- Taschenbuch: 528 Seiten
- Verlag: Penguin; Auflage: Reprint (28. April 2016)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 014312448X
- ISBN-13: 978-0143124481
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 13,8 x 2,8 x 21,4 cm
- Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 2 Kundenrezensionen
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After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead (Englisch) Taschenbuch – 18. Dezember 2013
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The Wall Street Journal:
"[Blinder] is a master storyteller... [After the Music Stopped] is one of the best books yet about the financial crisis."
Michiko Kakutani, The New York Times:
"Highly readable... Mr. Blinder draws on the work of many... reporters in his account. But if large portions of After the Music Stopped feel familiar, the book nonetheless benefits from its wide-angle perspective, as well as from its vantage point in time, now that it's possible to assess the fallout of decisions that were being made on the run by White House and Treasury officials under extraordinary pressures. It also benefits from Mr. Blinder's clear-eyed prose and nimble gifts as an explainer — gifts that sometimes approach those of Bill Clinton, when it comes to making complicated economic issues and policies understandable to the lay reader. Direct and concise, Mr. Blinder tells it as he sees it."
"Blinder's book deserves its likely place near the top of reading lists about the crisis. It is the best comprehensive history of the episode... A riveting tale."
The New Republic:
"For a reader wondering how we got here, and why the people in charge have seemed, often, to be so chary of stringing up the culprits, or tearing down the system, Blinder's book - not least because his fair-minded approach and pragmatic mindset evokes that of America's current regulators - gives us an invaluable insight."
"What does all the knowledge mean to generalist readers? A lot, actually. Blinder is no defender of his economist colleagues or other former and current insiders who caused so much damage - or, at minimum, failed to see the collapse on the horizon. He writes clearly - as well as lots of journalists. That combination makes the book a worthy addition to the literature."
“If you want to get between the covers with your favorite econ nerd this season, I recommend Alan Blinder’s After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response and the Work Ahead. Written by the former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, this deserves a place among the top reads on the Great Panic and its aftermath.”
Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"A prodigiously detailed yet generally accessible investigation of the roots of the meltdown, its multiple and continuing reverberations in the United States and globally, and the short-term fixes and long-term remedies required to treat, and then heal, the patient."
President William J. Clinton:
"If you want to understand every aspect of our economic crisis—how we got into it, how we escaped a depression, why we haven't fully recovered, and what we have to do now—read this book. It's a masterpiece—simple, straightforward and wise."
Paul A. Volcker:
"True to his scholarly roots and informed by his practical insights, Alan Blinder has produced in After the Music Stopped both a comprehensive and, mirabile dictu, engagingly readable analysis of the great financial crisis. Whether or not one agrees with every particular judgment, the force of the argument is clear: here we are, four years later, still short of reforms that are needed."
"Alan Blinder is one of the world's best informed and most balanced, sensible economists. His credentials include years as a senior adviser in the Clinton White House, then as vice chairman of the Federal Reserve and as regular op-ed contributor to the Wall Street Journal. After the Music Stopped is the best account available of what really happened in the 2008 financial crisis, why and what it now means for the future."
Mohamed A. El-Erian:
"Of all the books that I have read on the topic—and I have read quite a few—After the Music Stopped provides the most authoritative account of the why, how and what of the global financial crisis. This highly readable analysis takes you brilliantly through the construction of America's fragile house of financial cards, its sudden and dramatic collapse and, as important, the difficult reconstruction and rehabilitation work that must still be done. Whether you are interested in current affairs or in history, read this book if you want an expert and well-written analysis of how economics and politics interacted to create one big mess, not just for America but also for the global economy."
Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende
Alan S. Blinder, one of the world’s most trusted economists, is the Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University and vice chairman of the Promontory Interfinancial Network.
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If you are interested in the financial crisis, this is one for you.
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This book explains what really happened to us and why in the financial crisis. All of us know the crisis. Many can discuss it at the "cocktail party, shaking of the head" level of discourse, but few us can discuss the "why-did-they-do-it" or know what lies ahead for us next time. We think it too complicated or too much inside baseball to take the time to figure it out.
Blinder has done this work for us in an entertaining yet scholarly way that we can believe. It's not 24-hour news cycle hype nor a dumbed down HBO movie script.
