- Vorbespielter Audioplayer
- Verlag: Tantor Audio (2. Juni 2014)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 1467676950
- ISBN-13: 978-1467676953
- Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 4 Kundenrezensionen
Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (Englisch) Vorbespielter Audioplayer – 2. Juni 2014
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“This is the latest in a series of insightful books . . . in which Robert D. Kaplan . . . tries to explain how geography determines destiny—and what we should be doing about it. Asia’s Cauldron is a short book with a powerful thesis, and it stands out for its clarity and good sense from the great mass of Western writing on what Chinese politicians have taken to calling their ‘peaceful development.’ If you are doing business in China, traveling in Southeast Asia or just obsessing about geopolitics, you will want to read it. . . . Throughout the book, Kaplan tempers hard-nose geopolitics with an engaging mix of history and travelogue.”—The New York Times Book Review
“Kaplan has established himself as one of our most consequential geopolitical thinkers. . . . [Asia’s Cauldron] is part treatise on geopolitics, part travel narrative. Indeed, he writes in the tradition of the great travel writers.”—The Weekly Standard
“Kaplan’s fascinating book is a welcome challenge to the pessimists who see only trouble in China’s rise and the hawks who view it as malign.”—The Economist
“Muscular, deeply knowledgeable . . . Kaplan is an ultra-realist [who] takes a non-moralistic stance on questions of power and diplomacy.”—Financial Times
“A riveting, multitextured look at an underexamined region of the world and, perhaps, at the ‘anxious, complicated world’ of the future.”—Booklist
“Part travelogue, part history, and part geostrategic analysis, Asia’s Cauldron sets some lofty goals for itself and largely succeeds in presenting a holistic look at the competing diplomatic and economic interests of the nations along the South China Sea. . . . This volume is an excellent primer to the conflicting ambitions, fears, and futures of the nations bordering this vital sea-lane, which will remain one of the most dangerous flashpoints of the coming decade.”—New York Journal of Books
“In reminding Americans that their age of ‘simple dominance’ must pass, [Kaplan] avoids joining those groping in the dark and almost takes the detached stance of a historian of coming decades, describing how that future Asia came to be. This acceptance of Asia’s complexity and the limits of influence that any outside power has may well be the most valuable lesson.”—National Review
“Asia’s Cauldron is a perfect summation of the present turbulent moment in history, when the World War II security structure is beginning a rapid transformation. Kaplan engages the striking possibilities of where the current confrontation between China and Japan could lead, and underscores the point that this is a lot more significant than a simple border dispute.”—Paul Bracken, Yale University, author of The Second Nuclear Age
“Master global strategist Robert D. Kaplan turns his gaze to the bubbling heat of the South China Sea in his latest tour de force. Asia’s Cauldron deconstructs the extreme volatility of this enormous, dangerous, and vital maritime space. By thoughtfully pulling apart the complex tangle of argument and accusation among the nations of the region, he helps provide a well-charted course for the United States in this most turbulent geopolitical zone of the twenty-first-century.”—Admiral James Stavridis, United States Navy (Ret.), dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts University and Supreme Allied Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2009–2013
“Robert D. Kaplan has done it again: he has written an engaging—but disturbing—book about an area of the world that to most Americans is a distant rimland. Yet in an era of emerging Sino-American competition, the larger Southeast Asian region could well become the explosive cynosure of new great-power rivalries. Asia’s Cauldron is a wonderful and captivating guide that illumines the myriad colliding forces that will shape the future of the Indo-Pacific.”—Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende
Robert D. Kaplan is chief geopolitical analyst for Stratfor, a private global intelligence firm. He is the author of fifteen books on foreign affairs and travel, including The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, and Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. He has been a foreign correspondent for The Atlantic for nearly three decades. In 2011 and 2012 he was named by Foreign Policy magazine as one of the world’s Top 100 Global Thinkers.
From 2009 to 2011, Kaplan served on the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, appointed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Since 2008 he has been a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington. From 2006 to 2008, he was the Class of 1960 Distinguished Visiting Professor at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis. -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine andere Ausgabe: Gebundene Ausgabe.
