- Taschenbuch: 752 Seiten
- Verlag: Harvard Univ Pr; Auflage: 00002 (März 1993)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 0674319311
- ISBN-13: 978-0674319318
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 16,2 x 4 x 23,9 cm
- Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: Schreiben Sie die erste Bewertung
- Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 255.834 in Fremdsprachige Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Fremdsprachige Bücher)
Frege: Philosophy of Language, Second Edition (Englisch) Taschenbuch – März 1993
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Dummett's book is not just a book about Frege: it is an important contribution to all thetopics on which Frege wrote, and an invaluable commentaryon the work of many contemporary philosophical logicians.--Alan Ryan "Guardian "
A splendid achievement. Not only does it give an illuminating and in the main a systematic account of Frege's views, but it displays many penetrating insights of the author's own on the important and difficult problems which they raise. In its honesty, rigour and acumen it establishes Dummett as one of the outstanding philosophers of the present time.--A. J. Ayer "Listener "
A remarkable book. There are very few books of over 700 pages of which it is clearly true that not a page has been wasted...Philosophy can never be quite the same again after this book.--Alasdair Maclntyre "Observer "
Without question the most important philosophical book to have been published for at least a decade.--Anthony Quinton
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Michael Dummett teaches Logic at Oxford; he has written books such as "The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy," "Truth and Other Enigmas," "The Logical Basis of Metaphysics," etc.
He wrote in the Preface of this 1973 book, "This book is the first volume of two about Frege: it deals with his philosophy of language, and the second will treat of his philosophy of mathematics... I have left until the second volume a full consideration of Frege's definition of analyticity... I have said comparatively little here about Frege's doctrine of classes..."
But he admits at the end of the Preface, "There is some irony for me in the fact that the man about whose philosophical views I have devoted, over years, a great deal of time to thinking, was, at least at the end of his life, a virulent racist, specifically an anti-semite. This fact is revealed by a fragment of a diary which survives ... The diary shows Frege have been a man of extreme right-wing political opinions, bitterly opposed to the parliamentary system, democrats, liberals, Catholics, the French and, above all, Jews, who he thought ought to be deprived of all political rights and, preferably, expelled from Germany. When I first read that diary... I was deeply shocked, because I had revered Frege as an absolutely rational man, if, perhaps, not a very likeable one..."
He states, "When Frege engages in polemic against psychologism, what he is concerned to repudiate is the invasion of the theory of meaning by notions concerned with mental processes, mental images, and the like, and the confusion between the process by which we come to acquire a grasp of sense and what constitutes such a grasp. The psychological was for him a realm of incommunicable inner experience: cognitive notions... do not belong to the domain of the psychological as thus understood." (Pg. 240)
He points out, "Frege has three principal theses about the notions of truth and falsity. These are: (1) that to which truth and falsity are primarily ascribed in a thought; (2) truth and falsity are related to sentences as their referents; and (3) truth is indefinable." (Pg. 364)
He argues, "We have seen that... Frege's belief in the existence of non-linguistic correlates of incomplete expressions---concepts, relations and functions---can be justified, but that... the semantic role of such expressions cannot be explained in terms of their referents in anything like the same way as can the semantic role of proper names. The palpable incorrectness of Frege's deductions from his general principles concerning sentences may serve to deter even the most dogmatic disciple of Frege from overrating the analogy between the reference of names and that of incomplete expressions." (Pg. 428)
He observes, "Frege was very well aware of the fundamental methodological role played by these principles: indeed, in the Preface to [the Basic Laws of Arithmetic] he lists as the three basic principles that he has followed: always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective; to ask after the meaning of words only in the context of sentences, not in isolation; and to keep in view the distinction between concept and object." (Pg. 631)
He notes, "Frege's ideas appear to have no ancestry. He applied himself to formal logic, and invented a totally new approach; he applied himself to philosophy, and wrote as if the world was young and the subject had only just been invented. It is true that his works are full of diatribes against the mistakes of others: but he never seems to have learned from anybody else, not even by reaction; other authors appear in his writings only as object-lessons in how not to handle the subject." (Pg. 661)
He suggests, "it is probably due to Wittgenstein that Frege is read by philosophers today. The Tractatus [Logico-Philosophicus] pays profound homage to Frege, homage that is pointedly more intense than that paid to Russell, and is crammed with references to his doctrines: indeed, the book is virtually unintelligible without an understanding of its Fregean background. If it had not been for the influence of this celebrated book, and of Wittgenstein's other teaching and writing, it is possible that the writings of Frege might have been utterly forgotten." (Pg. 662)
He acknowledges, "The few fragmentary writings of Frege's final period are not of high quality: they are interesting chiefly as showing that Frege did... acknowledge the failure of the logicist programme, which he had announced so confidently in [Basic Laws], and had the energy to begin to construct an alternative whole theory of the foundations of mathematics to replace it. The discovery of Russell's paradox had been a shattering blow to a man who had repeatedly had to face the discouragement of neglect when he knew that his work was of the highest value... What is surprising is not that it silenced him for fifteen years, but that he ever started to write again." (Pg. 664)
This is a highly-detailed study of Frege's philosophy, that will be "must reading" for anyone seriously studying Frege.