The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

"The Hitler Myth" is essentially a charting of the effectiveness of--though not an in-depth investigation of--the propaganda machine relative specifically to how the German populace viewed Adolf Hitler from the late 1920's through the duration of the war. Kershaw measures the propaganda machine's effectiveness through 1) opinion poll results, 2) voting figures, and 3) anecdotal documentation, especially reports from Nazi Party functionaries regarding what might today be called "the word on the street."

What ends up being Kershaw's most strongly stressed observation in the text is the persistence in Nazi Germany of public "excusablility" of Hitler (my clumsy term, not Kershaw's) or a sort of "blame transfer" (again, my inadequate term) that existed relative to any negative news or regime mistakes.

In other words, when things went wrong, the public--in a seemingly maniacal way--held onto a "BUT IT'S NOT THE FURHER'S FAULT" mentality. Concomitant to this reality is the extent to which the Nazi Party was actually actively disliked by huge swaths of the population of Germany from quite early on (pre-war), and even more so by the beginning of hostilities with the Allies. Nonetheless, none of that displeasure seemed to get applied to Hitler himself until much, much later. Kershaw's fairly convincing stream of written evidence shows that the public persistently disassociated Hitler from the over-zealous policies, corruption, or flat-out bad ideas and brutish stupidity of the Nazi regime by assuming that Hitler was being misinformed by sycophants, or was being foiled by the pernicious British, or was simply too absorbed with genius foreign policy and thus distracted from domestic concerns, etc. In fact, the evidence suggests that during many points of the Third Reich's embarrassing reign, at least up until the defeat at Stalingrad, when the popularity of the Nazi Party worsened, Hitler's personal popularity actually increased.

The "why" behind all this is tricky, and Kershaw is honest enough to say so, admitting that he doesn't have a complete answer. But, his exhaustive research over the years has helped. Clearly, he thinks that the Nazi propaganda machine and its persistent application is the principle reason for the amazing success of the "Hitler myth." Or, to put it in modern pundit parlance: "It's the media, stupid." Control of communications by savvy, Machiavellian manipulators like Joseph Gobbles allowed for Hitler to always be positioned (literally, too!) in the best possible light, no matter what the national or international circumstances.

A secondary but important factor in the vitality of the Hitler myth was simply a desperate German thirst for leadership (decisive leadership or at least decisive-sounding) in the wake of 20 years of highly dysfunctional adolescent democracy burdened by rank corruption and destabilized by what was at the time the compelling Communist alternative, Communism having not then been discredited anywhere in the world nearly to the extent it has been now.

While Kershaw does not apply the lessons of the Hitler myth directly to any aspect of today's political environment, some parallels are there, and he discretely suggests as much in a few places in the text. Kershaw wisely leaves it up to you, the reader, to plumb them. I suspect that Kershaw, being a British citizen and longtime observer of the media of the past, cannot help but find some slight comparisons--arguably worrying--between the inability of the German media to respond critically to Hitler and the inability of the modern media to do the same relative to national leaders or powerful and essentially conservative or nationalistic movements, particularly in the United States and in those large regions of the Middle East served by Al-Jezeera's news service. Of course media observers, including some of Kershaw's professional colleagues, outside of the U.S. and some within (where it is considered fairly "politically incorrect") have drawn parallels to the staging of Hitler-focused Nazi propaganda events and rallies and those staged by the current American presidential administration. Parallels have also been drawn--much more often in Kershaw's native Britain than in the U.S.--between the Third Reich's control of the media the corporate control of the media today. (Incidentally, Kershaw does somewhat discuss public partisan events, especially Nazi rallies in small communities and parades in Berlin and elsewhere, and it is interesting to read the obsessively detailed accounts of official Nazi reports citing how many people were in the crowds during parades, what percentage of them seemed to be executing the Nazi salute, and so forth.) Granted, the media's inability to serve genuine public discourse today and be properly critical (I use "critical" in the same sense of the word as it is used in the term "critical thinking;" that is, "critical" meaning the qualities of being careful, objective, and intellectually rigorous, not necessarily "negative") is less severe today that than in Germany in the 1930's and 1940's. But, that begs the question: just how un-critical is uncritical *enough* to cause great harm to a society, nation, or culture, particularly a Western one?

