The Art of Intelligence und über 1,5 Millionen weitere Bücher verfügbar für Amazon Kindle. Erfahren Sie mehr
  • Alle Preisangaben inkl. MwSt.
Nur noch 1 auf Lager (mehr ist unterwegs).
Verkauf und Versand durch Amazon.
Geschenkverpackung verfügbar.
The Art of Intelligence: ... ist in Ihrem Einkaufwagen hinzugefügt worden
+ EUR 3,00 Versandkosten
Gebraucht: Gut | Details
Zustand: Gebraucht: Gut
Kommentar: INTERNATIONALER VERSAND MÖGLICH!!!. Gut bis sehr guter Zustand. Mit dem Kauf unterstützen Sie soziale Projekte in Nordindien!
Ihren Artikel jetzt
eintauschen und
EUR 0,10 Gutschein erhalten.
Möchten Sie verkaufen?
Zur Rückseite klappen Zur Vorderseite klappen
Anhören Wird wiedergegeben... Angehalten   Sie hören eine Probe der Audible-Audioausgabe.
Weitere Informationen
Dieses Bild anzeigen

The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service (Englisch) Gebundene Ausgabe – 14. Mai 2012

Alle 4 Formate und Ausgaben anzeigen Andere Formate und Ausgaben ausblenden
Amazon-Preis Neu ab Gebraucht ab
Kindle Edition
"Bitte wiederholen"
Gebundene Ausgabe
"Bitte wiederholen"
EUR 18,95
EUR 13,21 EUR 11,95
25 neu ab EUR 13,21 5 gebraucht ab EUR 11,95
Jeder kann Kindle Bücher lesen — selbst ohne ein Kindle-Gerät — mit der KOSTENFREIEN Kindle App für Smartphones, Tablets und Computer.


  • Gebundene Ausgabe: 352 Seiten
  • Verlag: Penguin Press (14. Mai 2012)
  • Sprache: Englisch
  • ISBN-10: 1594203342
  • ISBN-13: 978-1594203343
  • Vom Hersteller empfohlenes Alter: Ab 18 Jahren
  • Größe und/oder Gewicht: 16,5 x 3,2 x 24,5 cm
  • Durchschnittliche Kundenbewertung: 4.0 von 5 Sternen  Alle Rezensionen anzeigen (1 Kundenrezension)
  • Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 331.953 in Fremdsprachige Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Fremdsprachige Bücher)

Mehr über den Autor

Entdecken Sie Bücher, lesen Sie über Autoren und mehr


Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende

Henry A. Crumpton is chairman and CEO of Crumpton Group LLC, a strategic international advisory and business development firm. With the rank of ambassador at large, he served as the coordinator for counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of State from August 2005 until February 2007. Crumpton joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1981 and spent most of his twenty-four-year career working undercover in the foreign field. He is the recipient of the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the CIA's highest award for achievement. Crumpton received a B.A. from the University of New Mexico and a master's, with honors, from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Leseprobe. Abdruck erfolgt mit freundlicher Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.


In the summer of 2002, I embarked on a new mission. After two decades in the CIA’s Clandestine Service, including the last ten months leading the CIA’s Afghanistan campaign, it was time for a change.

This mission was a departure for me. There were no Mi-17 helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Predators, M4 assault rifles, Glock model 19 pistols, ceramic-plated body armor, inoculations, polygraphs, disguises, cover, or even basic tradecraft. There was no surveillance to avoid, agents to run, or terrorists to nullify. The assignment did, however, require that I enter a strange culture, readjust my attitude, and assume a different identity.

I returned to university as a student.

The CIA granted me an academic sabbatical at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. This new assignment, more sedate than some recent experiences, was nevertheless exciting. It was a full academic year of intellectual indulgence. I gorged on a feast of courses and books covering political thought, military strategy, China, history, foreign policy, terrorism, and philosophy.

I savored it all.

Searching the Spring Semester 2003 course catalog, I stumbled across something unexpected: a class on intelligence. The catchy title “The Art and Tradecraft of Intelligence” prompted me to research the background of the course’s professor, Dr. Jennifer Sims. She had an impressive résumé, both in academia and government.

As a veteran intelligence professional still on the CIA payroll, I felt obliged to take the course. I also figured the class would be fun and easy.

