- Taschenbuch: 352 Seiten
- Verlag: U S Naval Inst Pr; Auflage: Reprint (30. April 2013)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 1591148065
- ISBN-13: 978-1591148067
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 17,5 x 2 x 25,1 cm
- Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 2 Kundenrezensionen
- Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 251.090 in Fremdsprachige Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Fremdsprachige Bücher)
The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II (Englisch) Taschenbuch – 30. April 2013
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"A provocative study compelling...A highly controversial study, Suvorov's book is nevertheless well researched and warrants further examination into this critical period in the history of the war." "-- War in History""
A provocative study compelling...A highly controversial study, Suvorov s book is nevertheless well researched and warrants further examination into this critical period in the history of the war. " War in History""
Using new documents and reevaluating existing material, "The Chief Culprit" analyzes Joseph Stalin's strategic design to conquer Europe and his support for Germany, which helped bring Hitler to power and sustained him. Stalin's strategy leading up to World War II grew from Vladimir Lenin's belief that if World War I did not ignite the worldwide Communist revolution, then a second world war would be needed to achieve it. Stalin saw Germany as the power that would fight and weaken capitalist countries so Soviet armies could sweep across the European continent to the Atlantic. Viktor Suvorov reveals how Stalin conspired with German leaders to bypass the Versailles Treaty, which forbade German rearmament. Secretly, the Soviet Union trained German engineers and officers as well as provided bases and factories for war. In 1939, the nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany allowed Hitler to proceed with his plans to invade Poland, fomenting war in Europe. Stalin emerges as a diabolical genius consumed by visions of a worldwide Communist revolution at any cost, the leader who wooed Hitler and Germany in his own effort to conquer the world. -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.Alle Produktbeschreibungen
The evidence he presents is compelling; I have checked about 10% of his source citations, and found them to be correct.
What is even more convincing for me is that, for the first time ever, the big question of why Hitler invaded Soviet Russia in 1941, is answered in a way that makes sense.
Do not fear: Suvorov does not take an apologetic position towards Hitler and the Nazi regime, but he certainly does paint a very convincing, very different way of looking at the darkest part of recent European history. The only thing I find missing is a closer look at the role of Churchill, which I personally, especially in the context that Sukorov presents, think has had a large part in bringing about the full potential of the conflict, propably without intent.
A must-read, and way better than the predecessor, "Icebreaker", which was interesting, but tended to drown in detail military data, as well as not having had the benefit of many new sources that became available only after the collapse of the Soviet block.
Denn Suvorov zeigt uns hier an Hand von offiziellen Daten, dass Russland zu diesem Zeitpunkt mehrt Panzer besessen hat, als die ganze Welt zusammen, mehr Kampfflugzeuge besessen hat als die ganze Welt zusammen.
Russland wollte die "Weltrevolution" (Weltoktober) und die oganze Welt, wofür die russische Armee auch bestens vorbereitet war. Russland werde "nur auf den Gebieten des Gegners kämpfen" hiess damals der USSR "Kampfschrei", der soviel besagt, dass Russland (nur) expansive Kriege führen würde.
Deswegen waren sämtliche Kampfmittel (Panzer, Flugzeuge) direkt and der Grenze zu Deutschland (in Polen) stationiert. Munitionsdepots, Waffendepots, Treibstoffdepots, Stiefeldepots...: alles direkt an der Grenze deoniert. Der Krieg sollte genauso ablaufen wie kurz zuvor der Kriegirgendwo im Osten Asiens (war es gegen die Japaner? fällt mir gerade nicht ein)
Doch dann griff Hitler überraschend an.
Stalins Truppen wurden nie für einen Defensiv Krieg ausgebildet, nur für einen Angriffskrieg.
Stalins Truffen besassen nicht einmal Landkarten für das eigene Gebiet (um einen Verteidigungskrieg führen zu können) sondern nur Karten des Westens bis hin an den Atlantik.
