The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (Modern Library) [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

First of all, Lewis'"Crisis of Islam" is not about the Iraq War or George W. Bush. Secondly, it is NOT an anti-Islam, anti-Arab, pro-Western polemic. For example, Lewis writes that:

(1) "The expulsion of religious minorities is extremely rare in Islamic history - unlike in medievel Christendom, where expulsions of Jews and, after the Reconquest, of Muslims were normal and frequent. Compared with European expulsions, 'Umar's decree was both limited and compassionate ... And unlike the Jews and Muslims driven out of Spain and other European countries, to find what refuge they could elsewhere, the Jews and Christians of Arabia were resettled on lands assigned to them ..." [xxix-xxx].

(2) "To most Americans, bin Laden's declaration is a travesty, a gross distortion of the nature and purpose of the U.S. presence in Arabia. They should also be aware that for many, perhaps most Muslims, the declaration is an equally grotesque travesty of the nature of Islam, and even of its doctrine of jihad. THe Qur'an speaks of peace as well as of war" [xxxii].

(3) "During the centuries that in European history are called medieval, the most advanced civilization in the world was undoubtedly that of Islam" [29].

(4) "Fighters in a jihad are enjoined [by the Qur'an] not to kill women, children, and the aged unless they attack first, not to torture or mutilate prisoners, to give fair warning of the resumption of hostilities after a truce, and to honor agreements ... At no point do the basic texts of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder" [39].

(5) "There were certainly major negative consequences of imperialism and more broadly of Western European influence ..." [58].

(6) "There is some justice in one charge that is frequently leveled against the United States, and more generally against the West: Middle Easterners increasingly complain that the West judges them by different and lower standards than it does Europeans and Americans ... Sometimes, even where American interests are concerned, American governments have betrayed those whom they had promised to support and persuaded to take risks" [107].

(7) "Most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists ..." [137].

(8) "All these different extremist groups sanctify their action through pious references to Islamic texts ... They are, however, highly selective in their choice and interpretation of sacred texts" [138].

(9) "Islamic jurisprudence is a system of law and justice, not of lynching and terror" [141].

(10) "Can [the attacks of 9/11 and other similar actions] in any sense be justified in terms of Islam? The answer must be a clear no ... [such attacks] have no justification in Islamic doctrine or law and no precedent in Islamic history ... These are ... acts - from a Muslim point of view - or blashphemy" [154].

The whole thrust of the book, in fact, is that the extremism of today is a result of a particular sect of Islam, Wahhabism, which arose in the past two hundred years. He even concludes the book by arguing: "There is enough in the traditional culture of Islam on the one hand and the modern experience of the Muslim peoples on the other to provide the basis for an advance toward fredom in the true sense of that word" [169]. These are hardly the words of a religious or racial bigot, so enough of that nonesense.

Some of the most fascinating and illuminating parts of the book deal with:

(1) The major difference between Christianity (and Judaism) and Islam regarding politics. While Christ told his followers to "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's" and grew and developed for centuries as the "religion of the downtrodden", Muhammad founded a state and empire; therefore, he did not need to establish a separate church. For the formative first period of Islam, there was no experience of state persecution. Islam was the state and "God's approval of their cause was made clear to them in the form of victory and empire in THIS world." While Christ was crucified, and Moses died before entering the Promised Land, Muhammad died a sovereign and conqueror. The past centuries of Judeo-Christian superiority and victories is thus not just a humiliation for Muslims: It is a direct challenge to the truth of Islam itself. While Christians have been in dominant political positions throughout history, during their formative years they were not, and basically got used to being kicked around. While they have enjoyed holding power, they don't believe God entitles Christians to hold it.

(2) From the 7th Century the successors of Muhammad declared and fought an imperialistic jihad against the rest of the world. Muslim armies overthrew the ancient empire of Persia and absorped all its territories, thus threatening Central Asia and India. Much territory of the Byzantine Empire was conquered and the then CHRISTIAN provinces of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and North Africa were absorbed "and in due course Islamized and Arabized, and they served as bases for the further invasion of Europe and the conquest of Spain and Portugal and much of southern Italy. By the early 8th century the conquering Arab armies were even advancing beyond the Pyrenees into France" [34]. After several centuries, Christendom began to turn the Muslim invaders back from Europe. The Crusades, NOT an imperialistic enterprise, but a brief and delayed response to centuries of jihad failed utterly. Subsequently a new phase of the jihad was inaugurated by the Muslim Turks who also pushed into Europe.

(3) The US-Israeli relationship is examined and Lewis debunks the thesis that Palestine is the root cause of Muslim rage by pointing out a number of interesting facts:

(a) In the 1930s, Nazi Germany was the main cause of Jewish migration to Palestine. The Nazis facilitated this migration "while the British, in the forlorn hope of winning Arab goodwill, imposed and enforced restrictions" [94]. Nonetheless, the Arabs openly sided with the Nazis who were encouraging Jewish migration to Palestine, and against the British who were trying to keep them out.

