Evan's "Third Reich in Power" falls just short of being a great book. I would rate it a "9" if Amazon had a ten-point rating system. Evans concentrates on the period between the elevation of Hitler to the chancellorship and the German invasion of Poland in 1939. Evans uses what might be called the "mosiac" method. He examines most of the essential features in which Nazism attempted to regulate and direct the lives of the German people, and does so in succcessive chapters. This is an interesting approach -- rather unusual for contemporary history --, and is reminiscent of that taken in, say, Cambridge's Ancient History and Medieval History series. No "grant theses" emerge, but several themes suggest themselves.
First, Evans demonstrates that the German people were extremely ambivalent about the Nazi regime. On the one hand, most Germans genuinely idolized Hitler. On the other hand, they were deeply distrustful of his underlings, and of many things the government was doing to the economy and to national welfare. The picture that emerges is of a people disturbed by the quotidien aspects of Nazi rule -- censorship, police surveillance, low wage rates, labor restrictions, etc. -- but sufficiently sympathetic with the broader aims of the regime to make tolerance for the disagreeable aspects possible. The picture of the German people which emerges is rather unflattering: it was distrustful of the disorder occasioned by the regime's extreme anti-semitism, but disliked Jews and was more than happy to profit from their suppression. It was suspicious of militarism and the march toward war, but happy about the economic recovery rearmament enabled (as long was the eventual war was fought by somebody else). It was unhappy about the restrictions on art, culture and education, but shared the prejudices against modernist tendencies and agaisnt the educated elite which caused most people to shed few tears when the Nazis systematically dismantled Germany's high culture. Above all, Evans paints a picture of a people very queasy about what was happening, but unwilling to do much to save anybody else from the clutches of the Nazis. The Germans were not so much Hitler's willing executioners as Htiler's self-absorbed bystanders.
Second, Evans attempts to paint a picture of the Nazi regime as an attempt to completely mobilize and structure the way society thought and behaved. Evans emphasizes the role of terror and coercion, implicitly disagreeing with other historians who emphasize the small size of the Nazi policing appartus when compared with, e.g., the Soviet Union. He also focuses on something which has received relatively little attention -- the "dumming down" of German society. While Evans notes that the Nazi efforts to change the nature of the German educational system -- particularly its system of higher education -- met with mixed results, his claim that the quallity of the product of that system had dropped considerably by 1939 is compelling. One wonders how the Germans managed to be as successful in World War II as they were; it probably did as well as it did principally to the extent that its efforts to totally transform society were unsuccessful.
Finally, Evans confronts and sheds light on a very important issue. Nazi "philosophy" was, in important way, incoherent. It idealized men who were at once, aggressive, bullying, Darwinian, anti-intellectual, athletic, competitive and warlike, while at the same time obedient, self-sacrificing, other-directed, altruistic, idealistic and dedicated completely to the common "good" (as defined by the Nazis). It is very difficult to create a docile thug. The Nazis were as successful as they were in this endeavor by separating the thugs (who were allowed to do just about anything, as long as they did not threaten the regime) from the sheep (who, if obdient -- and Aryan-- were largley immune from thuggery by a sort of protection racket).
Evans paints a compelling picture of a society whose contradictions were bound to result in fatal instabilities in the absence of an every-victorious state of war. It is also a picture of a regime whose very commitment to physical and intellectual brutality would eventually make it impossible to quit while it was ahead.