- Taschenbuch: 496 Seiten
- Verlag: Vintage; Auflage: Vintage Books (29. August 1995)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 0679763996
- ISBN-13: 978-0679763994
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 13,2 x 2,4 x 20,2 cm
- Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 45 Kundenrezensionen
- Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 32.845 in Fremdsprachige Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Fremdsprachige Bücher)
Andere Verkäufer auf Amazon
+ kostenlose Lieferung
+ EUR 2,37 Versandkosten
+ kostenlose Lieferung
The Moral Animal: Why We Are, the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology (Englisch) Taschenbuch – 29. August 1995
|Neu ab||Gebraucht ab|
Wird oft zusammen gekauft
Kunden, die diesen Artikel gekauft haben, kauften auch
Es wird kein Kindle Gerät benötigt. Laden Sie eine der kostenlosen Kindle Apps herunter und beginnen Sie, Kindle-Bücher auf Ihrem Smartphone, Tablet und Computer zu lesen.
Geben Sie Ihre Mobiltelefonnummer ein, um die kostenfreie App zu beziehen.
Wenn Sie dieses Produkt verkaufen, möchten Sie über Seller Support Updates vorschlagen?
An accessible introduction to the science of evolutionary psychology and how it explains many aspects of human nature. Unlike many books on the topic,which focus on abstractions like kin selection, this book focuses on Darwinian explanations of why we are the way we are--emotionally and morally. Wright deals particularly well with explaining the reasons for the stereotypical dynamics of the three big "S's:" sex, siblings, and society.
rally born to cheat? Does monogamy actually serve women's interests? These are among the questions that have made The Moral Animal one of the most provocative science books in recent years. Wright unveils the genetic strategies behind everything from our sexual preferences to our office politics--as well as their implications for our moral codes and public policies. Illustrations.Alle Produktbeschreibungen
Welche anderen Artikel kaufen Kunden, nachdem sie diesen Artikel angesehen haben?
Derzeit tritt ein Problem beim Filtern der Rezensionen auf. Bitte versuchen Sie es später noch einmal.
What's exciting about evolutionary psychology is that for the first time psychology has a firm scientific foundation upon which to build. But it's a tough subject for some people, I think, mainly because they confuse "is" with "ought." The discoveries of evolutionary psychology about the differing reproductive strategies of the sexes offend some people in the same way that Darwin's insight about our kinship with (other) animals offended the Victorians. Evolutionary psychology shows us that men lie, cheat and hustle relentlessly for sex, while women manipulate available males into caring for their offspring, and if possible for children fathered by other males. Insights like these are seen by some as immoral imperatives, when in fact they are amoral statements of factual observation. What "is" isn't necessarily the same thing as what ought to be. And really, we shouldn't blame the messenger.
Where Wright's book especially shows its age is in trying to explain altruism. He wasn't aware of the handicap principle developed by Amotz and Avishag in their exciting book, The Handicap Principle: A Missing Piece of Darwin's Puzzle (1997) which nicely explains "altruism" (it's an advertisement of fitness) and a number of other evolutionary conundrums, including Wright's question on page 390, "Why do soldiers die for their country?" Additionally on pages 68-70, where Wright attempts to account for female cuckoldry, he gives three reasons, but seems uncertain of the most important one, which is that a woman, once established in a secure pair-bond will sometimes seek to upgrade the genetic input by having a clandestine fling with what she sees as an alpha male. Also Wright's attempt to account for homosexuality (pages 384-386) stumbles over itself in trying to be politically correct while missing the major point that homosexuality facilitates male bonding and therefore is certainly adaptive since male coalitions increase each member of the coalition's chance of securing females. It fact, Wright misses the whole concept of male bonding. There's not even an index entry for it.
These observations are not to be taken as criticisms of the book since Wright was writing before knowledge of some of these ideas became widespread. The Moral Animal remains an outstanding opus and one that has helped introduce a large readership to the power and efficacy of evolutionary psychology, a scientific approach to psychology that will, I believe, replace the old paradigms currently holding sway in our universities. Of course this will only happen when the old behaviorists, and cognitive and psychoanalytic stalwarts...retire.
I would like to see Wright revise this book in light of the many discoveries made during the nineties and reissue it. His readable and engaging style would make the update fun to read.
One way to do this is to reflect critically on Wright's explicit and implicit reliance on the rather extreme "modularity of mind" thesis implicit in the "triune brain" (reptilian, mammalian and human) model advanced near the beginning (p. 39) and the end of the book (p. 321, hardback edition) and underlying almost all its argumentation.
Wright writes as if the reptilian module (the snake inside us) were hermetically sealed off ("contained") by the rest of the brain. Rather worse, he writes as if our "natures" were fundamentally reptilian, as if we were not highly social primates, with natures that enable groups to monitor the style of play we bring to our various "prisoner's dilemmas", and to alter the "payoffs" in those games to deter deviant behavior.
Wright never discusses the coevolution of language and brain and, as a result, never comes close to illuminating the basic issue of the interaction of culture and biology in human evolution.
I think the book's principle value is its utility in teaching students how to recognize very bad science writing. Let those who think this a "soft minded" attitude, demonstrate some mastery of the neuroanatomy in Terry Deacon's <The Symbolic Species: coevolution of language and brain>, particularly Deacon's discussion of the evolution of the hominid prefrontal cortex.
The book also makes wild leaps in connecting together various pieces of evidence which simply would not hold for a real logician. William of Ockham stated that we should not multiply uncertainties needlessly. Aristotelean logic, furthermore, gives us explicit restrictions on how we may use particular propositions in a chain of reasoning. Wright has violated such rules of basic reasoning in this book, stringing together arguments which are at best tenuous. And I recall another philosopher, Leslie Stephenson, who, criticizing the work of Konrad Lorenz, asked if it is legitimate to draw inferences on HUMAN behavior from ANIMAL behavior. (A human being is, after all, a little more complex than a rhesus monkey.)
All in all, although I think evolutionary psychology can make some positive contributions to our understanding of humanity, the field, as it is depicted in this book, needs more development and good old fashioned scientific skepticism.
Möchten Sie weitere Rezensionen zu diesem Artikel anzeigen?
Die neuesten Kundenrezensionen