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The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf
 
 
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The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Michael R. Gordon , General Bernard E. Trainor
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Produktinformation

  • Taschenbuch: 576 Seiten
  • Verlag: Back Bay Books (9. November 1995)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • ISBN-10: 0316321001
  • ISBN-13: 978-0316321006
  • Größe und/oder Gewicht: 15,2 x 3,2 x 23,5 cm
  • Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 4.4 von 5 Sternen  Alle Rezensionen anzeigen (5 Kundenrezensionen)
  • Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 825.516 in Englische Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Englische Bücher)

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Michael R. Gordon
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Produktbeschreibungen

From Booklist

This inside view of the battle between high U.S. command officers in the conflict with Iraq is a fascinating and sustained analysis of the friction that takes place in real warfare. Writer Gordon teams with retired Marine general Bernard Trainor to record the struggles of the generals of the combined services in their endeavor to plan and execute the massive 500,000-troop movement that achieved the short and stunning victory over Iraqi forces. An important question is posed: Why didn't the generals press on to dismantle the Republican Guard of Saddam Hussein, and what were the consequences of their decision against such an act? The Air Force strategy called for constant precision bombing in the heart of Baghdad. Over 30 days of bombing weakened but did not finish off the enemy. The land attack, whose success was clearly foreshadowed, was concluded too soon and allowed Hussein to keep the Republican Guard intact. The authors believe that the cautious philosophy of General Colin Powell and the eagerness of General Norman Schwarzkopf to get out with an Army victory, combined with the decision of President Bush and his advisers, led to the unfortunate staying power of Saddam Hussein. The final conclusion is undeniable--the gate had not been closed in Iraq, and this book explains why. Eugene Sullivan -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.

From Library Journal

If the Vietnam War was conducted by politicians in Washington, the war for Kuwait was, according to New York Times correspondent Gordon and retired general Trainor, our "generals' war." The authors astutely conclude that President Bush understood what his predecessors never did. Neither Johnson nor Nixon, nor for that matter National Security Council adviser Henry Kissinger, allowed the military to wage a winning war. The lesson was well learned by the savvy Gen. Colin Powell, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who directed his subordinates to lash out against the Iraqis with everything we had save for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Kuwait was not Vietnam, however, and the unmotivated Iraqis were not the Vietcong. Aggrandized as "the world's fourth largest military," the enemy fizzled away within hours when confronted with the world's premier military force. Thus, it came as no surprise that Washington won the battle, but with Saddam Hussein still in power four years after hostilities ended, has it won the war? This cogent analysis provides several disturbing answers worthy of our attention. Recommended for informed lay readers and specialists.
Joseph A. Kechichian, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Cal.
Copyright 1994 Reed Business Information, Inc. -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine vergriffene oder nicht verfügbare Ausgabe dieses Titels.

In diesem Buch (Mehr dazu)
Einleitungssatz
WHEN CHARLIE ALLEN saw the satellite photos on the morning of August 1, 1990, he knew that it was time to sound the klaxon. Lesen Sie die erste Seite
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Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen
Good but judgmental! 19. Juni 2000
Von Tim Price
Format:Taschenbuch
I am half way through "The Generals' War" and I am enjoying it immensely. However, as an avid reader and student of military history, I feel the conclusions or the judgements by the authors of the commanders are a bit off and unfair. At times it comes off as a hatchet job.

In one example, the overall plan or objective to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard did not succeed as well as hoped. But, it was not at the fault of the planners or those fighting the battles. Bottom line - we prepared for the worst case scenario and got the best. With the left hook in motion, the Marines and the Army Tiger Brigade were to attack basically head on. The two events that occurred greatly in our favor to minimize casualties also caused the objective of destroying the Republican Guard to not be fully achieved.

First, the Iraqi soldiers gave up in numbers greater than ever expected. In many cases, it wasn't a fight. Second, partly because of the first, the Marines and the Tiger Brigade blew through their objectives so fast, the left hook barely had time to materialize.

There is something for everyone to remember when reading any book about the Gulf War. The intent of the major commanders was to minimize casualties. I'm thankful that they were a part of the Viet Nam fighting (if one can actually be thankful for such), because it instilled a common goal among each one of them, including Schwarzkopf, Powell, Horner and Franks to name a few.

To achieve the objective as planned would mean the casualties resulting from the expected heavier fighting would have had to occur. Our light casualties verses the full achievement of the objectives? That's a no brainer.

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GFB 18. September 1999
Von Ein Kunde
Format:Taschenbuch
This book provides a very vivid description of the planning and strategy prior to and during the Gulf War. The authors undoubtedly had some bones to pick with the planners here, it describes our successes and failures as well as why we're still there today in a different manner than one would find in the official reports to Congress.
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Format:Taschenbuch
I found the book the be more of an unvarnished look than most. The specials aired by the History Channel and PBS regarding the Gulf War seem to utilize a great deal of input from Gen. Trainor and his competence in his area of expertise speaks for itself.

I read the book within 4 days of receiving it and found it to be interestingly written, even though it is dealing with a historical matter.

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