In 1945, in San Francisco, when the UN Charter was written, the victors of the Second World War were looking to create an international body that would guarantee global security and prevent another conflagration like the one they had just experienced. The lines from the Tennyson poem "Locksley Hall:" "Till the war-drum throbbed no longer, and the battle flags were furl'd / In the Parliament of Man, Federation of the World" were carried by President Truman in his back pocket when he gave his famous address calling for a United Nations.
Paul Kennedy, Yale historian and author of "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers," reminds us that the internal contradictions that exist at the UN today were present at creation, so to speak. The UN was essentially created by the victors of World War II. The General Assembly, which at the time was made up of 49 members, reflected the internationalism of this venture, each member was allowed one vote regardless of size or power. The Security Council, on the other hand, made up of the five permanent members ( the US, China, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) were the only members allowed the veto reflecting the realism of the founders.
Essentially the UN is no more than what the great powers want it to be. It is disingenuous for the American right to attack the UN for being weak and ineffectual when they need it because it was designed to be so. In the case of Rwanda and Bosnia, the UN stood by helplessly while thousands were massacred; this was because no great power stepped forward in time to stop these atrocities. Likewise, if a great power decides to act unilaterally such as the US in Iraq or China in Tibet, there is nothing the UN can do. In the politcal and military realm the UN is primarily a tool for the great powers.
Any reform of the UN Charter, such as creating a standing army or increasing the number of permanent members of the Security Council, must be approved by all five of the existing permanent members. Over the years there have been endless commissions, reports, and proposals calling for structural reform at the UN, but none have succeeded in persuading the current five to change the status quo. One must concede that if the current five cannot agree on reform, it would be even more difficult for a larger group.
Kennedy points out that "there are in practice many UN's." Most citizens of great power countries think of the UN only in it's peacekeeping and peace-enforcing capacity - a capacity in which in does not have much power. Most of the developing world is more interested in the UN's "soft power," dealing with human rights, poverty alleviation, refugees, and public health. In these areas, UN efforts have met with some success. These people working through the UN and other NGO's have been instrumental in creating an international civil society, which have greatly contributed to global security and well-being.
Only a few years ago during the invasion of Iraq, American conservatives declared the UN useless and irrelevant. Recently, however, with the crisis in Lebanon and the nuclear stand-off with Iran, one great power after another is going to the UN with another resolution. Inspite of all it's shortcomings, it is still the only global forum for conflict resolution and burden-sharing.
In the last part of this book, Kennedy asks whether the UN can remake itself to reflect the realities of the 21st century. The answer lies in how much power the great powers are willing to relinquish. Globalization is rapidly creating a world that is more multilayered and interconnected. Will the UN be able to keep pace with these changes or will the world pass it by? Kennedy is an optimist.