If there is a glaring omission in Kershaw's book, it is that of technological and sociological context relative to media. His entire text is about propaganda, media, and public perception, and yet there is no examination of just how many of the German people read newspaper, how many newspapers there were, how many of the people listened to radio, how many hours, and what radio shows existed, and what the options were. In fact, at times it seems Kershaw was too close to his own material, and failed to realize that the basics of the media landscape of Germany from the 1920's through the 1940's isn't something even erudite readers are likely to understand today. Granted, he touched on points of this landscape: there are brief mentions of posters and their use, or the number of Hitler's speeches and their frequency; there are citations throughout from specific newspapers, including underground anti-Nazi publications (some of which, in retrospect, seem to have been stirringly prescient and clear-sighted, so much so as to make me shake my head at times while reading their predictions and worries about what Hitler would bring to the German people and Europe). But, it was not nearly a coherent enough picture. Even just one or two pages of text giving an overarching view of the German media landscape during the 1920's and 1930's would have been extremely helpful.

Kershaw is probably more famous now for his two part bio of Hitler, but he wrote this book around 1980 and it is still one of the best works on how propaganda painted a picture of the Fuhrer. What one finds out through reading this book is a glmpse into everyday life for Germans, how propaganda kept Hitler's popularity up despite the popularity of the Nazi Party declining, and how propaganda gave the general public a distorted view of Hitler. We also see how the public could have supported someone like Hitler and his party. Often times with the Nazi era, it is hard to understand how ordinary citizens supported the party considering what we know now, but of course people at the time did not expect a world war or the holocaust to happen. Kershaw does an excellent job of hitting this theme as he puts the reader in the time period so we see why Hitler and the Nazis rose to power. We also see that the Nazi's often times downplayed their anti-Semitism before taking power and their hatred of the Jews was not amongst the reasons most ordinary people voted Nazi or supported Hitler. All in all, this book is a must read for anyone interested in the Nazis or the use of propaganda. The book is scholarly, but for the most part is easy to read and flows pretty well.

