The Battle of Britain: Myth and Reality [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

In matter of fact, according to Overy, the air battle over Britain was never likely to have been followed by a Nazi invasion force, for the German forces lacked all the necessary marine transportation and logistics support to prosecute such an attempt to invade Britain. As William Shirer pointed out long ago in "The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich", Hitler never had much stomach for a cross-channel invasion, and the German General Staff never ordered all the necessary shipbuilding needed to mount a serious invasion attempt. In addition, the forces of the British realm were never so badly outnumbered as was previously believed, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) in fact had superior fighters and better logistics support that did their German opponents, not to mention the limited battle time for German pilots who had to ferry themselves back over the channel after doing battle, which provided the RAF with a key tactical advantage.

Yet Overy's purpose here is clearly not intended to denigrate or downplay the outright heroism, courage, and sacrifice of the RAF in its service to the English people over the skies of Britain that fateful year, but rather to celebrate the actual, fact-based history of those fateful events. Here in the Battle of Britain we find the first signs that the famed "unstoppable" Nazi juggernaut was not infallible, that it could be met on its own terms and defeated, plane by plane, raid by raid, and campaign by campaign, and denied its aggressive objectives by a determined and resourceful opponent. Also, by denying the Nazis the complete victory over its western European rivals it desired, the British forced Hitler into making a fatal blunder by opening up a two-front war with the invasion of the Soviet Union the next spring, forcing him to leave millions of troops along the western wall he could have otherwise used against the Russians in Operation Barbarossa.

Also, as Overy illustrates so convincingly, the British actions in the skies over their homeland convinced many in the American Government to take up Britain's cause, and this too had fateful consequences for the eventual outcome of the war. Finally, he argues that the consequences of turning back the attempts by the Nazis to gain air superiority over the skies of Britain galvanized and energized the British people with a new sense of vigor and purpose, and this was tremendously important in helping them to stay the course during a very difficult and trying period of time following the end of the battle of Britain itself. This is a great addition to the volumes of material already available on the Battle Of Britain, and presents the facts in a new and interesting way that makes it an important work which acts to clarify and modify what we already know about the events of 1940. I recommend this book, and hope you enjoy it as much as I did.

One of Overy's major points centers on the perception of the battle and British public reaction to it. We have been handed down an image of a unified, defiant Britain standing firm before the onslaught. Overy reveals a divided, in some senses baffled and relatively numb British public which gave its Government cause for concern (and not a few flights of irrational fancy).

Of Churchill's famous speech about "The Few" Overy points out the reference was a small and offhand portion of a speech largely devoted to other matters which was not regarded as one of Churchill's better oratories at the time.

Overy also shows how selection of the parameters of the battle in terms of time and geography distort historical perception to reinforce the myth of Fighter Command being severely outnumbered. He shows the British and German single-engine fighter counts (twin-engine fighters having been rapidly proven outclassed and irrelevant to the air superiority battle) started roughly even and subsequently diverged steadily in favor of the British.

Overy illustrates "The Few" were not so few in comparison to their equally few German opponents, and that the numbers of the British "Few" steadily rose through the battle, while those of the Luftwaffe steadily fell.

The idea that Fighter Command was nearly knocked about by attacks on its bases, is dispelled by the revelation of just how few British aircraft were destroyed on the ground, how light casualties on the ground were, and how quickly fields were restored to operation. Overy also reveals that the hardest hit bases were actually forward bases to support the Battle of France, not bases integral to Fighter Command's Air Defense of Great Britain.

Overy also acknowledges the role of ULTRA in the Battle of Britain alongside that of radar, the Observer Corps and radio listening posts in the background of which it is often lost.

As for the role of the battle in preventing an invasion (Operation Sea Lion) Overy raises the important point that even had the Luftwaffe forced Fighter Command back from SE England, it lacked the range to keep pushing it back or to stop the Royal Navy from fatally interfering with any landing attempt. Too many analyses of Sea Lion assume control of the air meant ipso facto control of the sea and forget that control of the air was merely a prelude to contesting control of the sea by air or surface forces. The Luftwaffe's ability to stop a Royal Navy intervention against a German cross-Channel landing attempt was by no means certain, particularly after failing to stop the more-vulnerable Dunkirk exodus.

Overy's book is a quick, five-star, one-afternoon primer for serious students of the Battle of Britain's import. It is not a detailed tactical description of dogfights. Nor is it an effort at debunking everything known about the Battle of Britain. Rather, it is a consolidation of facts usually brought out in isolation into a single coherent tapestry that reveals a somewhat different picture than we're used to seeing.