The narrative is an easy read through a difficult subject. It is better and more entertaining than for example Michael Lewis's "Big Short" (though Lewis is a Princetonian as well and probably took a course from Blinder) in part because Blinder takes us on a journey through the origins and responses to the ENTIRE financial crisis. Along the way, he asks the questions we would ask and then answers them in a down to earth prose.
Before writing this review, I looked at the expert reviews. The Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, Washington Post and even the Cleveland Plain Dealer described this book as the "best" account of what happened and why. While everyone has opinion on some aspect of the account, there is a consensus that Blinder presents the information in the best possible way for the rest of us and offers the most comprehensive discussion. The Washington Post said something I rarely see "Alan Blinder is a national treasure...He invariably sees what's really going on and has a gift for explaining it without being blinded by party or ideology." Then you have Bill Clinton saying " "If you want to understand every aspect of our economic crisis--how we got into it, how we escaped a depression, why we haven't fully recovered, and what we have to do now--read this book. It's a masterpiece--simple, straightforward and wise." Turn off CNBC and Fox; pick up Blinder. The PBS Nightly Business report did a good interview which you can watch here [...]
As I read through the chapters, I found myself not needing to stop and consider what I just read. The prose flows in a way that is almost conversational as the sordid story unfolds. It is as if the expert is there with me and understands I need an example from my life to make the exposition real to me.
Each chapter is divided into subsections and sub-headers to guide us though the narrative that is not a fluid sequence of a + b + c but more complex. Yet, the complexity is dealt like weaving a fabric. Each piece fits together and it is only until the end you realize that you have just completed something complicated. It seemed so simple as you went through it. And this is where I have an "AHA" moment. So THAT is what was going on. How did I get there? Blinder walked me through it...and i didn't even realize it.
In the end, Blinder gives a set of seven prescriptions for dealing with the next crisis. He clearly is an optimist and believes that enlightenment can change behavior. I'm not so sure. For example he didn't really address how the crazy compensation systems he identified up front will change. Greed still exists. If bankers pay cash up front for taking long-term risks, I doubt much changes. Yet that is something insidious. Blinder can't be expected to give us all the solutions.
"After the Music Stopped" is a great read to help the rest of us understand what happened. Then, what will be, will be, que sera sera. Read this book; understand. Make your own contribution, whether with friends at that cocktail party, at the office, online or in the solitude of the voting booth.
Blinder's 'supershort version' is that the U.S. financial system had grown far too complex and fragile for its own good, and had far too little regulation for the public good. It then experienced a perfect storm during 2007-09 that started with the bursting of the housing bubble, then followed by a 'bond bubble' implosion that was probably more devastating. The stock market also collapsed, turning many 401(k)s into '201(k)s.'
Blinder tells us that all modern economies rely on credit-granting mechanism to nourish the rest of the system, the U.S. more than most. What had been far too much credit turned into vastly too little. Congress then expanded the social safety net and enacted large-scale fiscal stimulus programs, the Federal Reserve dropped interest rates to the floor, created incredible amounts of liquidity, and took over AIG insurance. The result, per Blinder, was a modestly happy ending; however, he gives our macroeconomic performance post-Fall 2008 an F.
Why? Total jobs losses were just under 8.8 million, over a period during which we should have added about 3.1 million more, created a cumulative job deficit of about 12 million by 2/2010. Then the job deficit rose even higher in 2010-11 as job creation fell short of the 125,000/month required to keep up with population growth. By 8/2012 total employment was only back to 4/2005 levels - zero net growth over a period exceeding seven years.
In an average month during 1948-2007, less than 13% of the unemployed were jobless for over 6 months; by 4/2010, it was over 45%, and only slightly less today. Read GDP decline in 5 of the 6 quarters of 2008 and the first half of 2009 - the worst performance since the 1930s.
Blinder does not believe the housing boom/bust was a major factor in our poor recent economic performance.Residential construction normally comprises about 4% of GDP (4.5% in 2000), hit 6.3% in 2005:4, then started falling. Spread over the five years, this 'boom' added just 0.3% to the overall GDP growth rate. Home prices peaked in 2006 or 2007, depending on the measure used. Spending on new homes then fell to less than half this peak. Two or three years passed between the start of the decline in housing construction and the serious decline in the overall economy. During 2006-07 real GDP rose at a 2.3% annual rate and unemployment barely budged. Instead, Lehman Brothers' failure on 9/15/2008 kicked off the crisis.