Kaplan sketches the historical backrop underlines the difference to situation leading up to the outbreak of WW1 and WW11 in Europe
(a maritime rather than land based geography, which hinders the movement of armies, and would slow the action down) ,
and finally re-iterates the importance of oil.His view China flexing its muscles with time working in its favour, leaning on its weaker neighbours in this conflict, witht ideally "no gunshot". However we are still left with the nagging doubt as to the reaction of Vietnam,
Japan, U.S.A, and the danger of escalation from an incident.PGL
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The book seems written for readers with some knowledge of Asia and foreign policy issues. This is both a strength and weakness of the book. The book is very accessible and Kaplan writes clearly enough for readers with only minimal knowledge to step right in. In some ways, the book could serve as an introduction to the countries surrounding the South China Sea. As somebody who teaches about U.S. foreign policy in Asia, I could easily imagine using chapters from this book on my syllabus in future years.
Kaplan provides a compelling chef’s tour of the South China Sea. He has a knack for drawing out the essential political and cultural characteristics of each country without veering into essentialism. I found his chapter on Malaysia – ironically, one of the less consequential disputants in the region – to be particularly insightful in its ability to unpack the potential contradictions in Malaysian modernity and Malay Islam. I found the discussion of each government’s attitude towards military power to be particularly illuminating. Kaplan seems able to obtain honest insights from key policymakers about their country’s relationship with China and the U.S.
On the other hand, the book does not go into sufficient detail for Asia specialists (I am probably in the latter camp) or those who have studied the South China Sea for years. There is surprisingly little discussion about the territorial claims themselves – if anything, the book focuses on the disputants, not the disputes. He skims over important aspects of the issue, such as ASEAN’s role (or lack thereof). While he does include anecdotes about the state of military and naval forces in each country, analysts will likely long for more rigorous detail. Kaplan does not end the book with grand foreign policy proposals for the Obama administration or State Department. I think this partly reflects his admirable humility, but also left me wondering how the U.S. should proceed in the future (especially because one of the disputants, the Philippines, is a treaty ally).
I certainly do not mean this to be a criticism of Asia’s Cauldron, but rather to suggest that the book will likely suit generalist readers more than Asia scholars. It provides invaluable insights into the countries along the South China Sea. Policy wonks, however, will probably want to supplement this book with a report from Brookings or other think tanks.
This book explains what this situation is all about, the situation of each country on the South China Sea, and why China is so hostile to all this. Note that China is building up their military, not their army, but their navy, and to a slightly lesser degree, their air force.
The American press pictures China as the hostile power here, but when you look at it, China feels they have a rightful claim to the South China Sea, just as the U.S. has a claim on the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, and Europe having a claim on the Mediterranean, except that the U.S. does not violate the territorial waters off of other countries in the Gulf or the Caribbean.
With China now being a major economic power, and they do do business with India, Africa, and the Middle East,the South China Sea provides major passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and, like the United States, China intends to become a two ocean country. This sea also has a lot of valuable natural resources, starting with oil and natural gas, not to mention rich fishing grounds, and China is going to want all that wealth. With a population of 1.3 billion people, they are going to need it.
Another little known fact is that China does not go by the Law of the Sea treaty, with a claim 200 miles of the continental shelf off its coast only, with all other international borders respected. China want all of the sea. The U.S., from their point of view, has no right to it because they are a country 7000 miles away, with no claim whatsoever. China, having a history of being colonized, and humiliated by other world powers, in coming into its own, and what they claim, they will have. That's the way they see it. Are they really the villains?
Other countries around the sea do see China as a threat, and China's claims are intruding on their own territories on the sea, with Chinese coast guard vessels driving off fishing boats and other vessels, laying claim to small islands other countries also claim (the Spratleys, the Parcels, etc.).
Because of this, these countries, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam (yes, Vietnam), Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia are all drawing up treaties with the U.S., allowing them to either establish naval bases or at least allow our navy ships to dock at their ports. Many of these countries and also establishing posts of their own in the sea to counteract China.
This is where the situations stands today.