And despite substantial myth-busting, Overy's conclusion is that the Battle of Britain was a seminal moment in the war...if not in the way and for the reasons we have commonly believed. I highly recommend this very mature and realistic look at the Battle of Britain.

Chapter 1 observes that during the 1930s, Britain envisioned Germany delivering an airborne knock-out blow for which there was no defense. In response, between 1937 through 1939,millions were spent on an airborne defensive shield and an expanded Bomber Command if required for retaliation. The German strategy was to use air power in combined operations with the army to impose a decisive defeat of enemy ground forces. Britain was unprepared to meet this type of warfare. Therefore when France was attacked, Britain could supply little effective air support to aid the French. At this point, the British were not united. The author narrates the policy debates over whether to
appease or fight Germany. However, the fall of France and Dunkirk shocked the country and British morale was revived to fight on. Hitler, the author notes, regarded invasion as very
hazardous and hoped for a political settlement. Hitler made a peace offer in a July 1940 speech which Britain promptly rejected in a radio address. Britain now faced the air power type of conflict it had been preparing for since the 1930s.

Chapter 2 evaluates the two forces noting that The military confrontation in the autumn of 1940 became a test of strength between two rival air forces. The text notes both armies trained for the coming battle; but ....none of this mattered as long as the German air Force had not won mastery of the air over southern Britain. Command structures are described noting that Herman Goering was both air minister and air force commander while the British had an Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair, with separate commanders for fighters and for bombers. To Sir Hugh Dowding, of Fighter Command, fell the task of creating an effective defense shield. The author writes Sinclair epitomized that British elite of dignified public servants so much despised and ridiculed in German propaganda. Goering, on the hand, was everything Sinclair was not. The text notes that on 10 August 1940, The German single-engine fighters assigned to the battle over Britain was 1011, slightly fewer than Fighter Command thus destroying an enduring myth of the few against the many. The book compares fighter production, performance and armament noting that early in the battle there was rough parity in fighter number, but in the last weeks the British had the edge. Another myth is the shortage of trained RAF fighter pilots. The number of RAF pilots increased by one third between June and August 1940. The Germans could cope with pilot shortages because of a lower loss rate. The author writes If Fighter command were the few, German pilots were fewer. The British air defense system, set up to counter the enemy bombing offensive, is described and it was adjusted in the summer of 1940 to meet an invasion threat.

Coastal Command played a difficult, costly and critical role twice daily conducting reconnaissance of German controlled ports. Bomber Commands role was to wear down German resistance by
bombardment of vital objectives. The author notes that The one field of battle where British preparations proved at least equal to the task in 1940 was fighter defense and it was for that
reason alone that German air fleets concentrated on destroying Fighter Command using fighter sweeps in a war of attrition. German daylight bombing of London began on 7 September when
350 bombers raided the east dock area and the text notes The air battles in the week between 7 September and 15 September were decisive in turning the tide of the battle. During that week the German Air force lost 298 aircraft. Fighter Command lost 120, against 99 enemy fighters. Another myth that Richard Overy debunks is that Hitler never seriously planned an invasion,writing that There need be no doubt that under the right circumstances Hitler was serious about
invading Britain in 1940.... but that by the end of September Hitler concluded that air superiority had not been achieved and indefinitely postponed an invasion. Lacking daylight bombing success, the Germans shifted to night bombing thereby creating a problem as aircraft were very difficult to shoot down at night from the air or from the ground until new detection equipment was
developed. Overy states that though the Germans never formally adopted terror bombing, the tactics they employed caused widespread civilian casualties resulting in the death of 40,000 people during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz.

The Battle of Britain did not seriously weaken Germany and her allies, but the contest was not a draw. German air fleets did not gain air supremacy over southern Britain. The author observes
that In a great many respects, however, the two forces were remarkably matched. Both commanded a small group of committed, highly trained and courageous pilots, both forces responded with considerable tactical ingenuity to sudden changes of direction in the course of the battle; both exploited fighter aircraft at the cutting edge of aviation technology; both forces fought
the battle with operations commanders of real distinction.

Finally, this was not a traditional battle in that it did not have a clear-cut beginning nor a defined ending. However, the author concludes that like Trafalgar, the Battle of Britain was critical to the British people in that an invasion scare subsided and the nation could now get on with the task of
winning the war.