While the idea that numerous factors such as economics, world events, and local politics affect United States policy decisions, such as in the case of the Cold War, is a common idea today it was decidedly uncommon line of argument in 1973 when a then new scholar, John Lewis Gaddis, proposed it as his main argument for his now classic The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1947. While Gaddis' book is now somewhat out of date, especially with the number of Soviet documents that came to light during the 1990's, it still remains an important work for historians and lay readers alike.
What is so interesting about Gaddis' book is that it was one of the first post-revisionist works that looked at US policy towards the Soviet Union from numerous dimensions. Gaddis incorporates revisionist theories of economics; although he points out they are too limited to explain the Cold War, while at the same time putting them in context by describing how US leaders truly believed they would help bring lasting peace (page 20). Yet Gaddis goes far beyond revisionist theory in his argument clearly showing how not only personality quirks, bureaucracy, and other forces helped shaped US policy. An excellent example by Gaddis is his demonstration of the effect of religious organizations, such as the Catholic Church which was strongly anti-communist, on local US politics (page 52-53). In specific he describes how some politicians, especially Republicans, took advantage of Catholic, especially Polish Catholic, distaste for the Russians and Communism (page 146). Gaddis also points out how individuals and policy missteps also helped generate the Cold War. Gaddis describes how President Truman, who initially decided to follow Roosevelt's approach to negotiation with the Soviets, was influenced by W. Averell Harriman and others to adopt a tougher stance with the Russians over Poland and the Yalta Agreements (page 204-206). The resulting conflict between Truman, and his new get tough approach, and Molotov set the stage for an American reversal in cooperation with the Soviets leading to escalating tensions on both sides (page 356).
Gaddis does not definitively answer if the Cold War could have been avoided, to be fair one would have to be suspect of such a answer, but does suggest that better relations could have come from the US opening a second front in 1943, provided more generous loan terms, or been more open about its atomic monopoly. Then again as Gaddis points out these options were most likely not possible with the political climate in the United States. That being said Gaddis does a fine job showing how Truman was able to guide American attitudes towards a more hostile confrontational approach to the Soviet Union and this suggest that if politicians had so whished the converse would have been true (page 146). Regardless Gaddis work, even if outdated, is insightful, well written, and holds value for students of the Cold War today.