The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-first Century [Kindle Edition]

This is the book I have been waiting years for - it is the clearest picture I have yet seen of the 21st century's nascent Great Game; the Game as played by three Great Powers with very different styles: the United States, the European Union, and China. Khanna has developed an original view of a tripolar world, and effectively balances the force of geopolitics with the complementary trend toward globalisation.

The book has several persistent and gnawing weaknesses. Khanna persistently focuses on traditional land power geopolitics, an easier thing to describe and a well trodden path in International Studies, but perhaps an increasingly less potent matrix with the emergence of new realms of competition in this century: low Earth orbit (mentioned briefly in one paragraph of the book); the emerging Internet culture and electronic world; enduring naval power and new oceanographic frontiers; the growing diasporas and transnational, nomadic elites who owe no geographical national allegiance. In particular, he who rules lower Earth orbit rules the planet, regardless of who predominates upon the "World-Island" of Eurasia.

The author, like many intelligent NRI Indians, seems disillusioned by the failure of Indian democracy to overcome poverty and wealth disparity on the subcontinent (at one point stating, "It could be argued that China is a freer country than democratic India", ignoring some obvious differences in number of political prisoners, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free access to the Internet . . . ). Though often pointing out the environmental and cultural devastation that Chinese dominance has visited on its satellite countries, Khanna as frequently stumbles in his lavish praise of the authoritarian Singapore model that China is now following, hinting that China will allow a free society once it has acquired enough wealth, and understates the potential power of chaotic, creative, "undisciplined" (read: free) India and "Bollystan" (Khanna's term) in this century.

Freedom of speech and protection of a counterculture are more than just abstract features of a Western liberal morality. Freedom of speech and protection of "deviants" comprise essential economic infrastructure in the twenty-first century. As we move into an Information Age, societies that offer strong protection of freedom of speech and individual expression will trump those Confucian societies that emphasize obedience and silent submission to authority. As unlikely a winner as oft-benighted India may seem to be, I would still put good money on India and the individualistic U.S., in collaboration with the European Union, as the future leaders of the non-local sphere of Information and Cyberspace, leaving the Confucian societies not yet visited by glasnost far behind. Freedom of information should be treated by Khanna as one of the most important traits of an economic superpower, far more important than good roads, canals, and oil rigs. Confucianism, as it exists today, is a mimicry engine producing only commodities; free societies such as India have the potential to become creativity engines, producing entirely new economic niches.

Unless we are driven into a new Dark Age by war or resource disasters, the relentless Information Age will reward societies with strong creative classes (Richard Florida's term); reward societies with a protected counterculture and bohemia; and will punish societies ruled by conformity and fear of "deviance"; will punish societies without their equivalent of Mad Magazine; will punish societies that imprison dissidents. Until Chinese glasnost emerges, the United States, Europe and India will rule cyberspace, and hence the future.

India will not be destroyed by wealth disparities. The caste system will provide structural stability for some time to come, giving India a prolonged safety interval in which to grow a strong middle class. India is a nation of jatis, but a nation nonetheless. Its diversity and syncretic ability to adapt and absorb culture is a strength that the Chinese lack.

One final point before I go. Khanna's occasionally obsequious praise of Singapore-style authoritarianism is almost matched by the fault of his dismissive critique of United States foreign policy. As another reviewer has stated, the only reason the European Union can focus on building networks and economic bridges is that the United States is providing all the muscle. Without U.S. military presence, the EU would find itself much constrained and forced to be the "bad cop" more often. This is in no way an endorsement of what I agree is largely clumsy and inappropriate U.S. policy, but how the U.S. got to this point is much the result of an inadequate European security policy.

The book, on balance, is a good start.

Parag Khanna of the New America Foundation draws his inspiration from Arnold Toynbee's 12-volume history of the world. Toynbee wrote his books first, and then embarked on a trip around the world to check the acurracy of his work. Khanna, however, did it the other way around: he spent two years travelling to forty countries, talking to people and getting a first-hand look at the facts on the ground, then writing this book. The result makes this volume a very pleasurable read, mixing policy recommendations, historical analysis, and traveller's eye for local color.

