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When Genius Failed
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On September 23, 1998, the boardroom of the New York Fed was a tense place. Around the table sat the heads of every major Wall Street bank, the chairman of the New York Stock Exchange, and representatives from numerous European banks, each of whom had been summoned to discuss a highly unusual prospect: rescuing what had, until then, been the envy of them all, the extraordinarily successful bond-trading firm of Long-Term Capital Management. Roger Lowenstein's When Genius Failed is the gripping story of the Fed's unprecedented move, the incredible heights reached by LTCM, and the firm's eventual dramatic demise.
Lowenstein, a financial journalist and author of Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist, examines the personalities, academic experts, and professional relationships at LTCM and uncovers the layers of numbers behind its roller-coaster ride with the precision of a skilled surgeon. The fund's enigmatic founder, John Meriwether, spent almost 20 years at Salomon Brothers, where he formed its renowned Arbitrage Group by hiring academia's top financial economists. Though Meriwether left Salomon under a cloud of the SEC's wrath, he leapt into his next venture with ease and enticed most of his former Salomon hires--and eventually even David Mullins, the former vice chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve--to join him in starting a hedge fund that would beat all hedge funds.
LTCM began trading in 1994, after completing a road show that, despite the Ph.D.-touting partners' lack of social skills and their disdainful condescension of potential investors who couldn't rise to their intellectual level, netted a whopping $1.25 billion. The fund would seek to earn a tiny spread on thousands of trades, "as if it were vacuuming nickels that others couldn't see," in the words of one of its Nobel laureate partners, Myron Scholes. And nickels it found. In its first two years, LTCM earned $1.6 billion, profits that exceeded 40 percent even after the partners' hefty cuts. By the spring of 1996, it was holding $140 billion in assets. But the end was soon in sight, and Lowenstein's detailed account of each successively worse month of 1998, culminating in a disastrous August and the partners' subsequent panicked moves, is riveting.
The arbitrageur's world is a complicated one, and it might have served Lowenstein well to slow down and explain in greater detail the complex terms of the more exotic species of investment flora that cram the book's pages. However, much of the intrigue of the Long-Term story lies in its dizzying pace (not to mention the dizzying amounts of money won and lost in the fund's short lifespan). Lowenstein's smooth, conversational but equally urgent tone carries it along well. The book is a compelling read for those who've always wondered what lay behind the Fed's controversial involvement with the LTCM hedge-fund debacle. --S. Ketchum -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.
From Library Journal
This is a marvelous, unauthorized chronicle of the rise, fall, and re-emergence of Long-Term Capital Management, a private hedge fund that in September 1998 benefited from a Federal Reserve-orchestrated $3.6 billion bailout. Based primarily on interviews with key players from the six banks that participated in the rescue of the firm, Lowenstein, who previously wrote Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist, presents a well-crafted, easy-to-follow text. Readers will better appreciate the inner workings of the firm; the nuances of the individual partners; primary differences among investing in stocks, bonds, and derivatives; the fallacy of the efficient market hypothesis; the impact of computers on financial trading; and the importance of moderation. Recommended for both academic and public libraries.
-DNorman B. Hutcherson, Kern Cty. Lib., Bakersfield, CA
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.
-DNorman B. Hutcherson, Kern Cty. Lib., Bakersfield, CA
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.
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Einleitungssatz
IF THERE WAS one article of faith that John Meriwether discovered at Salomon Brothers, it was to ride your losses until they turned into gains. Lesen Sie die erste Seite
Buchdeckel | Copyright | Inhaltsverzeichnis | Auszug | Stichwortverzeichnis
IF THERE WAS one article of faith that John Meriwether discovered at Salomon Brothers, it was to ride your losses until they turned into gains. Lesen Sie die erste Seite
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After reading the first chapter of Lowenstein's book, Clancy's recent offering went onto the shelf. Lowenstein has written a concise and insightful recounting of the rise and fall of one of the largest and "smartest" investment firms created in modern times. However, the book is not just a well written story of failure. I can't decide whether When Genius Failed belongs in my library's psychology, management, mathematics, or business history section. It presents important lessons in each of these topics. All investors will gain from a careful read of this classic.
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This book reads like a horror story: we know John Merriwether and his arbitrageurs shouldn't ratchet up their leverage again and again but we can't tear our eyes away when they do it. Already knowing what ultimately happens to the Fund does nothing to alleviate the suspense and trepidation as a wave of panics begins to richocet from seemingly unrelated financial markets to trigger a worldwide financial crisis with LTCM square in the middle. Lowenstein's detailed description of the daily losses the Fund experienced will take your breath away.
All in all, this book provides a vivid portrait of how sensible, seemingly "safe" investment strategies can go terribly wrong when greed overcomes prudence and positions are pushed to the limit. Yet LTCM is not the only one who comes off bad here: Goldman Sachs is portrayed as shameless front-runners, Alan Greenspan looks like he is more out of touch than Ronald Reagan and Wall Street brokers and bankers appear as rational as rabbits in heat as they fall over themselves to extend credit to LTCM without charging hardly any margin whatsoever. This "easy credit" is what let LTCM leverage their assets up to an incredible 100X by the time of their downfall.
I promise you this: "When Genius Failed" will become "The Barbarians At The Gate" for the 1990s. And it will rightfully go down as one of the best books of business history of the last 25 years.
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The book relays the events in an entertaining manner; although the character assassinations are extensive especially when these observations are second hand. The principals of LTCM never mismarked their book during the crisis to hide the truth and dealt with it in a forthright manner.That is a truer sense of character.The markets are riddled with stories of dishonesty in the face of adversity. Was the risk at LTCM too big? In hindsight,yes. The partners paid a price for that with their net worth and with their confidence;but they never lied about the risk. This fact should not be overlooked.
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