Anyone willing to take up the toxic subject of US-Greek relations deserves admiration. This is especially so if the intent is to write not conspiratorial history, but to canvass the archives and try to reconstruct, as best as possible, how events transpired. In that task, James Edward Miller has succeeded, producing a fair book with ample documentation and support.
The book focuses on US-Greek relations after the Greek civil war in 1950 and until the fall of the military junta in 1974. Mr. Miller makes plain that he sees the history of US-Greek relations through the prism of Peter Sellers' "The Mouse that Roared," a "tale of the ways in which small states successfully manipulate great powers." His narrative tells of clashes, rivalries, and efforts by various actors - the monarchy or politicians - to solicit the support of the United States to their side. Often, those doing the soliciting were the same ones demonizing the United States for foreign "interference" in Greece's domestic affairs.
Mr. Miller has little patience for the "official" Greek view on US-Greek relations. He sees a Greek side that blames America for its own mistakes; that treats America as omnipotent; and that wishes for just enough "interference" to serve its ends. Miller writes thus: "The Greek political establishment and Greek public opinion were united on one issue, blaming their errors on the United States. For the next two decades [in the 1980s and 1990s], the United States served as a national piñata, trooped out left and right, on every possible occasion, to assuage feelings of humiliation and to avoid a national debate over the real causes of both the rise of the Colonels and the Cyprus disaster."
Mr. Miller makes these points but is no apologist for American policy. When that policy made no sense, he says so, and he is especially critical of how the Nixon Administration dealt with Greece. Usefully, he deconstructs American policy into its various components, distinguishing between the American embassy in Athens, the State Department, the CIA and, in later years, Henry Kissinger. Far from monolithic, American policy contained both trenchant and short-sighted analysis; idealism and realpolitik; and a tendency to react to facts on the ground as much as to create them.
In the end, it is that attention to detail and the fidelity to the archival record that gives the book its force. This is no flawless book, of course. There are times when it is short on details or where there is a discussion of a historical controversy not followed by resolution. And this is a text that could have benefited from more Turkish sources on the chapters on Cyprus. But of the many books and articles written on US-Greek relations, this book stands out.