Why the Mind Is Not a Computer: A Pocket Lexicon of Neuromythology (Societas) [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

First published as "Psycho-electronics" in 1994, this reprinted (2004) edition presents an updated text in an attempt to reach a wider academic audience. In particular, this volume sets out to discuss the working lexicon of researchers from disciplines concerned with the physiology, psychology, and philosophy of mind and consciousness. More specifically, Tallis repeatedly puts forward the idea that semantic (if not otherwise real) deficiencies may underlie our inability to have yet provided any convincing neural account of human consciousness. Indeed, from the outset of his 55-page, 17-item lexicon, the author contends that "appropriate neural activity in a normally functioning nervous system is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of ordinary human consciousness and behaviour". However, in no quarter of his critical neuro-epistemology does Tallis inform the reader as to where one might begin to look for the solution to this insufficiency (i.e., there is none of the esoterica so often included in final chapter speculations of books typical of this genre, e.g., the World 3 of Popper & Eccles, 1977). Indeed one is perhaps reminded of the debates surrounding the James-Lange theory of emotion, but here instead the role of emotion being replaced by consciousness: Is consciousness equateable to specific existential brain/body states, or does it arise only in response to them? What really are the differences between volitional and reflexive arm movement processes, for example?, and how might each be realized in the functioning mammalian nervous system?

Tallis constantly reminds us throughout this volume that much of the literature concerned with consciousness suffers from fallacies derived from the use of persistent abstraction mistakes or category errors such that having used up so much of our higher level language to describe neural activity, one has little remaining with which to describe the difference(s) between basal neural activity in the presence or absence of consciousness. But whereas on the one hand we cannot as yet satisfactorily explain consciousness in terms of any functional neuronal circuitry, neither may we simply reduce it to terms of grammar and information. For example, in his entry for Information, Tallis rightly reminds the reader that information as stored in books or on hard discs remain "potential information" (p.68), which, in and of itself only becomes "'information' proper once realized within the mind of its human receiver's consciousness. In this sense, such information necessarily requires "someone being informed" in order that its description be confirmed. Here, as in many other places throughout this volume, one is pulled up sharp in being encouraged to worry that, if our specific sensations/perceptions are in any way to be thought of as being dependant upon (or modulated by) our individual consciousness, then the former cannot, therefore also be used to explain the origin or emergence of consciousness.

In his critical response to this and other such examples of "neuromythology", Tallis' 17-item lexicon seeks to rectify this situation (and hence the subtitle), whilst also pointing out the poor use of human and mechanical thinking machine homologues in explaining mechanisms of thought, language and reasoning. However, although there is little to read here concerning the detailed workings of either brains or machines, we are nonetheless treated to a superb set of accessible and provocative reminders concerning the subtleties involved in our use of language, symbols, signs, and the limitations upon their use when positing explanations (as opposed to merely descriptions) of mental phenomena. Together with the texts listed in the bibliography, I would envisage critical use of Tallis' various lexicon entries providing great tutorial discussion material for psychology, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience majors alike. I thus strongly recommend this book for its advice to all in search of an explanation (rather than merely a representational redescription) of the phenomenon of human consciousness.

Dr. Tony Dickinson, McDonnell Center for Higher Brain Function
Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, USA.