Seven key weaknesses predated and contributed greatly to the ensuring financial mess. 1)Inflated asset prices, especially housing. 2)Excessive leverage. 3)Lax financial regulation - both in terms of what the law didn't regulate (eg. no one was responsible for the national mortgage market or protecting gullible consumers) and how poorly regulators performed their duties. 4)Disgraceful banking practices in mortgage lending. 5)Crazy unregulated securities and derivatives built on those bad mortgages. 6)Abysmal performance of statistical rating agencies. 7)Perverse compensation systems that created incentives to go for broke. Summarizing - errors and frauds by private companies and individuals, combined by government's hands-off policy that limited aid to corporations did us all in. A backlash against TARP's overgenerous bailouts and failure to prosecute corporate leaders was then directed against government activism, Obama, Congress - especially Democrats, Keynesian economics, and the Federal Reserve.
Blinder then reviews some of the most common prescriptives for preventing recurrence. Glass-Steagall (GS) would not have succeeded. U.S. banking problems mostly didn't come from investment banking, but from high leverage combined with poor lending practices. Nor would GS have prevented the shenanigans at Bear Stearns, AIG, Countrywide, etc. Blinder also rules out actions directed against 'Too Big to Fail' (TBTG). These would force large U.S. firms to either deal with scores of modest-sized banks or large ones based overseas. Instead, he proposes a systemic risk regulatory federal agency that (hopefully) would have seen the dodgy mortgages, the questionable AAA ratings for securities built on those mortgages, the hug risk concentrations on and off banks' balance sheets, and the fact that a single insurance company (AIG) was on the sell side of an inordinate share of CDs issued and lacked the capital to back them.
Reducing allowable leverage would reduce profitability. Volker has proposed banning FDIC-insured banks from proprietary trading. Blinder, however, points out that it's difficult in practice to distinguish trading for the bank's own account and market-making for a client. Hedging (good) can be distinguished from gambling (bad) only by knowing a bank's entire portfolio, if even then. Should a giant non-bank investment house with a huge trading book be allowed to go under ala Lehman? 'Not very appealing,' per Blinder. Meanwhile, we now have six federal regulatory agencies and 100 more at the state level (bank and insurance). Overlap and gaps are a problem.
Derivatives are another target for reform proposals. Blinder points out that they can be used to hedge or gamble, and an insurer can go bankrupt, dragging others down. Perhaps their most obvious flaw comes with customized OTC products and their bringing opacity, higher trading costs, and richer profits for investment banks - the latter creating large profits and resistance to change.
Hedge funds have been another source of ire. However, Blinder contends they helped mitigate the housing/bond bubbles via short-selling that pushed prices down, they typically use less leverage (managers are owners with a great deal of their own money at risk), none were seen as TBTF, and none received government assistance. So why push greater regulation? Because if the Volcker Rule was adopted the shift in trading might make some hedge funds TBTF.
How to fix the ratings agencies - assign issuers randomly to ratings agencies (Sen. Frankel).
ARMs were not the major cause of mortgage defaults, except in the early days of the crisis when rates rose. The Federal Reserve's subsequent efforts to lower rates then either stopped upward resets or lowered rates. Job losses and other economic setbacks were a much bigger problem.
Blinder contends the mortgage default crisis could have been prevented by $200+ billion in federal lending, per the 1930s model provided by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC). It paid off existing home mortgages and replaced them with new ones with less onerous terms; financing came from the Treasury and the open markets. Despite 20% still defaulting, the HOLC made a small profit overall before it was terminated. We overbuilt about 1.75 million houses prior to the collapse, and since then underbuilt about 3 million - thus, a similar program today would have been digestible. Unfortunately, government leaders were too timid (possibly scared off by negative reactions to TARP), ideologically opposed, and/or bureaucratic.
To his credit, Blinder is critical of virtually all the major culprits, though he is rather soft in his criticisms of the Federal Reserve (the Fed)and the federal government. He tends to minimize the role that the Fed had in creating the crisis in the first place. This is not surprising for a former high-ranking Fed official. In addition, he seems to relegate moral hazard to a secondary or even tertiary cause or factor in the crisis, whereas I think it plays a primary role, not just because of the recent bailouts but because of the message that has been conveyed for several decades by the Fed that the big banks and their profits will always be safe. I believe this is one of the main reasons why executives and other workers at large financial firms are given such huge bonuses: they know they'll be bailed out if things get really ugly, so why keep the cash on hand. The executives themselves may not understand this at a conscious level, but the Fed's message over the decades has been clear. Indeed, The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve makes a pretty good case that one of the main reasons the Fed was founded in the first place was to ensure profits for the big banks. And after the rescue of, I think, Continental Illinois bank in the 1980s, that book cites none other than former Fed chairman Paul Volcker as saying that saving the big banks was one of the main reasons the Fed was created.