Robert Kaplan has visited these countries, studied their cultures, and history, and gives a clear understanding of why these countries, and China, have the points of view that they do. In order to stabilize that part of the world, the U.S. Navy, and Air Force, has to be there to protect these countries and allow freedom for their ships, merchant and military, to sail where needed. China needs the freedom to sail on the South China Sea, through the Straits of Malacca, to the Indian Ocean and beyond to Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
What is especially interesting is the question on Taiwan. China may want it back, and they are very stubborn about this, but Taiwan's coast is almost impossible for ships to land in invade, and the Taiwanese themselves are armed to the teeth.
Vietnam, in spite of our war with them (they call it the American War), has invited the U.S. Navy back to Cam Rahn Bay for ships to dock. They have a sense of superiority because they won the war against us, but that is fading into history.
Malaysia is an interesting case because, although Muslim, that also have a Chinese and Indian population, and they all get along quite well.
All these countries and cultures are described in great detail, and gives us a point of view that Americans do not have.
One reason why this book is accurate because after I have finished reading it, I read in the newspapers how U.S. Air Force reconnaissance planes constantly flies over the South China Sea to spy on the Chinese and test their reaction. It is only a matter of time before the Chinese navy and air forces catches up with us.
Also given are scenarios of China should their economy begin to fail. How likely that is remains to be seen.
When you read the newspapers about the present situation in the South China Sea, I strongly recommend that you pick up this book for a clear point of view, and how China and Southeast Asia sees it.
Kaplan does a good job explaining the issues. Firstly, the South China Sea is an important waterway. More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the region. Secondly, it contains a lot of oil and China is desperate for new energy. Chinese oil reserves account for only 1.1% of the world total, while it consumes over 10% of world oil production. China believes the South China Sea contains more oil than any area of the globe except Saudi Arabia. Some Chinese observers have called the South China Sea “the second Persian Gulf.” Thirdly, China is seeking an Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine, and believes in “Asia for the Asians.” Fourthly, the future of the region depends on whether the US is willing to pull-back and allow China to expand its power and influence.
Kaplan believes the South China Sea is to China what the Greater Caribbean was to the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries. He argues that the United States became a great power, geopolitically, by dominating the Caribbean. He claims that the Europeans departed the Caribbean allowing the US to dominate it. He suggests that the US should consider reciprocating in the South China Sea. “American officials…must be prepared to allow, in some measure, for a rising Chinese navy to assume its rightful position, as the representative of the region’s largest indigenous power.”
Kaplan has this back-to-front. The US did not chase Britain out of the Caribbean. Britain had several sugar colonies in the region and possessed the world’s largest navy. It maintained several naval bases and in 1895 it could deploy forty-four battleships to America’s two. Its ships went where they wanted, like the US today. America still thought of Britain as its major geopolitical rival at Bretton Woods in 1944. Like Britain in the Caribbean, the US has no intention of pulling out of the South China Sea.
The US has maintained a military edge over its rivals since WW2 because of its superior technology. Most "experts" in the media advise us that for the foreseeable future, China’s military is no match for America’s. The US Navy still relies on 11 very expensive, but increasingly vulnerable aircraft carriers to police the oceans. However, China has been developing capabilities specifically designed to counter America’s power in the Pacific. The Economist reports that for over two decades China has been investing in submarines, air defense systems, ballistic missiles, and advanced cyber capabilities. The aim is to make it too dangerous for America’s carriers to operate close to China. The Economist suggests that the US may find it difficult to win a war in the South China Sea. After all, the US fought China during the Korean War and the result was a draw.
The US has been the hegemonic power in Asia since WW2, but it now has a rival. America assumes the right to send its ships close to the Chinese mainland, and China views this as intimidation. Kaplan believes that the US is in relative decline, while China’s military power will continue to grow. He concludes that America will either have to change the way it operates in the South China Sea, or risk war.
The US does not have many good options. Many of the states in the region depend on the United States for diplomatic and military support. It will be difficult to run away, as Ian Bremmer has advocated. Kaplan is hopeful that China will become a benign regional hegemon and won’t pose a threat to its neighbors. Kaplan is optimistic about China, he claims that China “however truculent, is no Imperial Japan.”