It was a hoot. We explored how George Washington, one of America’s great spymasters, ran agents with superb tactical tradecraft and then brilliantly exploited their intelligence for strategic value. We studied the advances of intelligence capabilities in the U.S. Civil War. We learned that

President Lincoln spent many of his days in the White House telegraph room, turning it into his de facto intelligence and command center. We followed how the advent of wireless telecommunications, airplanes, radar, satellites, and other technical marvels transformed intelligence throughout the twentieth century.

We observed how, unlike Washington and Lincoln, most political leaders forging national security policy and waging war failed to understand or appreciate intelligence. When they also failed to keep pace with geopolitical changes, it was in part because of the gaps among intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and policy implementation. We reflected on how the government and the broader society perceived and treated intelligence professionals, with comments swinging from deep loathing to cartoonish fantasy. Uninformed and sometimes unreasonable expectations, low and high, of intelligence professionals have whipsawed these officers and their agencies throughout U.S. history. As a nation, our collective ignorance of intelligence has undermined not only our intelligence capabilities, but ultimately the policy makers and citizens served.

Although enjoyable, the class was not easy. Dr. Sims demanded far more study and thought than I anticipated. It was almost embarrassing to realize how much I did not know and how much I learned—even with my many years of experience in espionage, covert action, and war on several continents. Although chagrined by my own ignorance, I was enthralled by the learning experience.

I gained a broader perspective, well beyond the intelligence business, during this academic interlude. It was the first time in twenty years that I was not focused just on the immediate, operational tasks of intelligence. With the opportunity to study and reflect, I better appreciated that the world was transforming rapidly, not least in terms of the nature of conflict, risk, competition, and cooperation. But there was one common denominator: The value of intelligence was increasing. Our Afghanistan campaign of 2001–02 offered many examples of this. The transformative geopolitical trends of our time, many fueled by exponential advances in technology, suggest that intelligence will play an even greater role in an increasingly interdependent and complex world. Our collective understanding and appreciation for intelligence, however, lags far behind our country’s needs, just as it often has throughout U.S. history.

After the United States and its allies won the Cold War and the Iron Curtain collapsed in November 1989, many responsible and respected leaders, such as the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, voiced their doubts about the need for robust intelligence. Some questioned the need for a Clandestine Service. In the 1990s, Congress cashed in the “peace dividend” and slashed intelligence budgets to the bone. As a field operative during this decade of budgetary collapse, I witnessed operations collapse and agent networks wither. The CIA closed stations all over the world. It was as if our leaders expected that geopolitical risk would fade away.

Some CIA leaders wondered out loud about their nebulous mission. Some quit in confusion and disgust. Remarkably, some CIA veterans even embraced the concept of a new world without real enemies. One CIA Clandestine Service division chief, Milton Bearden, declared that Russia no longer posed any significant espionage threat. His argument gained traction until the exposure of a string of Russian penetrations, such as those of Aldrich Ames in the CIA and Robert Hanssen in the FBI. These traitors dealt great harm to U.S. national security. They also provided information to their Russian handlers that led to the execution of almost a dozen brave Russian agents working for the CIA. While the United States clearly has far more to gain from a cooperative relationship with Russia, as with China, espionage remains an indisputable fact. These great nations are U.S. partners in diplomacy, science, commerce, and much more. They are also espionage adversaries. Both Russia and China probably have more clandestine intelligence operatives inside the United States now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, than at the height of the Cold War.

In the prosperous calm after the Cold War, however, America as a nation enjoyed a delusional respite, in an imaginary world without serious threats and deadly enemies. Policy wonks bloviated about America’s unrivaled supremacy and the universal, unstoppable, unhindered march of liberal political thought and free-market principles. Life was good.

Then al Qaeda (AQ) attacked the U.S. homeland. It was September 11, 2001. Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and his 19 hijackers murdered 2,977 people. The victims were mostly Americans but included citizens from many other countries. Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and others perished that day. New York’s World Trade Center’s twin towers were destroyed, leaving human remains shredded among the huge piles of urban rubble. Some of the victims had chosen to jump to their deaths, holding hands, instead of being burned and crushed in the buildings’ collapse. Outside Washington, D.C., the Pentagon, the headquarters of the greatest military on earth, lay wounded, a deep, black, smoking hole in its side. U.S. military men and women, dead and wounded, were strewn throughout its corridors.

The heroic passengers of United Flight 93, in the only effective response to the enemy on that grim day, overpowered the hijackers. The plane, out of control, exploded upon impact in the rural lands near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. This citizen band, a spontaneous, self-organized team of nonstate actors, collected intelligence from their cell phones, analyzed their situation and the risk, and planned and executed a daring counterattack. There were thirty-three...