Blinder cites some facts that did, I admit, surprise me. For example, in the end TARP (Trouble Assets Relief Program) netted a small profit for the American taxpayer. In addition, he suggests that the Fed's keeping interest rates so low for so long can't be a main cause of the housing bubble since England, for example, also had a housing bubble in the midst of interest-rate increases by that country's central bank. Such facts did, as I said, surprise me. At this point, I don't know what to make of them, except that they do seem to poke a hole in some criticisms of low interest rates advanced by libertarian economists/thinkers. Until I read Blinder's book, I had bought into those criticisms.
However, I don't believe Blinder is a big-picture kind of thinker. I say this because he looks for the causes of the current crisis in more recent events and doesn't seem to give much thought to the cumulative effects of certain policies. For example, what have the effects been of taking the U.S. off the gold standard, as a first step by FDR and then definitively by Nixon in 1971? By severing the link between gold and the dollar, Nixon unleashed forces that could ultimately lead to the complete devaluation of the dollar. After all, the average lifespan of fiat currencies (and why should they die at all?) is around 100 years. Look at a chart of the dollar. It starts losing serious value around 1898 when we entered the Spanish American war and then continues its irrevocable and earnest decline after 1913, the year the Fed was founded. Doesn't look like a good record of fighting inflation to me. What are the effects of Fed policies over the past century? Blinder doesn't address this issue.
Blinder also doesn't address the issue of what it means to have the world's de facto reserve currency as the U.S. does, what that has meant for Americans' standard of living, and what losing that status could mean for us in the future. Likewise, Blinder doesn't look at legislation, such as the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, that undoubtedly led to the housing bubble in the early to mid-2000s. That legislation, together with a report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in 1992 that suggested that lending policies of banks were inherently racist, coupled with threats by the Clinton Justice Department to file suit against lenders who evinced race-based lending policies (the report was later shown to be based on flimsy evidence), directly contributed to the run-up in housing prices, but Blinder does not even mention it. He must be aware of it, but for whatever reason, it doesn't fall within his radar. Another major issue completely ignored by Blinder is a central feature of our banking system: fractional reserve banking (FRB). The long-term, cumulative effects of fractional reserves are truly perverse; personally, I see no difference between FRB and counterfeiting. However, the effects of FRB are long term and so take a while to be felt. Finally is the inflation threat. Blinder seems to believe government statistics on inflation that show it to be minimal. But, as John Williams at ShadowStats has shown, government inflation models of today are not what they were in the 1980s, which weren't what they were in the first half of the 20th century. If they were, then the government would be showing inflation running at a much higher rate than it currently reports. I don't know if Blinder is deliberately skipping over Williams' work, but he doesn't question government-derived statistics on inflation (or unemployment).
Where Blinder is most at odds with my way of thinking is in his prescriptions for dealing with the situation. After arguing that one of the factors that contributed to the financial crisis was a lack of enforcement of regulation (regulation that was already in place), Blinder advocates more regulation, without explaining how that regulation would have any better chance of being enforced than the regulations that supposedly would have mollified the effects of the current crisis had they been enforced. When Harry Markopoulos, author of No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller, first notified the Federal Reserve about Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme, there was already enough regulation in place to stop Madoff in his tracks, and his investors would have lost only $3 billion at that point. By the time regulators got around to enforcing the law, Madoff had $50 billion in investors' money. Thus, the problem was not with a lack of regulation but a lack of enforcement. Blinder doesn't explain how new regulation would necessarily be enforced.
