The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Rather than discussing the "why?" most of the emphasis of this book is on the "how". Overall it is fairly entairtaining but lacks cohessivness. The authors seems to be very selective in the statistics he uses. It is very dishartening that a presumed scholarly work fails to follow the simplest rules of scientific investigation. If the answer to the question still intrigues you, I sugest that you buy a different book. Guns, germs and steel by Jared Diamond is far superior and rigourous in its approach.

So why are some nations rich and others poor? Does Landes tell why by the end of the book? Sort of. I would say he's right on the money until about 1900. He starts by examining the geography argument: Huntington and others in the 19th century, who saw differences in prosperity from region to region, and tried to fashion a "science" of economic analysis based on climate. People in cold regions were energized and people in the tropics were enervated. The former thrived and the latter loafed. Then these theories shaded into ever more questionable connections between climate and race and ability and wealth, and were ultimately discredited. After all, if cold weather encourages prosperity, how are we to explain the economic disaster that is Russia? And why are Singapore, Hong Kong, and Hawaii so wealthy in their tropical locations? So if not geography, then what? By way of answering that question, Landes discusses most major movements toward riches and power that have ever taken place. Why does Islam jump up and take over a large percentage of the world, then slip into torpor and poverty? Why does the Industrial Revolution begin in England instead of China, a civilization thousands of years older? Why does Spain, winner of the global lottery in the 16th century, have nothing to show for it by 1900? To sum it up in just a few words: freedom, tolerance, curiosity, and common sense. The warriors of Islam could grab off an empire and the scholars of Islam could lead the world in astronomy, but when narrow-minded mullahs took over and banned all thought that was not in the Koran, the advance stopped. The Chinese perfected the most basic human activities: raising food and families. But ordinary Chinese were not allowed to own property, and commercial activity down through the centuries was, often as not, against the law. So while the Chinese people were undoubtedly clever enough to set up factories and make piles of money, they did not do so seriously until 1978 because their various governments forbade it. Spain replayed the Islam story, with variations. Instead of putting their riches and power into ever larger moneymaking ventures, they squandered it in wars. Instead of cultivating their brightest citizens, they placed the intellectual straightjacket of the Inquisition on them. They kicked out the Jews. They kicked out the Moors. They attacked the British. There is no better argument against climate and geography than the Spanish. They controlled an empire that included tropics and temperate zones, deserts and rain forests, minerals in fantastic abundance, swaths of agricultural land into which you could drop several Britains. And after three centuries what they had built was little more than a collection of churches. It seems to me that Landes is more adept at answering his central question in the pre-industrial era, which is curious since he is an Industrial Revolution scholar. Perhaps he knows so much about the IR that it overloads the judgement capacitors in his brain. Or maybe a sudden heat wave in Cambridge temporarily reduced his mental powers. Whatever it was, after the first third of the book he seems to drift, ignoring the very answers he's put his finger on: freedom, tolerance, curiosity, and common sense. This seems to me to be of vital importance, because when you add to these qualities an account of the natural resources of the various places in the world, you can explain quite well (if a little glibly) why some nations are so rich and some so poor. The Soviet Union, for instance, with it's abundance of natural resources and able people could have been quite prosperous, except that it was morally bankrupt from its inception. Science was exalted, free thought and speech was forbidden, spirituality squelched, and dissent not tolerated. In the various Islamic empires spirituality was exalted, almost nothing was tolerated, and scientific advances were searched for in the pages of the Koran. But more fascinating than these broad explanations are the little side alleys of thought that abound. Intellectuals have known for at least a dozen years that tolerance is a good thing, but Landes shows in a number of situations just how costly and economically atrophying intolerance is, in rich nations as well as in poor. The American South never industrialized substantially until after the Civil Rights movement. Paraguay, in the 19th century, attempted to make itself into an egalitarian state but failed. Why? Because, like Castro, it attempted to do so at gunpoint. The solons of Cambridge, among whom Landes resides, could learn much from the story of little Paraguay. Every so often Landes' writing becomes facile, as when he repeatedly dismisses one theory or another with the phrase "So much for..." or when he lapses into the Latin that academics still believe adds luster to their prose: "status quo ante" instead of "the way it was before". Yet all in all, the defects are minor, and do not take away much from this very impressive and enjoyable achievement: a world history that is not constructed on the usual framework of treaties and political leaders, and that is written in a lively and provocative style.

I enjoyed the book, even when I disagreed with Landes. I was, however, disappointed - apart from some interesting anecdotes here and there, I learned little that I did not know already (and I am neither an economics, nor a history major).

The project Landes took on is ambitious; he wants to explain - and without too many numbers, please! - why some countries are so rich, and some so poor. He does a decent job in explaining Europe/USA, and a reasonable job in explaining the poverty of sub-Saharan Africa. But his style is to talk about issues from 100,000 feet above sea-level. If you are interested in economics (even only an amateur one), or are a policy-maker, this approach, and the book, are utterly useless. East Asia and Japan are addresses, but in disappointingly shallow fashion. Latin America merits a similar fate. China's past gets mentioned; its present is either not mentioned at all, or completely glossed over. India gets passing mention.

The book's historical sections are splendid; his language, even in criticism, is graceful. But the book has an air of having been hurried towards the latter portions, and all-too-leisurely in the initial, historical sections.

There's also a theme running through the book that will jar the optimists. It is this: culture is destiny. Maybe you can do an end-run around Ricardo by creating your own comparative advantages using protections; maybe you can dodge Adam Smith too, by constructive involvement of the state in industry, but you can not dodge who you are, nor can you easily change that state of affairs. Disturbing thought.