In the late summer months of 1933 and 1934, groups of German citizens flocked to Berghof hoping to catch a glimpse of Adolf Hitler walking through the countryside . Filled with a zealous belief for the `Hitler Myth', post World War I Germany surrendered itself to Nazi propaganda. Responding to the humiliating treaty of Versailles and the economically unstable Weimar Republic, Hitler took on the Weberian characteristics of charismatic leadership . Unconditional loyalty and unquestioned faith in the Fuhrer rekindled historical notions of charismatic authority within the German psyche. Only after millions of European deaths and an Allied imposed peace could Germany finally tear itself away from the spell of Adolf Hitler.
Unlike other chroniclers and scholars of the Nazi regime, Ian Kershaw in his book The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in The Third Reich, examined the subtle distinction World War II German citizens carried in their assessment of Hitler and the Nazi Party. According to Kershaw, Hitler realized that the personality cult constructed around him could be used to cement the integration of the Nazi Party and the German populace. Indeed, the spell of Hitler or the myth of Hitler did not always exactly correspond with the German populace's perception of the Nazi Party. Throughout his well documented work, Kershaw makes the case that the `Hitler Myth' held a different form of allegiance within World War II Germany. The `Hitler Myth' unlike the Nazi party, prevented the German citizen from abandoning the Fuhrer in his quest for European dominance . It was trust in Hitler not in allegiance to the Nazi Party that propelled many German citizens to fight through World War II, despite food shortages and mounting casualties. Only after the dropping of 1,202,000 tons of bombs in 1944 did the majority of the German populace awaken to the reality of the Third Reich and realize the linkage between the devastating policies of the Nazi party and `The Hitler Myth'.
The separation of the Fuhrer from the Nazi party began with the incarceration of Adolf Hitler at Landsberg in 1924. Prior to his jailing, Hitler merely saw himself as an intrepid vanguard for a future National Socialist dictator . Only after a period of gestation when Hitler read voraciously, wrote Mein Kampf, and received countless party visitors did the future Fuhrer bloom to the realization that he could carry the mantle of National Socialism and assume the untapped potential of the `Hitler Myth'. Only a year prior to Hitler's incarceration, the German populace viewed the Munich orator as little more than a "vulgar demagogue". With his Landsberg transformation, Hitler assumed the reigns of the Nazi Party.
Appealing to the German middle classes, Hitler promoted a message of anti-Marxism and strong authoritarian leadership. While assuming political power for the Nazi Party, Hitler subtly cultivated his own cult of personality and authority by issuing a 1933 directive through the Minister of the Interior calling for the compulsory greeting of `Heil Hitler' for all governmental employees . More than jailings, beatings, and political sabotage, the greeting of `Heil Hitler' provided the Fuhrer with a subtle tool for manufacturing German consent. This consent was needed in 1933-41 as the Nazi party failed to uphold promises of economic renewal and growth . Despite material dissatisfaction, the German populace did not reject the `Hitler Myth' which was seen by many Germans inhabiting an allegiance outside the political and economic system.
Hitler realized that the continued allegiance of the German populace needed to be sustained by tangible triumphs. The growth of Lebensraum not GDP was an essential component in fostering the `Hitler Myth'. In 1938 and 1939, Hitler created a mythos of `Triumph without Bloodshed' by occupying the Sudentanland with a perceived skill and strong armed diplomacy. If Landsberg secured the `Hitler Myth' within the Nazi Party structure, the Munich Crisis convinced a majority of the German citizens to unquestionably follow the charismatic and diplomatically agile leadership of Adolf Hitler. Following victories in Denmark, Norway, Poland, and France, the `Hitler Myth' encapsulated all of Germany, since military action failed to make a serious dent in the living conditions of late 1930's Germany .
The growth of Lebensraum and `Hitler Myth' met their fate in the Stalingrad winter of 1943. Despite claims of fighting a Valhallian death, Hitler and the Nazi propaganda machine of Joseph Goebells could not mask the defeat of General Paulas and the surrender of 90,000 German soldiers . In addition, the North African military reverses and the treatment of Germany's mentally ill, chipped away at the Hitler Myth . Though Hitler was losing his dream of Lebensraum, the Hitler myth still showed its tenacity through the Final Solution.
For Kershaw, the Hitler Myth provided the German populace with an excuse to disassociate themselves from the genocidal anti-Semitism taking place across the Eastern Front. In a 1942 survey of Nazi party members, 42% of those sampled which was the largest percentage of the opinion poll, indicated that they had no interest in the fate of the Jews. In fact, the German populace never heard Hitler speak of the Jewish question in any public speeches from 1933 to 1934. Clearly, Hitler promoted the Fuhrer myth to two different audiences with two different objectives. The `Hitler Myth', which was promoted to the public, focused on a growth of Lebensraum and a linkage to the Nazi Party agenda. While the `Hitler Myth' encapsulating the Nazi Party apparatus insured unyielding loyalty to the Fuhrer and a direct participation within the Final Solution .
Only after World War II could the world and many German citizens obtain an accurate picture of the Third Reich. The Final Solution and the irrational quest for Lebensraum were finally upheld to a public light. However, this awakening came in 1945, not in 1933 when Adolf Hitler obtained the Chancellorship. For almost twelve years, the majority of the German people never questioned the "Hitler Myth'. Only after an allied bombing campaign that directly affected 1 in 3 Germans did the Volk turn away from Hitler . By 1945, German citizens no longer found the "Hitler Myth' in the sunny garden of Berghof but could see it in the morbid bunker of Berlin.