One minor aspect of the book I had a problem with was the style. Blinder tries to combine a scholarly, learned tone (and he is clearly at ease with his subject matter - a big plus of the book) with a chummy, colloquial one. Sometimes this grated on my nerves, and in one instance it makes Blinder look rather foolish. The title of Chapter 8 is "Stimulus, Stimulus, Wherefore Art Thou, Stimulus," an obvious echo of Juliet's "Oh Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou Romeo" from Shakespeare's "Romeo and Juliet." The first thing to note here is that in the original, there is no comma before the last "Romeo" because Juliet is not talking to Romeo; it's a monologue. The second, and more important, thing to note is that "wherefore" is an archaic word that means "why," not "where." Juliet is saying "Why does your name have to be Montague" (of all families in the world, why do you have to be the son of my father's mortal enemy?)? Blinder's use of "wherefore" thus makes no sense. I think he meant to say "stimulus, stimulus, where are you," because so far, the stimulus that the government promised hasn't materialized, but he seems to be ignorant of the real meaning of "wherefore." (Doesn't Blinder have any friends in the English Department at Princeton?) It's a minor point, I know, but it makes Blinder's attempt at showing off his erudition look silly.
All in all, I consider this book a worthwhile read, though by no means the final word. The bibliography and notes are also very good. However, Blinder seems (forgive me) blind to his own underlying assumptions, and if you don't know that it's possible to look at some very basic issues very differently from how Blinder regards them, you might not understand that Blinder is making an assumption at all but just stating the facts. But Blinder's general view is along the lines of the dominant one in the media and in policy circles, so it is likely to be praised as clear and even-handed, even wise. I recommend reading it alongside other books, though, for a broader understanding of the ongoing financial and economic crisis.
And so it proved.
I've read the lot. From Kaletsky to Krugman, from Stiglitz to Shiller, and what they all have in common is an angle; an axe to grind. Blinder, you feel, has written this book as a mere starting point. He just wants to get the facts documented as they happened. And he's not out to cover his tracks either. He does not spare his former masters any punches. The Clinton administration's misdeeds could very easily have been shoved under the carpet, since that presidency ended a good seven-eight years before the crash, but there's mention of both the "well-publicised drives to increase homeownership -including by relatively low-income families" (p. 59) and of the Clinton Treasury having been on the wrong side on the regulation of financial derivatives (p.279).
Blinder has done his level best to produce an honest, meticulous account of the crisis. That is by far the strongest part of the book. He starts with seven causes of the crash. Most accounts concentrate on one or two, but he gives us a long, if prosaic, list:
1. the bubbles in housing and housing-related debt,
3. lack of regulation, especially of shadow banking,
4. disgraceful practices in subprime lending,
6. the poor incentive structure and inflated significance of rating agencies,
7. compensation-related incentives and Other People's Money.
As you can see, he keeps it simple and he keeps it all within the realms of finance. You won't find tirades about inequality, global imbalances, or the global glut of savings here. The case is built from lower-level, almost technical, stuff.
I was particularly impressed by a distinction he makes about the Fed. When it comes to the housing bubble, the way he puts it "the enemy is us." People fooled themselves into thinking they had discovered the financial wizard inside them and bought more house. To blame the Fed is probably disingenuous. Low Fed-administered rates, on the other hand, are blamed for the frenzy of housing-related debt that fed back (pun not intended) into the housing market. So the Fed can only be held accountable for what the author calls the "bond bubble" but not the housing bubble. I personally disagree a bit with the author on this. I think he underestimates the power of the feedback loop between more housing-related debt and housing prices going mad as the Wall Street / mortgage banking axis went ape, "sourcing" more "product." But it is a very legitimate distinction and one well worth making.
He then dives straight into a day-by-day account of the two most intense years of the crisis and how it unfolded. What institution got hurt when, how the authorities responded, what worked, what didn't, and all of it as if you were in the control room. You really feel like you were riding along with Bernanke, Paulson and Geithner as they battled the crisis. He also makes a very good distinction between the first part of the fight, which was all about bailing out Bear, Fannie and Freddie, Merrill, Lehman, AIG, Wachovia, WaMu, Citi and Bank of America, and the second part of the fight, where the authorities changed tack and concentrated on saving entire markets, rather than individual institutions: the money market, the CP market, the market for bank bonds etc. I'm convinced he correctly identifies this as the turning point where the "war was won" and depression was averted.
Very importantly, this book is ACCESSIBLE. The author explains everything in plain English. I think you can follow the whole thing without being an expert. With non-expert readers in mind, the author has tons of "boxes" interspersed through the book, that explain all sorts of financial concepts in plain English: "Leverage and Financial Returns," "What is a Derivative," "Insolvency vs. Illiquidity," "The Moral Hazard Debate," "Contagion and Financial Panics," "Signalling and Stigma," "Bid-Ask Spreads," "Keynesian Economics and Stimulus," "The Expectations Theory of the Yield Curve," "Quantitative Easing," "Proprietary Trading" and "Information and Free-Riding." I really really wish he had dedicated another box to explaining what the Fed does outside of a crisis and how we have substituted Federal obligations (backed by taxes on Americans) for gold at the heart of the monetary system and that all money used is printed. He often refers to this, and clearly he is at total peace with it, but he assumes his readership also understands this. Many people don't.
