Franklin has done a brilliant job of showing that the concept of probability used by practically all civilizations throughout history[for instance,Hebrew(Talmud),Greek(Aristotle),Medieval(Scholastics),etc.],prior to Pascal's attempt to mathematicalize the meaning of the term probability so as to help out some French noblemen who were trying to find a way to get an edge in certain types of gambling ,was the inductive,qualitative,comparative concept based on recognizing probability as being a primarily nonnumerical,vague concept that could not be precisely defined.Its usage was built into the common languages that human beings developed over time.Franklin's book supports the original logical interpretation of probability first put forth in published form in 1921 in the A Treatise on Probability(TP) by John Maynard Keynes.Keynes's theory is a general theory which analyzes probability from the most general use of the term(qualitative,nonnumerical,comparative) to its most specialized forms(quantitative,numerical,interval,mathematical,statistical,frequency,subjective).There are a few places in this book where the author could have given a substantially better analysis.One place is where he discusses Keynes's concept of the weight of the evidence.He bases his discussion only on chapter 6 of the TP,ignoring Keynes's additional discussions in chapter 14,section 3 and chapter 26,where Keynes became the first scholar in history to both define weight,w,on the unit interval between 0 and 1,and to invent a decision rule,his conventional coefficient of risk and weight,c,which solves a number of the paradoxes of decision theory, as well as a number of the anomalies rediscovered by Tversky and Kahneman.Franklin also fails to point out Keynes's original development of an interval valued approach to probability in chapters 15 and 17 of the TP.The scholar who comes closest to Keynes in incorporating a clearcut role for a vague,comparative,qualitative understanding of probability is D.Ellsberg.