Khanna argues that there will be three superpowers in the 21st century - China, the European Union, and the United States. He sometimes calls them empires as in the subtitle of the book, but that term is confusing since the Big Three will not resemble the empires of old. These superpowers will have their own unique approach for extending their power and influence. The main objectives of the Big Three are essentially the same: they want to be in the good graces of energy- and resource-rich second-tier countries such as those of the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Khanna calls this the second world. And as more and more countries become nuclear, military muscle becomes less of a tool. The superpowers are developing non-military means to win allies and influence. According to Khanna, winning in the 21st century will not take place in the battlefield but in the geopolitical marketplace.

Of the three, Khanna finds the European model the most attractive. The European practice of offering the prospect of membership in the world's richest market is a very powerful incentive for countries to reform themselves and comply with EU standards. Europe has successfully assimilated many countries on its periphery. Khanna, however, glosses over Europe's problems, such as an ageing population and unassimilated minorities.

Khanna also speaks glowingly of the rising influence of China. By the shear thrust of their economic growth, China has been able to buy friends and influence in the second world. And with their indifference to human rights, they acquire some very unsavory friends. This practice however, is now backfiring as people everywhere are rallying for Tibetans as the Olympics approach. Khanna's praise for "Asian values" amounts to accepting enlightened despotism.

The most scorn, however, is reserved for the United States. With the war in Iraq in its fifth year, America is starting to look like an overstretched empire and an object of global resentment. He excoriates America for neglecting its poor as well as its physical and financial health. This may hold some truth at the present, but Khanna has forgotten that America is resilient and has a great capacity to renew itself.

Critics of Khanna, however, should not write him off as anti-American or a pessimist. At the end of the book, he has a long list of recommendations for transforming the military-industrial complex into a diplomatic-industrial complex. He would like to see the resources that we now invest in the Pentagon go to the State Department. A new muscular foreign service is needed to further American interests and make globalization work for us. If this book sounds like it's written by an international relations graduate student, that's because it is.

Parag Khanna's travelogue of the world is a good read for 320 or so of its 343 pages. I suggest you keep Google close by however, as Khanna's world tour touches on multiple historical events and places that it does not describe in enough detail, which is understandable in order to keep the book slim enough to draw in readers. Khanna does, helpfully, include regional maps that I found myself constantly flipping to in order to keep track of his travels.

Of the 320 pages or so I enjoyed, one downside was Khanna's overly optimistic view at times of global relations. In discussing China and Japan for example, Khanna ignores the legacy of World War II and continuing fear and dislike between those two important Pacific powers. Another example is Khanna's discussion of the European Union. The EU nations have certainly coalesced in many circumstances around a common purpose, but they do not yet speak as one. Ireland's recent vote against the EU treaty testifies to that fact. I felt Khanna did this often, papering over disagreements between nations in favor of what draws them closer together. That could be a good political strategy, but it can also be a bit intellectually dishonest.

But the real downside to the book is its conclusion. After an interesting, compelling travelogue Khanna begins a twenty page rant as to why everything America does is wrong and cannot be restored. It is not constructive. The journal Democracy really nails down the problem in its review of The Second World, comparing it disfavorably to Fareed Zakaria's more constructive "The Post-American World." You can read the review here: [...]

Another oddity I noticed in the book is Khanna's brief discussion of Israel. On pages 209 and 210 of the hardcover edition, he makes the sweeping statement that "Until Palestinians are granted statehood, pressure on Hamas to recognize Israel is premature and ironic precisely because Palestine is an entity, not a state, and thus is in no position to offer such legal recognition." The statement struck me as strange for a few reasons. First, don't we usually expect organizations, companies, and people to recognize nations? Do I have to be a nation myself to recognize that Ghana, to pick a random example, is a country? Second, the statement is pretty sweeping and probably deserves its own book. But that is all Khanna has to say on the subject. That brief passage stuck out to me as I was reading the book, an uncomfortable speed bump as I was cruising through a great read (again, this was before the disappointing conclusion).

If you are picking up the book, I suggest skipping the conclusion and enjoying Khanna's many insights on the multitude of nations most of us do not think much about, but are all important in their own spheres, and globally.