- Taschenbuch: 288 Seiten
- Verlag: Penguin (Non-Classics); Auflage: New edition (3. September 1991)
- Sprache: Englisch
- ISBN-10: 0140149635
- ISBN-13: 978-0140149630
- Größe und/oder Gewicht: 19,4 x 12,8 x 2 cm
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Bomber Command had never attempted a large-scale precision night attack before and indeed, this was the only occasion it was tried. Three other innovations were employed: time & distance runs, a master bomber and moving aim points. However Middlebrook makes the point that the American 8th Air Force, which was trained for daylight precision attacks, was not consulted because Churchill wanted Peenemünde to be an "all-British" operation. If true, this was a stupid case of national pride overriding operational common sense. On the bright side, the British mounted a highly successful Mosquito diversion over Berlin which drew off most of the 200 German night fighters launched and there was no fighter opposition for the first half of the raid. British intruding night fighters also had a good night and shot down four Luftwaffe fighters, including two aces. The Germans badly misjudged where the raid was going, partly since the Luftwaffe low-level commanders did not know the significance of Peenemünde. The raid did inflict significant damage on the housing area but it failed to hurt either the experimental works or V-2 production buildings. About 150 Germans (incl. 2 scientists) and 600 foreign laborers were killed. The RAF lost 41 aircraft and 290 men, almost all on the exit route when the night fighters finally showed up. The moonlight night made it something of a duck shoot.
Middlebrook believes that the raid cost the Germans about 6-8 weeks worth of delay in producing the V-2s, which he says equates to saving perhaps 800 civilians in England. After the raid, the Germans dispersed the production to underground facilities in central Germany. The USAF made three raids in 1944, which hit the facility with much greater accuracy. I believe Middlebrook sketches out the facts but fails to draw a conclusion; namely, that had the Americans attacked Peenemünde in 1943 the damage to the facility would have been more severe. Overall, this book is not quite as good as Middlebrook's other books on RAF bomber raids.
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