doesn't distinguish between A and B, whereas if you hear 3 sounds then you can already perceive a difference between A and B. This assumes that all three sounds are played simultaneously. If they are played sequentially then you would be comparing a perception with a memory in which case conclusion 4 doesn't logically follow. Having said all that I found the discussion interesting moreso in the first half where a number of practical issues are discussed, some of which (the identity of something over time) are interesting phiosophical issues in themselves.