Professor Brinkley attempts to answer this question in this excellent recapitulation of liberalism's development from the late 1930s to the end of World War II. That period began with the so-called "Roosevelt Recession," an unwelcome development for liberals and progressives who had, despite other differences, put their unwavering faith in the political and economic leadership of President Roosevelt.
Brinkley borrows from Ellis Hawley's The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly and other first-rate treatments of the New Deal to show how previous splits in liberal thought were further aggravated by Roosevelt's recession. Liberals wanting statist control of the economy; liberals wanting governmental-corporate-labor "associational" agreements on production and pricing; liberals stressing anti-monopoly governmental efforts as a way to increase consumption --- all these guys fought for Roosevelt's ear as the President vacillated maddingly on the proper response. The upshot was a decision by FDR to mix anti-monopoly policy with modest Keynsian fiscal pump-priming as a hopeful solution to the recession.
Keynsianism represented the triumph in liberal thought of concerns over the consumer (governmental spending increases jobs and wages, which fattens the wallet and pocketbook) over systemic changes in capitalistic production. The latter, Professor Brinkley argues, would represent a true attempt to reform the economy. Brinkley shows that during and after World War II, with a booming economy and the defeat (or proved moral bankruptcy) of threats to our capitalistic way of life, the consumer ethic established further beachheads in liberal thought. Also, conservatism in Congress, the business community, and the American public further limited the chance for real reform and the attractiveness of capitalism as a way to stuff our refrigators and garages.
By the end of World War II all the components of liberalism more or less bought into the consumerist gambit to keep the economy booming. All that was o.k. so long as the boom continued. Mainstream liberalism, Brinkley argues, proved its inability substantively to help its constituencies, however, when economic tough times returned in the mid-1970s.
Brinkley's book represents a great critique of American liberalism from the left. He shortchanges the constraints under which Roosevelt worked in World War II -- after all, he wanted to win it -- but this is still good stuff. Oh yeah, he needed more analysis of the Supreme Court -- after all one cannot understand post World War II liberalism without grappling with the role of the federal judiciary. How did FDR and his liberal advisors contribute to that when they put "liberal" judges in the federal judiciary?
Still, buy this book if you want an understanding of how liberalism got to where it is today. Kudos Professor Brinkley.
