The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

The second section of the book (another 100 pages) gives an overview of the situation today -- the massive police state run by Saddam, the nature of the threat he poses, and what other Persian Gulf states (and others in the area and in Europe) think of his regime. The description of Saddam's repressive policies and the threat he poses are both chilling (both more realistic and more scary than anything I have heard from our current Administration). The country-by-country overview of current attitudes toward Iraq and what US policy should be was particularly fascinating. Pollack carefully proceeds through each country, explaining their own particular interests in and policies toward Iraq, and how they wish the US to act. This section provides some very interesting perspectives that I have not seen elsewhere in the popular media, particularly on Jordanian, Syrian and Turkish interests.

In the final 200 pages, Pollack turns to an analysis of US policy options. He carefully reviews all of the options, assessing their feasibility (the stumbling block of any renewed sanctions regime and of covert operations) and weighing the arguments pro and con. Pollack convinces me that the only real options are a fall back to "pure" deterrence (consisting of lifting the remaining sanctions, allowing Saddam to rebuild his military strength and eventually (soon) acquire nuclear weapons, while relying on the threat of US military intervention should he attempt to act beyond his own borders) or a full-scale invasion to remove Saddam and rebuild Iraq. As between deterrence and invasion, I wish that I could say that I think deterrence will work. I'm not excited about the US going to war -- ever -- and particularly not without an immediate provocation. I started this book looking to pick holes in the argument. But I have to confess that Pollack has convinced me that deterrence poses too many risks. Our Cold War deterrence of the Soviet Union is often cited as an example -- but what we deterred the USSR from doing was attacking the US. We did not deter them from Berlin or Prague or Afghanistan, nor did we keep them from meddling in any number of African, Asian and South American countries. Instead, Soviet nuclear weapons deterred *us* from intervening. Once Saddam acquires nuclear weapons, will we really risk a nuclear attack on the Saudi oil fields or Tel Aviv in order to defend Kuwait? Even if Saddam does not invade Kuwait, he will have the economic and military power to make other Gulf states bend to his will, and could wind up effectively controlling a substantial share of the world's oil supply, with potentially devastating economic effects. By comparison to these risks, the costs of war, high though they may be, seem amply justified.

On the other hand, I also think that Pollack underestimates some of the problems associated with invasion. First, he more or less dismisses the need for a legal justification for invasion, saying it would be better if we had one, but it is not essential. I think that many Americans and most of our allies (in the Middle East and elsewhere) will find it hard to support any war that does not have an adequate legal cause. In the absence of overt provocation by Iraq, we at least need a United Nations mandate behind us. How can we call others "rogue states," if we ourselves act without an international consensus behind us? Second, Pollack makes a persuasive case that we can invade only with the support of the Saudis and other Gulf states, who will support us only if the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is at least quiet. That hardly seems likely in the near future. If invasion also turns out not to be feasible, we may be left with no option but deterrence. At least having read "The Threatening Storm," I now know what risks that entails.

Pollack is eminently well-qualified to write about Iraq, having served in the CIA and the National Security Council during the first Bush and the Clinton administrations. He writes well and provides enough detail to make his arguments compelling without bogging down in military detail. He gives all arguments a fair treatment, acknowledges that the costs of invasion will be high and vigorously advocates a rebuilding of the Iraqi state and economy as an essential element of any invasion policy. Nation-building is not Pollack's area of specialty, which shows in his chapter on reconstruction and probably makes him overly optimistic about what reconstruction will cost, its prospects for building a prosperous and stable Iraq, and its potential to rehabilitate the US in the eyes of the popular Arab world. Nevertheless, his point -- that it would be foolish for us to incur the cost of toppling one destabilizing regime only to allow chaos or another unstable regime to take its place -- is well taken, and undoubtedly other resources can fill in the nation-building picture.

Highly recommended to all who wish to have an informed opinion in the debate on Iraq.