The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

Here in New York, where you could literally taste the World Trade Center in your mouth for weeks and it seemed everybody had a harrowing story to tell, I noticed that people adopted one of several strategies for coping with their shock and grief. Some bolted into action, working on relief, recovery or joining the Coast Guard. Others withdrew into the trivia of normal, everyday life. A third group, which included myself, grabbed everything they could read that might help them make sense of the incomprehensible.

Benjamin's and Simon's "The Age of Sacred Terror," which was published in 2002, was one of the first books to appear after 9/11 that offered a thorough explanation of the origins of Islamic terrorism and traced America's intensifying response to it. Balanced and studious, it showed how the attacks did not come from "out of the blue," but from the depths of religious zealotry and historical grievance. It provided some comfort; the world may be crueler than you thought but at least it still followed the same logic of resentment, bigotry and violence.

"The Next Attack" is not comforting even in that limited sense. It is a shout of alarm and a warning. The authors can barely contain their anger at the Bush Administration for its marginalization of the government's intelligence bureaucracy and its consequent misconceptualization of the jihadist threat. To their credit, however, they do not descend into pure polemic and their arguments are well documented with 437 end notes. Their careful evaluation of some claims and counter-claims, such as the President's statement that "75 percent of known al Qaeda leaders have been brought to justice," is particularly appreciated by this reader.

Benjamin and Simon do not just think that the occupation of Iraq was poorly planned and mishandled, though they certainly make that case. They argue that the endeavor was misconceived to begin with and that by occupying Iraq the United States has played into the hands of its opponents. "It is unlikely that even in his most feverish reveries," they write, "Usama bin Laden could have imagined that America would stumble so badly and wound itself so grievously." The invasion and occupation of Iraq, they argue, has alienated our allies (that's rather obvious), confirmed the worst fears of Muslims about America's motives, and spurred recruitment into terrorist organizations. Although they acknowledge that in the short run the war may suppress terror acts in the United States as jihadists flock to Mesopotamia, they think that Iraq will prove to be an invaluable training ground for terrorists who will ultimately threaten the West directly, especially in Europe. Their discussion of Muslim immigration and alienation in Europe reads as if the civil disturbances in France had already happened when they wrote it.

The authors' analysis of the decision-making process leading up to the invasion adds to the growing evidence that, WMD or not, such momentous decisions must not be made as they were. They portray a clique of ideologues, lead by the Vice President and Secretary of Defense, who sought a pretext for a long-desired course of action and were disdainful of anyone who voiced misgivings, including, incredibly, the Defense Department's own counter-terrorism bureau. While much of the story is now familiar, Benjamin and Simon obviously maintain contacts with many current and former officials in the defense and intelligence communities, and offer some interesting details anonymously attributed to them.

The authors attempt to move the political debate beyond criticism of the Bush Administration's WOT, toward an alternative strategy for defeating Islamic radicalism and protecting Americans. Their suggestions are sensible but the chapters seem a bit hurried and are more of an outline of a policy than a full-blown plan. For example, they argue that recruitment into terrorist organizations would be minimized by "tamping down" regional conflicts in the Caucasus, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines and above all, Palestine. Who could argue with that? But the authors are vague on how to address those intractable disputes. The weakest part of their foreign policy formula, though, relates to Iraq. Whatever the case against the war and its planners, we're there now, and any plausible strategy must take that as a starting point. Benjamin and Simon only offer a bare-bones endorsement of an "Iraqification" program and don't really describe what specific steps need to be taken to limit our losses or, better yet, to turn the situation to America's advantage.

The portion of the book that is least persuasive is its conclusion, in which the authors argue that America's domestic politics, unduly influenced by our own religious fundamentalists, is incapable of producing a deliberate and effective response to Islamic terrorism. I disagree: the invasion of Iraq was an improbable American response to 9/11 and it's hard to imagine any other Administration, Republican or Democrat, that would have led us so directly into the present mess. If there is a structural problem, it is that the American public has not been sufficiently vigilant in evaluating its political leadership, probably because it hasn't yet had to pay a price for its inattention.

Its faults notwithstanding, this is an important book that should be read.