Man kann sich leicht vorstrellen was für ein Chaos auf der russischen Seite geherrscht haben muss. Keine Möglichkeit des Rückzuges zwacks mangelnder Landkarten, etc.Lesen Sie weiter... ›
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For me every para, every page ,every chapter of this book were a revelation. Military buffs you will never regret exploring it ; if not , you have missed something
Firstly,author impugns the established wisdom on World War II Soviet Union was an innocent victim of Nazi aggression. Suvorov argues Stalin hatched plans to invade Germany. Exploiting German preoccupation in the West ,he started massing troops along the border as a prelude to launching a war of liberation. Soviet dictator succeeded in entangling Nazi Germany in a war with Western democracies. Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact and carve-up of Poland was a step in this direction.
Stalin had aggressive intentions and Suvorov has adduced arguments buttressing this view. If Red Army planned a defensive war they should have entrenched behind a web of obstacles ,entanglements. This would have slowed an invading force giving sufficient room for a defending army to launch a counter-strike;for instance, Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. Instead,author argues, Soviets did things to the contrary.Buffer space was demolished as a result nation came to share a common border with Nazi Germany.Bridges across rivers Bug,Vistula were kept intact.while Red Army erected supply dumps,ammunition depots,airbases closer to the border. What were they for? Sounds shocking.
Author dwells on the nature of Soviet troop deployment.Immense concentration of forces in narrow strips of land which wedged deep into enemy territory. For a nation planning a defensive war this tantamount to suicide. Of particular significance is massing of Soviet forces along the Lvov bulge.Thrust from here along the north western axis toward Baltic coast would have severed Wehrmacht from its supply bases in Germany apart from depriving it of precious oil from Ploeisti in Romania.A maneuver of unprecedented strategic beauty ,a lethal blow which would have destroyed Germany in one shot.Unfortunately for Stalin ,Hitler guessed axe was about to fall upon his neck and swiftly acted to prevent it. Therefore Field Marshal Keitel's comments that Soviets planned a first strike and Germans preempted it stands vindicated.
Suvorov debunks the argument the Red army was an ill-trained,ill-equipped ,poorly-led rabble.Author argues Red Army was primarily trained for offensive and capable of carrying war into enemy territory. Most striking comment is about winter war with Finland which author argues Red army won but was mistakenly assessed by the West. Also details about Soviet TB-7 strategic bomber were terrific. Further author has made narration lively by using metaphors. I liked Suvorov's didactic, simple ,clear writing. I take this opportunity to appeal to publishers kindly make Suvorov's other titles available in English.
The book was an eye-opener to me. For years Soviet propaganda tried to convince that Nazi Germany launched a sneak attack. Author has shown this to be a hoax. World escaped a Soviet-style revolution only by a whisker. Ironically, it was Hitler who averted this calamity.Finally,author while accusing the Bolsheviks of using all forms of aliases for concealing their identities himself has used a pseudonym to cloak his identity which again is ironical.
Joseph Stalin brutalized the Russian people to produce the largest military machine the world has ever seen for one purpose - World Revolution. In the book Hitler's Stooge, Soviet figures are revealed that show Soviet Communists were responsible for the deaths of 132 million people of the Soviet Union from 1917-1989. This was the human cost of the Soviet build up.
The typical history is that Russia was backward, their equipment poor, and the army badly trained. Suvorov goes into excruciating detail about the high quality and astronomical quantity of Soviet weaponry. And, of course, of Stalin's long term plan to invade and conquer Europe in the summer of 1941 - so that Europeans could also enjoy the wonderful benefits of the Gulag.
The only problem with the book is that the print is quite small, and may be a problem for some people. It should have been a larger size for easier readability.
It is hoped that the success of this book will encourage the author to have his other works upon the subject translated into English to further flesh out the history and understanding of Stalin's plan.
This is history at its best. That the world dodged the bullet of World Revolution by less than 2 weeks in 1941 is a revelation deserving of our attention. This is a definite "must read" for everyone interested in the background of World War II, and of Stalin and his dream.
