- Gebundene Ausgabe: 224 Seiten
- Verlag: John Wiley & Sons; Auflage: 1 (20. Juli 2001)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 0787956279
- ISBN-13: 978-0787956271
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 16,2 x 2,3 x 23,8 cm
- Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 2 Kundenrezensionen
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Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity (University of Michigan Business School Management Series) (Englisch) Gebundene Ausgabe – 20. Juli 2001
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"...it's worth reading..." (Professional Manager, January 2002)
High reliability organizations (HROs) such as ER units in hospitals or firefighting units are designed to perform efficiently under extreme stress and pressure. Using HROs as the model for the 21st century organization, Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe show readers how to respond to unexpected challenges with flexibility rather than rigidity and to reduce the disruptive effects of change by using tools such as sensemaking, stress reduction, migrating decisions, and labeling. Introducing the powerful new concept of "mindfulness," the authors outline five qualities of the mindful organization and the organizational skills needed to achieve them. Each concept is clearly expressed in vivid case studies of organizations that demonstrate mindful practices in action. A Book in the University of Michigan Business School Series Voted Best HR Book of 2001 by HR.comAlle Produktbeschreibungen
- die wiederkehrenden Muster von höchst zuverlässigen bzw. krisenfesten Organisationen werden herausgearbeitet und in nur 5 grundsätzlichen Regeln destilliert - dadurch werden sie für den Leser auf seine eigene Organisation anwendbar.
- das theoretische Modell und seine Anwendung in der Realität nehmen jeweils die Hälfte des Buches ein, d.h. die Theorie und ihre Umsetzung in der Praxis werden gleichermaßen bearbeitet.
- dabei geht es stets darum, die passende Haltung und Kultur zu komplexen und schwierigen Situationen etablieren zu können. Lobenswert: zu keiner Zeit werden billige Patentrezepte angeboten.
- es werden Forschungsergebnisse der Autoren präsentiert und an zahlreichen Beispielen aus privatwirtschaftlichen und staatlichen Organisationen veranschaulicht. Die Spiegelung an der einschlägigen Literatur ist prägnant und kurz. Ein Assessment-Vorgehensmodell wird beschrieben und mit dazugegeben.
Dadurch hat das Buch einen originären Charakter, es ist überdies spanned geschrieben.
Meiner Meinung nach 4 Sterne für ein professionelles, originelles und unaffektiertes Werk. Geeignet für Berufserfahrene aller Hierarchiestufen.
Es hat mir bewusst gemacht, dass man die kleinen Momente der Überraschung / Perplexität / ..., wenn etwas Unerwartetes passiert ist, ganz bewusst wahrnehmen sollte. Man sollte kurz innehalten und eine bewusste Pause einlegen, um aus dem Moment möglichst viel lernen zu können.
Die Autoren unterteilen ihre Ratschläge in zwei Bereiche: 1.) "Anticipating and Becoming Aware of the Unexpected" und 2.) "Containing the Unexpected". Natürlich kann man das Unerwartete nicht vorhersehen, man kann aber durch die erläuterten Praktiken seine Sinne schärfen und lernen, rascher und flexibler zu reagieren.
Was das Buch so besonders praktisch macht, sind die Fragebögen im hinteren Teil des Buches. Man kann sich selbst bewerten oder das Unternehmen, in dem man arbeitet und erhält wertvolle Hinweise, worauf man seine Aufmerksamkeit lenken sollte, um sich zu verbessern.
Ein tolles Buch, das ich wärmstens empfehlen kann!!!
Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen auf Amazon.com (beta) (Kann Kundenrezensionen aus dem "Early Reviewer Rewards"-Programm beinhalten)
On the plus side, I found myself underlying and marking up this book much more than most I've read recently. There are moments where the authors spell out issues in plain language with comforting clarity. That's not always the case in Weick's other books and articles. The book is very quotable, you might say. I'm well versed in Weick's articles and other books but this book leans toward people who should be looking to learn management and leadership lessons from High Reliability Organizations. I 100% appreciated that focus.
On the other side of the coin, I have two issues that would-be readers should know in advance. 1) The content circles back on itself quite a bit. While there is an overall arc to the book in terms of foundational concepts, then some case studies, then some takeaways, I found that the same concepts and even examples came back into the mix several times. Maybe it's my style of learning but I like call-backs in writing in limited doses. Perhaps the later editions develop in more step-wise fashion. 2) I would have liked the concrete advice for professionals to be even more concrete. Admittedly, there are some survey tools and some distilled lists with great advice. Nevertheless, I was hoping for just a little bit more of that practical-guide feel (e.g., how to run meetings to "surface"--love that term--bad news or unexpected data, how to have 1-2-1 conversations that treat all news as good news, even bad news, etc.). I do thoroughly appreciate the principles and lessons offered. I just wanted to take the content that extra step into how exactly these conversations can happen. Granted, it is hard to capture the in-the-moment actual conversations but I'd settle for dissections of approximate/recreated discussions.
On balance, I did enjoy it and was thrilled while reading it. I plan to look at the latest edition as well.
The authors distill the essence of reliability (and safety) into five essential qualities: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. As a long time safety professional (with experience largely in the aviation and chemical processing industries) I couldn't agree more with the authors after reading the text associated with these five qualities. I have found that especially in larger organizations that deference to expertise is perhaps the most difficult of the five traits to be accepted in the workplace, as generally rank or seniority tend to be deferred to, particularly in a crisis. The airline industry has come a long way with the different iterations of Crew Resource Management (CRM), and of all (often unstated) the reasons that CRM has succeeded I think that deference to expertise is the single most important.
