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Produktbeschreibungen
Kurzbeschreibung
What causes a financial crisis? Can financial crises be anticipated or even avoided? What can be done to lessen their impact? Should governments and international institutions intervene? Or should financial crises be left to run their course? In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, many blamed international institutions, corruption, governments, and flawed macro and microeconomic policies not only for causing the crisis but also unnecessarily lengthening and deepening it. Based on ten years of research, the authors develop a theoretical approach to analyzing financial crises. Beginning with a review of the history of financial crises and providing readers with the basic economic tools needed to understand the literature, the authors construct a series of increasingly sophisticated models. Throughout, the authors guide the reader through the existing theoretical and empirical literature while also building on their own theoretical approach. The text presents the modern theory of intermediation, introduces asset markets and the causes of asset price volatility, and discusses the interaction of banks and markets. The book also deals with more specialized topics, including optimal financial regulation, bubbles, and financial contagion.
Über den Autor
Franklin Allen is the Nippon Life Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He has been on the faculty since 1980. He is currently Co-Director of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. He was formerly Vice Dean and Director of Wharton Doctoral Programs and Executive Editor of the Review of Financial Studies, one of the leading academic finance journals. He is a past President of the American Finance Association, the Western Finance Association, the Society for Financial Studies, and the Financial Intermediation Research Society. He received his doctorate from Oxford University. Dr. Allen's main areas of interest are corporate finance, asset pricing, financial innovation and comparative financial systems.
Douglas Gale received his PhD in Economics from the University of Cambridge and was elected to a Junior Research Fellowship at Churchill College, Cambridge. He has taught at the London School of Economics and the University of Pennsylvania and is currently Julius Silver Professor of Economics at New York University and an Extraordinary Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge. He has served as the co-editor of Econometrica and Economic Theory, an associate editor of the Journal of Economic Theory, the Journal of Mathematical Economics, and Research in Economics, and an advisory editor of Macroeconomic Dynamics. He became a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 1987 and is currently a Senior Fellow of the Financial Institutions Center at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of several books and a large number of articles on economic theory and financial economics.
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Einleitungssatz
What happened in Asia in 1997? Lesen Sie die erste Seite Ausgewählte Seiten ansehen
Buchdeckel | Copyright | Inhaltsverzeichnis | Auszug | Stichwortverzeichnis | Rückseite
What happened in Asia in 1997? Lesen Sie die erste Seite Ausgewählte Seiten ansehen
Buchdeckel | Copyright | Inhaltsverzeichnis | Auszug | Stichwortverzeichnis | Rückseite
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1 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
good book for professional economists
17. Dezember 2008
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe
This is a nice book if you're looking for a coherent overview of theoretical models of financial crises. Maybe less interesting to practitioners, although there are some good insights even there.
8 von 12 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Heavy slugging for most readers, to pull out the insights.
30. Juli 2008
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe|Von Amazon bestätigter Kauf
Interestingly, published in 2007, the research in this work is before the US crisis which developed in late 2007 and has continued through 2008 (as of this review -- it still remains to be seen whether similar crisis will develop in other countries or regions globally). The reader may develop many insights about the many debates and points of view as to what may have caused the current US crisis and what may solve it.
For example, page 19 discusses the 1930's where markets were seen as the problem and government the solution. Currently (reminder, published 2007) the perception is that there is moral hazard in the system caused by government guarantees which cause crisis and market forces are the solution (a reversal of the 1930's). This is evident, for example, by the philosophy which established the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 as a result of banking problems (p5); and the repeal of that act and replacement by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 which eliminated the segregation of investment banking (manufacture and sale of stocks, etc) from traditional commercial banking (p190). A theme the authors develop is that the development of financial regulation is more a matter of trial and error than development and application of formal theory, a major reason they wrote the book (pp 19, 24).
Chapter 1 is a historical review of various crisis that have occurred and the cyclical nature of their ebb and flow, a discussion of banking crisis and currency crisis (twin crisis when they occur together), and the close relationship between banking crisis and stock market crashes. A very good historical and crisis primer.
After this, the development of mathematically expressed models makes for heavy reading (even for one with a BS cum laude Physics). Not a book that will give deep insight through word descriptions, this is one more appropriate to graduate students in economics who are interested in further developing an understanding of crisis and how to model crisis. The work is a bit of a disappointment by discussing utility maximization and rational individuals (with Spock/Vulcan-like logic) through the traditional economics lens even though the masses don't seem to respond much to logic. Assumptions galore need to be made to design their rational models. However, such is the way of traditional macro economics; by the authors own words, "... economists have a well developed set of tools for studying optimal economic systems." (p153). Mobs aren't rational and those are the ones rushing financial institutions. I am still hoping for the budding economist who can put the mathematical and behavioral models together someday.
For most, these other works in contrast to this traditional, rational-economic-being, thought and approach may make for more interesting reading. Read how rationality may be irrational after all in these works -
Your Money and Your Brain: How the New Science of Neuroeconomics Can Help Make You Rich by Jason Zweig.
Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions by Dan Ariely.
And perhaps why crisis may be okay after all (Chap 6 Allen/Gale discussion)-
Pop! Why Bubbles Are Great For The Economy by Daniel Gross
Wealth Odyssey: The Essential Road Map For Your Financial Journey Where Is It You Are Really Trying To Go With Money?
For example, page 19 discusses the 1930's where markets were seen as the problem and government the solution. Currently (reminder, published 2007) the perception is that there is moral hazard in the system caused by government guarantees which cause crisis and market forces are the solution (a reversal of the 1930's). This is evident, for example, by the philosophy which established the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 as a result of banking problems (p5); and the repeal of that act and replacement by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 which eliminated the segregation of investment banking (manufacture and sale of stocks, etc) from traditional commercial banking (p190). A theme the authors develop is that the development of financial regulation is more a matter of trial and error than development and application of formal theory, a major reason they wrote the book (pp 19, 24).
Chapter 1 is a historical review of various crisis that have occurred and the cyclical nature of their ebb and flow, a discussion of banking crisis and currency crisis (twin crisis when they occur together), and the close relationship between banking crisis and stock market crashes. A very good historical and crisis primer.
After this, the development of mathematically expressed models makes for heavy reading (even for one with a BS cum laude Physics). Not a book that will give deep insight through word descriptions, this is one more appropriate to graduate students in economics who are interested in further developing an understanding of crisis and how to model crisis. The work is a bit of a disappointment by discussing utility maximization and rational individuals (with Spock/Vulcan-like logic) through the traditional economics lens even though the masses don't seem to respond much to logic. Assumptions galore need to be made to design their rational models. However, such is the way of traditional macro economics; by the authors own words, "... economists have a well developed set of tools for studying optimal economic systems." (p153). Mobs aren't rational and those are the ones rushing financial institutions. I am still hoping for the budding economist who can put the mathematical and behavioral models together someday.
For most, these other works in contrast to this traditional, rational-economic-being, thought and approach may make for more interesting reading. Read how rationality may be irrational after all in these works -
Your Money and Your Brain: How the New Science of Neuroeconomics Can Help Make You Rich by Jason Zweig.
Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions by Dan Ariely.
And perhaps why crisis may be okay after all (Chap 6 Allen/Gale discussion)-
Pop! Why Bubbles Are Great For The Economy by Daniel Gross
Wealth Odyssey: The Essential Road Map For Your Financial Journey Where Is It You Are Really Trying To Go With Money?
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