The author has done us all a very great service by bringing this case to our attention. The comparison of Stalin and Hitler in the Preface is worth the price of the book by itself. Author Suvorov also builds a very good case on the strength of the Red Army for its use in conquering Western Europe, particularly with respect to armor which was clearly superior to anything in the West by 1940, in Germany or anywhere else. In fact, it took the US until 1945 to catch up to where the Soviets were in 1940. The widely disseminated verdict on Soviet tanks in 1941 as obsolete was simply untrue, and can be relegated to the dustbin of Soviet propaganda. The arguments concerning the air force are less convincing, and the impact of the purges in the late 1930s are subject to much controversy even before the publication of this book. The author also omits the artillery arm, which the Soviets demonstrated as clearly superior to the Germans beginning with the Battle of Kursk in 1943.
All this begs the question as to why the Red Army performed poorly in 1941. First and foremost was that the readiness of common soldiers to die for Communism and Stalin which was not greatly in evidence in the troops of 1941. Soviet combat effectiveness was greatly enhanced by German brutality and the emergence of a patriotic war for the Russian motherland. The tanks were not as effective as they should have been due to a lack of radio communication and necessity of the tank commander to also act as gunners. In addition, Soviet leadership was clearly inferior to the German as were Soviet tactics. Training was not as good as in Germany, and the Russian peasant did not possess the martial skills of his German counterpart. One must remember that in 1941, much of the German Army was composed of veterans, while most of the Red Army had not yet been blooded.
Where the book is strong is in regards to the positioning of the Soviet units -- essentially in offensive jumping off positions, with air power and supplies well forward. Two fighters were poised to deliver a knockout blow, and the one who swung first won a very great advantage. The author's disclosure of Soviet intelligence concluding that the Wehrmacht was not prepared for a campaign into the Soviet Union, either in clothing (especially winter garb) and in equipment puts Stalin's assumptions into better perspective. Also, the Red Army would reach its operational peak in the fall of 1941 by virture of the pattern of its buildup and enlistments, and the optimum time for an attack on Poland/Germany was in September/October. This pattern would also be in evidence later in the Cold War where the Fall Maneuvers were the moment of maximum effectiveness for the Red Army. The Soviets also could fight efficiently in the winter with their equipment, the Germans couldn't. In retrospect, it appears that Stalin was in a very good position to crush Germany and the West, winning Europe for Communism, if Hitler hadn't attacked first. In the event, it took four years for Stalin to reach the Elbe, but by that time the US was in the war and could defent Western Europe while the Soviets were reaching a point of exhaustion. Stalin's opportunity had passed (for the moment.)
This book almost reads like a detective story where forensic evidence is carefully amassed and analyzed. The reader, especially historians, is/are invited to reason with the author and form conclusions that may or may not agree with the author's.
One can see by other reviews that this thesis is and will be highly controversial, especially to those who might be rather well-disposed to the Soviet side and the myth of Soviet victimhood. But that is hardly a negative, and more evidence is needed to confirm or reject the author's thesis. Ad hominem attacks on the author as being a liar or traitor (to the Soviet Union) are totally out of place in this discussion -- let's examine the facts and draw reasonable conclusions.
Highly recommended to all readers interested in World War II.
For Stalin, Germany was the gateway to the West. He needed to smash it in order to spread his ideology to Western Europe and beyond. After reading this book it becomes pretty clear that Hitler not only had no choice but to invade the USSR, but that his failure to defeat Britain in 1940 guaranteed his defeat.
Stalin's strategy grew from Lenin's belief that if WW1 failed to ignite the world revolution, another war was necessary. Lenin was beholding to Germany for getting him into Russia and Stalin wanted to develop industry. Germany was banned from developing its military. The solution was for Germany to build and test new war equipment inside Russia, out of sight of the West. So both Germany and Russia acquired the technology.
Stalin provided Hitler with scarce supplies so Hitler could fight France and Britain. Russia would then conquer all of them as exhausted/weakened countries. Stalin increased the army from 1 million to 5.5 million. The best troops were sent to learn by fighting the Japanese. Long range bombers were discontinued in favor of ground attack fighters. Heavy tank production (Germany had none) and artillery went into mass manufacture. These prove Suvorov's conclusions.
We now know that Stalin ordered the slaughter of Polish officers. The Germans had said this from the beginning. The Germans also said they attacked Russia because they were about to be attacked. Russian archives and Suvorov's personal investigation prove that was true.
Stalin's Other War by Albert Weeks provides lots of additional details. And he discusses events beyond Stalin's lifetime.