(b) The Soviets played a major role in securing the UN vote to establish Israel in Palestine and they then gave Israel immediate de jure recognition. The US was more hesitant and gave only de facto recognition. The Soviets immediately sent the Israelis weapons through Czechoslovakia after the war (to hurt the British) while the US maintained a partial weapons embargo. Nonetheless, the Arab (though not the Turks and Persians) embraced the Soviet alliance without bitterness!

(c) Throughout the 1950s, US dealings with Israel were limited and cautious. The US decisively intervened in 1956 to denounce the Israeli invasion of Egypt and demanded their immediate withdrawal. As late as the Six-Day War (1967), Israel relied for its weapons mainly on France. It was not until the return to the Arab world of Russian imperialism in the form of the 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms deal (nonetheless hailed across the Islamic world) did the US-Israeli alliance begin. Thus, "the strategic relationship between the US and Israel was a consequence, not a cause, of Soviet penetration" [97].

Bernard Lewis is a master of clarity. I must say I have not read any of his works other than his "Middle East," but the quality of these two books, combined with his general reputation make it clear that he is a giant in the field of Arab and Islamic studies. His grasp of history is phenomenal, and his ability to apply history to current exigencies is astounding.

"The Crisis in Islam" very neatly, but not simplistically, lays out the history of relations between the (mainly) Christian West, and the world of Islam, beginning with the generation of the Prophet up to the current times. It is critical to understand, and the brilliant introduction lights the way, that Muslim from birth see the world in metaphors that we can barely descrobe. The former American imperative of Manifest Destiny is a pale reflection of the inevitability many, but certainly not all, Muslim feel about the spread of the "Dar al-Islam" in the world. This literally translates as "House of Peace" and implies the eventual conquering and conversion to Islam of the entire planet, without room for compromise. All other "nations" and religions are within the "Dar al-Harb," literally "House of the Sword." No permanent peace can exist between the two houses. (Again I stress that this is NOT a universal attitude.) In Lewis' thesis, attitudes toward the West have evolved through contacts with first the Eastern Empire in Constantinople, then Spain, Portugal and France, and through years of direct conflict in the Crusades and the colonial wars of the 19th and 20th centuries. Combine this with the flourishing of multiple schools and "sects" within Islam, combined with chance vagaries of history, and you wind up with the hegemony of the Wahhabi school within the Kingdom of the Su'ud family (now Sa'udi Arabia). Then add the discovery of oil. Then add the poverty of most Arab Muslim people whose only access to any education is via Wahhabi supported schools and mosques, and you have a very heady recipe. While this is grossly oversimplified, it gives the barest skeleton of the first part of the book.

To Lewis, the influence and philosophy of the Arab Wahhabis and Iranian Shi'ites make accomodation pretty much impossible. The West, especially the United States is seen as primarily a force for temptation and corruption. There are many surprise insights in the book; one big one for me was the revelation that the hostage crisis in Iran in 1979 was not due to the decline in relations between the two "Dar"s, but instead because there was a threat of 'rapprochement' which was seen as potentially corrupting. Another was the explanation of how democratic process is used by some as a tool to achieve power legitimately, then subverted in a method he calls amusingly the "One man (only men), one vote, one time" method. While popular demand may be for self-determination, the hard-liners (who are really NOT fundamentalists) have other agenda. And the West has done a pretty poor job making a case for co-existence, given its history in such places as Iraq and Syria.

I cannot recommend the book enough as a quick, but not superficial way to "catch up" with how our Muslim brothers have arrived at the current impasse, and how terrorism seems to function within a peculiar and very important social structure.

Bernard Lewis continues his lifetime devotion to teaching about the Middle East and Islamic culture in this all too thin volume. As in his last book, What Went Wrong, here again Lewis focuses on raising the average readers understanding of this crucial region and its history. Unlike many so called academics, who argue from polarized positions on CNN and FOX News, Lewis takes a complex and nuance approach to this most complex of regions. Indeed, while everyone else seems to either want to condemn all Islam and its culture or apologize for the terrorists it currently inspires, this author writes from a position of respect and appreciation for this civilization all the while refusing to be blinded by base sentimentalism.

Looking through Islamic history, Lewis explains how a preoccupation with a loss of status and power, a world view looking to blame outsiders rather than looking inward for critical self-examination, and a lack of democratic tradition, continues to radicalize the Middle East. The author further seeks to explain how Islamic culture holds a different world view from those in the west and that we need to understand this world view if we are to confront the threat of terrorism.

Readers should be aware that this text is not an introduction. Lewis does not write for laymen. Assuming a certain baseline of knowledge, he tends to gloss over arguments or offer evidence in a sort of short hand, expecting the educated reader to understand references and names. In a world where most non-fiction is over written, Lewis is a throw back to an earlier age, writing thin volumes that are light on detail and heavy on argument. This does not detract from the quality of his work, but it does limit what a reader without a firm grasp of the fundamentals can learn from reading it. Still, there is much to be learned from this work, in particular his examination of the Wahabbi sect being exported by Saudi Arabia and the traditional self understanding of Islam as an ascendant religion that would spread over the whole world.

Readers should also look to Lewiss earlier work, in particular the Middle East: A Brief History and Islam and the West, both essential reading for someone whishing to understand the modern Middle East.