Amazon.com:
Early in Emergence
, you note that the principle of
complex behavior arising from simple components is nearly ubiquitous, yet we've
only noticed it comparatively recently. Why did it take us so long?
Steven Johnson:
I think what's happened recently is that we've begun to
understand emergence as a kind of global
phenomenon, one that shows up
in a number of different fields and that seems to obey similar laws as you jump
from field to field. But we've been observing the local
renditions for a
long time--that's why I spend so much time near the beginning of the book
talking about Engels's visit to Manchester in the mid-19th century. He wrote a
wonderful passage describing the way that city neighborhoods form orderly
patterns without any master planners laying them out--which is the essence of
urban emergence--but he didn't have the vocabulary yet to explain what was
really happening, or to connect it to other disciplines.
The same goes for a number of the other fields I look at in the
book. (For instance, we've understood that ant colonies have a kind of
decentralized intelligence for centuries--if not longer.)
Why did we start seeing the global phenomenon now instead of a
hundred years ago? That's always a hard question to answer, but part of the
explanation has to be the invention of modern, graphical computers, which made
it much easier for us to visualize, model, and experiment with these
systems.
Amazon.com:
Does emergence scale? If simple elements like ants and neurons can
give rise to intelligent functions, are we likely to see the same kind of jump
when we combine more complex elements (like humans)?
Johnson:
I do believe that emergence scales, and you can see that scaling
in action in any metropolitan center, where neighborhoods spontaneously form
and sometimes keep their shape for hundreds of years. Or you can see it in
something like Amazon's recommendation system. I don't want to sound like I'm
preaching to the choir here, but the recommendation agent that we interact with
at Amazon has gotten remarkably smart in a remarkably short time. If you've
built up a long purchase history with Amazon, you'll tend to get pretty
sophisticated recommendations. That's a kind of emergent behavior as well--a
bottom-up intelligence that comes from looking for patterns in distributed,
lower-level behavior.
For these systems to work, though, you need to eliminate a lot of
individual complexity. In the city, the neighborhood clusters are formed
through simple movement patterns: you visit this neighborhood on the weekend;
you move out of another one after 10 years; you make a random visit to another
neighborhood one afternoon. Your internal mental life and all its complexity is
effectively irrelevant to the system of the neighborhood--it's all shaped by
crude traffic patterns. Same goes for Amazon's recommendation system. The
software doesn't know what it's like to read a book, or what you feel like when
you read a particular book. All it knows is that people who bought this book
also bought these other ones; or that people who rated these books highly also
rated these books highly, etc. Out of that elemental data something more
nuanced can emerge--if you set up the system correctly, and give it enough
data.
Amazon.com:
Given that we're participating in emergent phenomena, how can we
recognize them as such, any more than an ant can recognize its place in the
colony?
Johnson:
For the same reason that we recognize many things that the ants
don't recognize. We have giant neocortices that are incredibly good at rational
thinking, observation, and language--while the individual ants have extremely
limited conceptual tools and no complex language to convey whatever
observations they might stumble across. Ants and humans also share a sense of
smell, and in many ways the ant's smell system is far more nuanced than
ours--it's the closest thing the ants have to a language--but even the most
radical champion of ant intelligence will acknowledge that humans
understand
how smell works better than the ants do. The same goes for
emergence.
Amazon.com:
While comparing car traffic in Los Angeles to foot traffic in more
traditional cities, you suggest that human interactions on freeways are too
short-lived to give rise to higher-level order. Yet there are some
freeway-related phenomena that seem inexplicable if one disregards
emergence--traffic congestion is one example that you cite. What's going on
here?
Johnson:
That's a really interesting question, and I hadn't thought about
it much since I wrote the line you refer to. I think the answer is the flip
side of what I said about the need for eliminating individual complexity in
emergent systems. I think the cars are too simple.
Ants or humans have a
relatively simple set of actions that contribute to the higher-level system of
the colony or the neighborhood, but it's not too
simple. It matters when
someone decides to move to a neighborhood, but it also matters whether that
person is an investment banker, a lesbian, a technology writer, or all of the
above. The higher-level attributes of the neighborhood change based on those
subtleties. The ants, similarly, have a sophisticated pheromone language that
they use to communicate with one another. But the cars are far more crude in
the flow of information between them. What do you care about when you're
driving? You care about how fast you're going. Everything else is pretty much
peripheral to that. So the primary piece of information that's being shared by
the complex system of traffic is the number and position of cars and how fast
they're going. All the other subtleties are pretty much useless.
Now, even with that limited supply of information, higher-level
structures form, like traffic jams, or other weird periodic cycles. But they're
nothing to write home about. Because the cars are too stupid.
Amazon.com:
Will intelligence-generating tools like collaborative filtering be
applied to politics and governance? What would that look like?
Johnson:
I hope they will, if only because I think they'll lead to a
fragmenting of the absurd red-vs.-blue political map that has appeared in the
last few decades. Collaborative filtering--when it's done well--does a
remarkably good job of finding smaller pockets of shared interests. Show our
current political system 100 people, and it'll segment that population into two
groups--Republicans and Democrats. Good collaborative filtering will find many
different subcultures within the same 100 people. It's less rigged to segment
the world off into two types of people.
What would that look like? European parliamentary systems,
potentially. Lots of smaller parties, lots of coalitions between them, and
shifting alliances. More diversity, no doubt, but also more power at the
extremes.
Amazon.com:
A dystopian or apocalyptic reader might fear that unstoppably
destructive behaviors could emerge--or are emerging--from seemingly innocuous
small-scale actions. Are we capable of slowing, stopping, or changing the
course of our higher-order behavior?
Johnson:
There are definitely some problems that are best not solved by
emergent tools. There's too much random trial-and-error involved, too much
experimentation. If there's a top-down approach that's clearly working, there's
no need to try our hands at emergent approaches just for the fun of it. But
where the existing top-down solutions aren't working--in inner city housing
projects, to use the Jane Jacobs example--it's worth taking on the risk of the
emergent approach.
Amazon.com:
Many of the examples you give of guiding or tweaking emergence
come from the world of programming. How can we direct our large-scale behavior
in the real world?
Johnson:
At the very end of the book, I talk about the anti-globalization
movement, and its successes over the past two years. I think they've become so
prominent partially because they've explicitly embraced the bottom-up approach
to organization. Think about the popular imagery associated with this movement:
there's no Jackson/Chavez/MLK/Ché figure pounding at the podium,
energizing the masses into action. There are just these loose assemblages of
different groups coming together for each big global finance event. They're
self-organizing clusters, and that's precisely what makes them so powerful.