This is an excellent, brief history of the Soviet-Polish War of 1920. Let me repeat. This is a military history. Its primary concern is with the composition of armies, military leadership, strategic objectives, battlefield tactics, weapons, etc. T. Kunikov's review notwithstanding, it is not a book about the grand political objectives of the Soviet regime or a treatise on the Communist threat to western civilization (although these are taken for granted by the author).
Kunikov's review is typical of the kind of knee-jerk reaction so many Marxist apologists experience whenever they perceive the slightest criticism of Soviet (or Chinese or Cuban) Communism.
As I have said, this is essentially a book of military history which makes only occasional, oblique references to the motives and objectives of the Soviet (and Polish) leaders. The Soviet leaders' desire to spread their revolution to Germany and Western Europe is alluded to in the book's subtitle, "Lenin's Failed Invasion of the West," which, if I know anything about the publishing business, was probably dreamed up by an editor eager to give the book more pizzazz. Subsequently, it is referred to in one short paragraph on page 2, which consists almost entirely of two quotations form Lenin himself; in one sentence on page 6 about the Bolshevik's general belief in the necessity of overthrowing the "established world order;" a phrase on page 7 about "ensuring the survival of Communism in Russia" by exporting revolution to Germany; and another indefinite remark on page 9 about the Communists' expectations of the "immanent triumph of revolution throughout the world." That's it.
The rest of the book's 224 pages consist of a detailed history of military operations during the Soviet-Polish War of 1920, filled with excellent maps, easy to read and understand.
Even the concluding chapter does not discuss Soviet intentions in their invasion of Poland, except for one sentence in which the author refers to Stalin's success in 1945 in achieving "much of what Lenin had set out to do in 1920," and noting "the dark night of Communism that engulfed [Poland] for half a century" thereafter. No one but an ideologically blinded Marxist could deny the truth of that statement.
The Polish attack on the Soviet armies massing on their eastern frontier in 1920 was clearly an act of pre-emptive self defense against an immanent, well prepared Soviet plan to invade their country (similar to Israel's pre-emptive attack on Egypt and Syria in 1967). The Soviet invasion was scheduled to be launched within forty eight hours. The Poles were well aware of Soviet intentions because they had the world's most highly developed capability for decoding and reading their opponents radio messages, a talent which was to prove invaluable to the British in World War II.
I find it astonishing that certain reviewers can continue to ignore the openly declared intentions of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and the rest of the Soviet leadership of the time ("World Revolution" was their slogan), as well as all of the facts that have emerged from the Soviet Archives since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russian scholars like Viktor Suvorov, Dmitri Volkogonov, and Arkady Vaksburg, as well as their American and British counterparts such as Albert Weeks, Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, Ronald Radosh, Richard Pipes and J. Arch Getty, have been using this material for nearly two decades now. Many of the original documents are also accessible to any interested reader in the Yale University Press "Annals of Communism" series, which consists of some twenty volumes of Soviet archival documents edited by American and Russian scholars. But, of course, one must first read the documents, then make up their mind.