I like the concept of realistic audits the authors promote, and particularly enjoyed the insight regarding the vulnerability of Singapore to Japanese attack as it came to be understood by Winston Churchill, who had a penchant for realistic self-appraisal, to wit: "I ought to have known. My advisors ought to have known and I ought to have been told, and I ought to have asked." The point is that we frequently believe what we want to believe, not because we are intellectually dishonest, but because of the human tendency to seek out information that confirms our views, and not to seek out disconfirming information. A mark of a truly reliable and safe organization (examples include airline operations, nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers, etc.) is seeking out information which points toward problem areas, rather than viewing successes as being demonstrative of the quality of institutional planning and procedures. The example concerning the Moura mine disaster on p.135 makes the point quite eloquently: "HROs assume that the system is endangered until there is conclusive proof that it is not." There could be no better single- sentence summary of the book.
There are many more interesting observations in the book, the most enlightening of which can be found in chapter five. I particularly enjoyed the discussion of a "learning culture" beginning on p. 136, and find that one of their most salient observations is also one of mine from years of industry experience, that being the concept of "learned helplessness." When people attempt to bring safety issues to the fore but are quickly dismissed, they learn to keep to themselves. This is a major problem, especially in large organizations, and the advice proffered by the authors is both sound and cogent. I was absolutely delighted to see the long-overdue examination (p.140) of "de minimus error" in which context is examined as it relates to seemingly unconnected small events. In this situation, people frequently seek out separate, small reasons for each deviation, ignoring the accumulating evidence that there is actually one large problem responsible for all the disparate events. Though the authors did not note it as an example, people familiar with the Apollo 13 accident will no doubt realize how the controllers had to fight off this kind of error willfully. (I think that Apollo-era NASA was an excellent example of an HRO.)
There are many more issues that Weick and Sutcliffe bring to the forefront in this book, from intelligent rule-making, to flexibility of response. My advice to any manager or safety professional is to put this book at the top of your reading list. It is easy to read, easy to digest, comprehensive in scope, yet universally applicable across industries. Even if you are not involved in an industry like nuclear power or aviation where large issues of life and death are literally in your domain, this is still mandatory reading. Any business can learn for the examples cited (which range from a merger-induced railroad meltdown at the "bad" end of the reliability scale, to nuclear-powered aircraft carrier operations at the "good" end of the reliability scale.)
I highly recommend this book to managers, safety professionals, researchers, and anyone else interested in becoming more informed about reliability and organizational safety.
After some thought and research it dawned on me that the answer may be context, Weick's focus at the time of writing on high reliability organizations (HROs). Weick naturally attempts to push his five principles too far into contexts that are more into business realms that the negative reviewers may be envisioning. A flower shop, a social organization, an industrial firm producing low-value retail product would not fit the HRO mode, nor would their culture demand "mindfulness". Mindfulness might be beneficial to these organization in small portions, but not necessary or sufficient and perhaps counter-productive to success.
Arthur Fiedler, the originator of "contingency theory" (1970s)hypothesized that management style (authoritarian vs. participatory) was dependent upon task context. In a meta-analysis of 24 experimental studies testing contingency theory, Peters (1985) found consistent evidence of the validity of the theory. My personal experience also aligns with Fiedler's theory and I believe that mindfulness may be a dimension of management style.
However, my strongest support for Weick comes from his language of practicality after allowing for his excessive enthusiasm. In his final chapter, Weick offer practical advise to managers, most of which is sound in any context; create awareness.., cultivate humility, speak-up.., etc. It would be hard to argue against an academic espousing such actions.
Weick and Sutcliffe also provide clear guidance on how to implement their advice, but the reader should be warned that doing so is tough. Most bosses don't want to be bothered with a) "insignificant" developments b) news about near misses c) inquiry into gray areas that cannot be resolved quickly and cleanly, and d) reflections on efforts that failed or nearly failed. Few organizations truly defer to expertise rather than to rank. Few bosses devote time to exploring isolated events that may have subtle relationships connecting them. All of these cultural characteristics resist the implementation of mindfulness.
This book is helpful in part because the authors articulate complicated ideas in a clear and condensed way. They give us words and phrases that we can actually use at work. It is also useful because the book draws on real life examples of mindful organizations and of others that paid the price for not being mindful. I count this book among the top dozen or so business and management books I have read over the years, and I have read many of them. It is outstanding.
The main point could be explained in a single sentence: We can get valuable lessons if we pay attention to organizations who work in high risk and unpredictable environments.
This is my own view and, actually, I tried to show this using aviation as a kind of learning field. That is why I hope the authors will be lucky. My own experience was unsuccessful and that itself shows that the authors are right.
When I started to get conclusions from aviation to business management, I found that the more interested people came precisely from aviation. I'm afraid the authors could suffer the same experience and people interested in their concepts could come from air carriers, nuclear-powered plants and some other examples they use.
The authors could be three or four steps in advance of the present situation in business management. They try to extract the right lessons from other fields. However, they would not be surprised if their intent "bounces back" and it is picked-up precisely from the fields that they try to show as examples, not from business management.