One commonly held view of the relationship between scientists and engineers assumes that the latter represent an applied form of the former. Vincenti shatters this notion by showing how engineers develop their knowledge and use that information in the context of the problems they solve. While engineers and scientists share in their formative education a curriculum heavily devoted to mathematics (at least through differential equations) and fundamental physical forces, their priorities diverge at the context of their assigned tasks and in the type and quality of information that can be made available to complete their purposes. In particular, engineering knowledge does not exist for its own sake, in contrast to science.
Vincenti cites several examples from the aeronautics industry. While these descriptions take on an anecdotal character, these collected narratives nonetheless impose his conclusion as well as any philosophical essay could and probably better. In each case, _What_Do_Engineers_Know_?_ demonstrates that incomplete information may yield intermediate results having little or no effect on the intended problem.
The first example relates to a wing design for the B-24. The history of the Davis airfoil design is explained, as well as its incorporation for the B-24 wing. At the time of its adoption, various airfoil shapes had been investigated, and the Davis form subsequently was found to resemble the high performance laminar-flow airfoil. But did this form benefit the B-24 performance. Probably not, answers the author. Laminar flow can be difficult to maintain at the Reynolds numbers typical of modern aircraft, particularly in wartime conditions when surface roughness will likely increase tripping the boundary layer to turbulent (with resulting increased drag -- laminar flow has a thinner boundary layer, but is more prone to flow separation). The B-24 was considered a fine aircraft, in part due to its wing length.
The second example describes flying-quality characteristics and relative design priorities regarding stability and control. (The Wright brothers had emphasized stability in the infancy of manned powered flight.) Designers had to determine what characteristics made an airplane desirable to pilots, and which would consign them to the scrapyard. This ergonomic study evolved as pilot and aircraft capabilities expanded in speed and flight duration. An appendix provides qualitative criteria used to compare stability performance.
The third example compares how thermodynamics is treated by physicists and engineers. The latter employ control volume analysis as developed by Ludwig Prandtl for economy and accuracy rather than the understanding of nature governing thermal energy transfer. The fourth example covers data collection for airplane propellers. Subtle changes in camber, pitch and twist in a design can have subtle or profound effects on efficiency. These were evaluated using empirical studies, in contrast to a more analytical treatment where the contributing second and third order effects are more difficult to distinguish. The fifth example explains the struggles in riveting thin metal sheets with countersunk joints for aircraft production. The establishment of standard head angles required more detailed material behavior for both rivets and attaching sheets than previously known.
Finally Vincenti concludes with a synthesis on how design knowledge develops from functional collections of information. The writing style can be tedious at times, and other times smooth, but this is a matter of personal taste for the reader. While a typical engineer may find some aspects of the work, particularly among the examples, more familiar than other chapters, it nonetheless remains a beneficial insight into how engineering knowledge is acquired, organized and utilized to address the concern at hand.