WAR BY LAND, SEA, AND AIR: DWIGHT EISENHOWER AND THE CONCEPT OF UNIFIED COMMAND
COLONEL DAVID JABLONSKY, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2010
HARDCOVER, $35.00, 386 PAGES, NOTES, INDEX
On the eve of World War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower appeared to be approaching the end of a moderately successful career distinguished mainly by exemplary staff work. A member of the 1915 Class of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he spent most of the First World War training troops at home. He never received so much as a battalion command until 1940. Graduating in the upper third of his class at West Point, Eisenhower had already displayed the warmth, friendliness, and ability to say the right thing that endeared him to colleagues. These qualities, further perfected, would serve him well in increasingly challenging relationships and would eventually lead to the "I Like Ike" campaign that swept him into the White House in 1952. But more than likeability formed the essence of the future supreme commander. Eisenhower came under the wing of General Fox Conner in the Panama Canal Zone in the early 1920s. Conner saw leadership potential in his young chief of staff and introduced him to the writings of classical philosophers and military historians. Supervising Eisenhower's drafting of military orders, he guided him through careful analysis of tactical and terrain problems. When Ike went off to the Army's Command and General Staff School, he finished at the top of his class. Continued distinction in staff assignments brought him to the attention of Army Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, who made Eisenhower his special assistant both in Washington and later in the Philippine Islands, where they were charged with preparing its defenses against future invasion. Back home in 1941, Ike caught the attention of the new Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, who put him in charge of planning for the war that seemed to be looming ever closer. He impressed again with papers that essentially outlined the main thrusts of American military actions for the next three years. By this time, coordinated war planning was being done through the U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff. When a Supreme Allied Commander for the European Theater of Operations (ETO) was needed, Eisenhower was tapped by Marshall with the approval of the British. As a Lieutenant General, Ike moved to London and directed the invasion of North Africa that began in November, 1942. He also supervised the invasions of Sicily and Italy in 1943, smoothly coordinating U.S. and British forces through a variety of commanders, some of whom had far more experience than he. This factor and the natural buildup of irritations among the Allies taxed his diplomatic and interpersonal skills as preparations were made for the D-Day invasion of France in June, 1944. Despite its success, German resistance continued and dissension developed among Ike's subordinates as to how to finally break it. Britain's Field Marshal Montgomery proved especially difficult to placate. But Ike kept the lid on the clashing emotions, made the tough decisions on allocations and tactics, and was deservedly lionized when victory came in May, 1945. In this well-timed book, retired U.S. Army Colonel David Jablonsky takes a fresh look at Ike's lasting military legacy, in light of his evolving approach to the concept of unified command. Jablonsky examines in great detail the career of Eisenhower and his efforts to implement a unified command in the U.S. military-a concept that eventually led to the current organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that, almost three decades after Ike's presidency, played a major role in defense reorganization under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. After reading this well-written and researched book, you will not only admire Eisenhower's character and affirm his outstanding performance as the Supreme Allied commander during World War II but also how these two influenced his ideas on a unified command.
Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn, Florida Guard
Orlando, Florida