- Taschenbuch: 272 Seiten
- Verlag: Orion Publishing Group; Auflage: New edition (Juli 2000)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 0304355100
- ISBN-13: 978-0304355105
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 15,5 x 2 x 23,5 cm
- Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 1 Kundenrezension
- Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 3.924.784 in Fremdsprachige Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Fremdsprachige Bücher)
- Komplettes Inhaltsverzeichnis ansehen
The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster (Cassell Military Paperbacks) (Englisch) Taschenbuch – Juli 2000
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The battleship "Bismarck", flagship of the German Fleet Commander, was sunk by the British on her maiden voyage, 27 May 1941. By examining the role of high command in German naval strategic and operational decisions, this book shows how the disaster was probably the result of military strategy.
Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende
Graham Rhys-Jones was a Royal Navy aviation and anti-submarine specialist, serving in the Fleet Air Arm and in surface ships. He commanded a frigate when it was still fashionable to chase Russians. He held two appointments in Whitehall, and spent two years at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, teaching strategy and operations to senior US and international personnel. He is now a defence consultant, and writes and lectures on maritime topics.
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Raider decided on a campaign, which would use his surface ships to sink, allied merchant shipping. This book is an examination of whether that was a sensible decision. It examines two of the major naval campaigns, Operation Berlin which was the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau's raid in the Atlantic and Operation Rheinburg which was the unsuccessful sortie which resulted in the destruction of the Bismarck.
The author makes the point that although superficially Operation Berlin had some success it had significant problems. Those problems were that surface ships faced considerable problems in locating enemy merchants without air assistance. The commander of Operation Berlin Lutjzens had to use captured merchant ships to from a reconnaissance line.
The sinking of the Bismarck in fact ended German fleet operations in the Atlantic. In short what happened was that British Cruisers using radar were able to track the Bismarck and Prince Eugen as they sailed in the Denmark Straight. The Germans had not realised the efficiency of British radar and had overestimated the ability of surface ships to use bad weather to escape detection. As a result of this detection the British were able to direct two heavy ships the Prince of Wales and Hood to intercept the German ships. The battle of the Denmark Strait should have been the end of the Germans. Instead a freak shot sunk the Hood and the Germans were able to sail on. The British cruisers were still able to follow and Swordfish aircraft flown from aircraft carriers were so able to cripple the Bismarck that she was easily sunk by British capital ships.
Rhys-Jones shows that the destruction of the Bismarck was if not inevitable due to a floored operational plan. Not only was the Bismarck sunk but the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Geneisu were vulnerable to air attack and were repeatedly damaged in French harbors. Later the pocket battleships were also shown to be vulnerable to air attack. The actual Rheinburg operation was planned very poorly. News of the operation was made available to large numbers of civilians and the ship was even given an official send of which was seen by Norwegian civilians.
The author shows clearly that Raider had little knowledge of the effectiveness of British radar and how it changed the game rules. He also was not willing to ensure that German air surveillance was available to assist his ships in avoiding enemy capital ships.
This is a short and reasonably expensive book but it is an interesting examination of the surface navel war and contains material not available eslewhere.