The Tragedy of Great Power Politics [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Those of us who are familiar with John Mearsheimers' illuminating and provocative work have been waiting quite a few years for him to put all his thoughts together in one coherent and all-encompassing book. The wait is finally over, and the result does not disappoint. Mearsheimer has written what is sure to be the standard text for the Realist paradigm for years to come. It is clear that he is in fact trying to place himself in the Realist cannon as the logical successor to Morgenthau and Waltz. Whereas Morgenthau could not explain why states are driven to be as aggressive as they are, and Waltz's Defensive Realism did not adequately describe the constant struggle for power among states, Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism claims to explain both. States are aggressive due to the anarchic nature of the state system, which leads them to not only seek to ensure their survival, but to also try to acquire power at every opportunity possible.
Mearsheimer's lengthy volume is divided roughly into two parts. The first half is the theoretical section, in which he presents his Offensive Realist theory in detail, along with an explanation of how to measure state power (population and wealth). Also included in this part is an entire chapter called "The Primacy of Land Power," in which he not only tries to explain why land power is the most important, but also goes into the limits of sea and air power, and the limited effectiveness of blockades and strategic bombing campaigns. It is somewhat surprising that these issues have generally been overlooked by IR theorists until now. Hopefully that will no longer be the case. The second half of the book is more empirical, including the histories of all the recent Great Powers, focusing on why and how they have been aggressive in their foreign affairs. Also included are chapter on the "Offshore Balancers" (UK and US), alliance behavior, and the origins of major wars.
Critics of this book are likely to be the usual assortment of Liberals, post-Modernists, Critical Theorists, and other Realists. But Mearsheimer has not only created the most coherent Realist theory yet, he has also solved some of the major contradictions within the Realist paradigm as well. It is a stunning accomplishment, and this is a book to be read by the general reader and seasoned IR Theorist alike. Indeed, Mearsheimer has written it in a style that is accessible to all, but with generous footnotes for those interested in more details. If you only read one book on International Relations in your life, let this be the one! It will explain more of the world around you than you would think possible.

Before any reader digs into Mearsheimer's tome, they should be aware of two things: First, the book is a study of GREAT POWER politics (which is why one should not expect the U.S.-led war against minor power Iraq or the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to be accounted for; nor should they be cite these as examples of what the book lacks). Second, the book is not an international politics primer. Rather it is the most advanced presentation of the theory of offensive realism. Mearsheimer is the theory's leading proponent, and his book is not meant to be a balanced debate between realism and international liberalism, constructivism, etc.

That said, Mearsheimer's book is well-written and essential reading if one wishes to have a balanced view of international relations. The "Tragedy" of great power politics occurs when the power-maximization that nations pursue (which is almost mandated under international anarchy) leads to awesomely destructive hegemonic wars. Mearsheimer shatters the rhetoric surrounding great wars, reducing them to the basic elements of power. His theory is backed up by historical example, making for compelling reading. In addition, Mearsheimer looks to history and applies offensive realism in predicting that China will continue its rise and potentially challenge U.S. power in the near future.

Many will not agree with Mearsheimer's theory (this is the man, after all, who called for the nuclearization of Germany after the Cold War and pronounced NATO dead over a decade ago) but he is the leading Realist mind and strongest Realist voice in the IR community today. Love it or hate it, offensive realism does not get any more lucid than this.

First off, the book is very easy to get through - the primary theoretical points are clearly laid out and easy to understand, the selected empirical evidence is interesting, and the style is fluid and coherent. This is the strength of realist theory - clarity of thought, and results in a much more enjoyable read than something by a radical-constructivist or critical theorist. The disagreement over theory is clear from the wide range of ratings in the reviews, but I'd like to briefly cover some of the issues brought up by other reviewers.

Offensive realism, as posited by Mearsheimer is NOT a rehash of Waltz's structural realism but rather adds some important new elements to realist theory. As a result, it is still susceptible to some of the critiques of realist theory in general but also adds new theoretical problems.

Mearsheimer uses Waltz' assumptions on the anarchic nature of the international system and its implication for state behaviour but goes in a very different direction. Using the same assumptions, Waltz believes great powers will essentially be status-quo and defensive while Mearsheimer believes they will be revisionist and aggressive power-maximizers. Mearsheimer thus can avoid the argument against Waltz's defensive realist theory that it leaves no room for transformation of the international system. The potential for conflict is a direct result of the distribution of power in the anarchic system.

The assumptions used by both are by no means "given" and disagreement over them has come from liberal institutionalists, the English School, and the various subsets of constructivist theory. Whether state interests and identities are exogenous or endogenous, and whether there is any room for interests to be shaped by domestic politics, culture, ideology, or institutions is the primary diagreement. Realism says there are only structural variables.

If you think you're a realist, you might want to take note that no prominent realists supported the Iraq War. Realists would also pay no attention to the government of China - a hegemonic democratic China is as dangerous as a hegemonic authoritarian China. Also, the environment and potential for conflict in Europe is the same as in Asia - NATO and the EU, as institutions, are merely tools for great powers to position themselves in hegemonic struggle(this might be included because Mearsheimer said NATO was to be disbanded shortly after the end of the Cold War and needs to find a reason why it is still around). Ideational factors simply have no place in the theory.

Returning to Mearsheimer, he adds another variable to his theory, the impact of geopolitics on state interest. So not only does the distribution of power affect the potential for conflict, geographical factors also play a role. This complicates matters because no longer is there a single variable that can be used to determine causality, and it might be seen as a theoretical crutch. The US and UK both are exceptions to the rule that great powers expand aggressively. Some would say it is because they are liberal democracies, but Mearsheimer argues that it is because they are "offshore balancers", insular states that find it difficult to project power but also derive security from this. An exception to that exception is Japan in WWII, which Mearsheimer explains didn't have a lot of resistance and so couldn't help itself.

Another reviewer wrote of the unverifiability of Mearsheimer's theory. I think that the two variables and the stipulations he puts on power-maximization do make the theory a bit "slippery". Mearsheimer concludes the book by saying that, "Of course, states occasionally ignore the anarchic world in which they operate, choosing instead to pursue strategies that contradict balance-of-power logic." This is a contradiction of the book and realist theory in general. States shouldn't be able to choose how they behave but should be bound by the structure of the system (and geopolitics in Mearsheimer's version) to behave in a certain manner (offensively or defensively according to Mearsheimer or Waltz, respectively).

There are too many exceptions and stipulations to Mearsheimer's rule to make it particularly useful. Whereas the strength of Waltz's theory is its simplicity, Mearsheimer believes he combines theoretical simplicity with policy applicability. He succeeds in neither. Nevertheless, the book is the clearest articulation of offensive realism. Perhaps more comprehensive reading would be Mearsheimer's article on international institutions in International Security Winter 1994/1995, followed by responses from John Ruggie, Robert Keohane, Alexander Wendt, and the Kupchans, and a concluding reply by Mearsheimer.