I am very surprised to not see other reviews of this book. While it lacks the intimate detail and the passion of Richard Clarke's book, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, it is the first book I have found in the years since 9/11 that satisfactorily reviews the bidding, provides a polite but hard-hitting critique of all we are doing wrong, and ends with reasonable recommendations for future action--recommendations that will most certainly not be adopted by the current Administration.

Most gripping, on page 159 of the book, is a quote from a TIME article in 2003 that I missed back then, but that today I find compelling--a quote that likens Al Qaeda and its off-shoots not to a snake, the analogy popular with the Administration, but to mold--toxic mold one might add.

The authors are to be commended for both their recognition that it is disruption, not destruction, that will cause the most pain to the West; and that most of our wounds are self-inflicted.

"Intelligence" qua spies and secrecy and espionage does not play in this book. Indeed, in a footnote, the authors wonder if future adversaries will have any respect at all for U.S. intelligence, and with good reason. The irrelevance of secret intelligence to this larger conflict lends added weight to the common-sense open source information observations of the authors. [My own first book, On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World, with a Foreword by Senator David Boren (D-KS), today President of the University of Oklahomna, is the coffin I will use to redirect 80% of the secret intelligence budget back toward education and the only true national intelligence, the aggregate collective intelligence of We the People.]

This book is especially recommended for students and citizens that do not have the time or money to read very widely in the national security arena, but want one single book to "catch up" on all that we have failed to accomplish. The book might well have been sub-titled "How a Naked Emperor Pranced Past a Sleeping Public for a Second Term."

We are losing" - the first sentence in "The Next Attack." Inspired by Osama's boldness and outraged by America's actions, more Muslims are joining the terrorist movement. Meanwhile, the U.S., instead of taking a comprehensive view of radical Islam, uses only two indicators to show progress - the number of days since 9/11 without a catastrophic attack, and the number of terrorists captured or killed. Benjamin and Simon also believe that in destroying one of the most hated secular dictatorships that jihadists had been unable to dent, the U.S. has created an open field for radicals to raise havoc and provided them with Americans in close proximity for targets.

U.S. attacks in Afghanistan did serious damage to Al Qaeda - aided by the Taliban's straight-line trenches and high-tech weapons. On the other hand, Osama's ability to elude capture for a period longer than U.S. involvement in WWII has enhanced his image. Regardless, we now have the phenomena of "self-starting" groups that include highly educated Muslims capable of highly sophisticated acts (eg. the Madrid and London train bombings).

While it is impossible to provide credible estimates of the number of foreign fighters in Iraq, an Israeli's analysis of 154 foreigners who died in Iraq concluded that the vast majority had never taken part previously in violence. At the same time, a British bomb expert employed as a consultant notes that terrorist progress in Iraq has been rapid - a result of the pooling of experience from around the region (and the Internet).

The number of terrorist (mostly Muslim) Internet sites has risen from 12 in '98 to about 4,400. Uses include dispensing "how-to" information, showing evidence of recent acts (eg. IEDs exploding, beheadings) and fatwahs, and serving as recruitment tools.

Europe has had problems integrating and employing its rapidly growing Muslim community - for example a recent survey found that 41% of Britain's Muslims saw themselves as "Muslim" rather than "British and Muslim." The U.S. has yet to experience such problems - its Muslim population has an average household income and percentage with advanced degrees (1/3) greater than the general population (about 9%).

The authors then spend time rehashing the flawed march to war in Iraq, failure to adequately prepare for occupation, squabbling between U.S. agencies over Chalabi (eg. the CIA sees him as unreliable), and fighting between Defense and State over management of post-war Iraq.

Recommendations include encouraging Europe to better integrate its Muslims (hard to do with existing high unemployment and very high levels of Muslims in some areas), creating a better image for the U.S. (efforts to-date have floundered - how does one sell a "product" that is widely hated for its acts?), and improving homeland defense by focusing on top priorities (reality - the U.S. provides an infinite set of terrorist targets).

Benjamin and Simon offer a key new point about political compexity of U.S. actions - the growing strength of fundamentalist Christians who support Israel in hopes of bringing about the Biblically-foretold "second coming of the Messiah." These same groups presumably are also responsible for Rumsfeld failing to fire Gen. Boykin for his offensive (to Muslims) religious comments.

Contains some interesting new material, and also much already well-covered in the news or their prior book ("The Age of Secular Terror"). Not a "Must Read."