Regardless, the great thing about the first, dunno, 200 pages of the book is that it is a 100% honest account of how we got into and out of big trouble. I would recommend it with zero reservation to anybody who would like an objective historical overview of the crisis in plain English. The account is straight and plain, it has a beginning and an end, it's balanced and it never attempts to over-reach.
Sadly, it's a bit downhill from there. Not terribly downhill. But not as strong as the first half of the book, that's all.
For example, I loved the chapter about Dodd-Frank. It's really all there. You find out where it started, what's in it, how it got there and what's left open. There are extensive tables to help you track the reforms. I think I'll make a spreadsheet of that table and keep it on my computer so I can carry on keeping track for myself as we go on.
On the other hand, the book goes partisan at some stage. When it comes to discussing the Obama stimulus package, it goes almost into full-front attack on the Republican party. It's a crying shame. It means I can't recommend his book to my Republican friends and family. They will read the first 200 pages, which I find excellent and fair, and then they will read what the author has to say about the stimulus and they will (unjustifiably) doubt the first 200 pages. They will think I duped them into reading a Democrat pamphlet, and a 400-page pamphlet at that. Ach!
And it goes catty too. If anything, I find Blinder is far too careful (dare I say American?) in going out of his way to never doubt the guys in charge. He defers to Paulson's and Geithner's best judgement when it comes to their single-mindedness with reference to bailing out some institutions and people who had been on horrible behaviour (though he does decry that only one man, Lee Farkas, has been convicted of any crime relating to the crisis to this day) and he is not merely deferential to Bernanke (in a very strong chapter on "Unconventional Monetary Policy"), his prose amounts to grovelling. He thinks TARP is the best thing since sliced bread and chooses to not mention that some of its financial returns were funded by other parts of government. So be it. But in that context it is very dissonant to hear him repeatedly pan Larry Summers. If there is no room for backseat drivers, and that's very much the tone of the book, leave him alone. It is unthinkable to me that Summers broke more rules than Paulson, Geithner or Bernanke or that he was anywhere nearly as conflicted or involved, for that matter.
My conclusion about this book is that it's a fantastic guide to the crisis for the uninitiated. Not for me, though, because I've lived the crisis from my trading desk and because I've read tons about it. With five years' worth of hindsight, I was hoping for some synthesis after the exquisite analysis.
Blinder defines the problem narrowly enough to declare the response a triumph. He does not ask where we're left, other than to refer to issues everybody with a pulse knows about, like the future costs of Medicare and the need for both lower spending and higher taxes in the future, but lax fiscal policy now. If you watch CNBC for an hour somebody will mention all of that. Twice.
The only concession he makes is to call the foreclosure situation a "train wreck" and to admit that it should have been dealt with better. But, having discussed moral hazard extensively, he does not tell us if he thinks we're now awaiting the next moral-hazard-induced train wreck or if we're OK. Having started his book by stating the whole crisis was caused by letting Lehman go, he does not return to the topic to let us know if this was a rhetorical flourish or what he considers to be fact. He does not offer a view of where we'd be without Lehman, of whether it was one of many accidents waiting to happen or the one key we'd have to turn to avoid the crisis (which is a commonly held view of the establishment). He does not attempt to tell us if the 2008 victory was Pyrrhic or decisive.
Also, his perfunctory chapter on Europe should have been left out, it is not to the standard of the rest of the book.
Same goes for his ten commandments and seven recommendations. Blinder strongly commends Paulson / Geithner / Bernanke for their "laser-beam focus" on the narrow issue-at-hand. He should follow his own advice, decide where the economy needs to head and then go making recommendations for the future and focus them around this one core. Instead, he goes scattergun.
So I think what we have here is 200 pages of a five-star book that focuses on analysis, maybe even a six star book, followed by an honest but flawed three-star book that does not do a terribly good job of synthesis. I'm better off for having read it, though, and I have not found a better one.
Halfway through the book I was ready to say my search was over, that's what rankles...