In diesem Buch (Mehr dazu)
Ausgewählte Seiten ansehen
Buchdeckel | Copyright | Inhaltsverzeichnis | Auszug | Stichwortverzeichnis
Hier reinlesen und suchen:


4.0 von 5 Sternen
5 Sterne
4 Sterne
3 Sterne
2 Sterne
1 Sterne
Siehe die Kundenrezension
Sagen Sie Ihre Meinung zu diesem Artikel

Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen

Format: Gebundene Ausgabe Verifizierter Kauf
Dieses Buch ist chronologisch aufgebaut und gibt - genehmigte - Einblicke in die Aufklärungsaktivitäten des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes und den Beitrag des Autors zur Verteidigung der Freiheit und Demokratie. Es beschreibt den Einstieg und die anfänglichen Selbstzweifel, ob Henry a. Crumpton die hohen Einstiegshürden schaffen würde. Es beschreibt Teile und Schwerpuntke der Ausbildung und einige berufliche Stationen.

Das Buch bietet neben diesem chronologischen Entwicklungspfad auch systematische Einblicke in die Struktur bzw. die einzelnen Tätigkeitsfelder. Der Autor spricht von Human Intelligence (Aufklärung mit Hilfe von Mitarbeitern, Personen), SIGINT (Fernmeldeaufklärung und -analyse), IMINT (Bild-/Satellitenbildaufklärung) und vielem mehr.

Auch die Emotion und Motivation kommen nicht zu kurz: Er beschreibt die Anziehungskraft der westlichen Werte und der Freiheit. Die ja für viele von uns selbstverständlich ist, was aber nicht in allen Ländern gilt. Ein Schwerpunkt des Buches ist auch dem aktuellen Kampf gegen den Terrorismus und den entsprechenden Verteidigungsstrategien gewidmet.Er zeigt das diffuse Bedrohungsbild in Afghanistan aufgrund der verschiedenen Akteure.

Dieses Buch hätte beinahe 5-Sterne bekommen. Im Endeffekt sind es aber nur 4,49 Sterne, weil mir ein Kapitel nicht so gut gefallen hat.

Der Autor spricht hier von einem digitalen Geländemodell und einer sagenhaft schnellen Integration in die IT-Plattformen, die Aktivitäten und die Truppen unterstützen würde. Das ging mir aber etwas zu schnell und reibungslos.
Lesen Sie weiter... ›
Kommentar War diese Rezension für Sie hilfreich? Ja Nein Feedback senden...
Vielen Dank für Ihr Feedback. Wenn diese Rezension unangemessen ist, informieren Sie uns bitte darüber.
Wir konnten Ihre Stimmabgabe leider nicht speichern. Bitte erneut versuchen

Die hilfreichsten Kundenrezensionen auf (beta) 188 Rezensionen
72 von 74 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
A Primer on Intelligence Tradecraft 17. Mai 2012
Von Nickolas B. - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe
This book should be added to any serious reader's espionage bookshelf. It is not a memoir, per se, but a readable study in what motivates people to spy for the United States, and how the CIA's operations officers get them to do it. It is illustrated with stories from Crumpton's career and those of his friends an colleagues. It is entertaining, funny, illuminating, and educational.

Some previously un- or under-told stories include: 1) how the Predator program was created because of the determination of enterprising young operations officers and military details 2) how CIA's National Resources division quietly does its work in the domestic theater, with the help of patriots in the private sector and 3) the critical role of liaison with foreign intelligence services and how that works.

The best part of this book is that it not only describes how operations officers do their work, but how analysts, technicians, support staff, all work together to provide the best intelligence they can for the country. Whether policymakers use it or not is another matter, addressed in this book in a factual, non-strident way.

It is a fast read. Crumpton's writing style is simple, direct and clear and you have no questions about where he stands on matters of opinion.
27 von 28 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
This book was an education 4. Juni 2012
Von David Benjamin - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe Verifizierter Kauf
I have been an active citizen and lawyer for 40 years, and I have always wondered what a spy does, how the CIA operates in and outside the US, and what is the interplay between the CIA and politicos. This book went a long way to explain much of that. While reading this book, I was consistently surprised how the book offers clear and insightful education to an average citizen like myself, and, yet, will probably be a textbook in spy training for years. Do I agree with everything Crumpton believes? No. Am I grateful Crumpton lays out his experiences and views? Absolutely.
107 von 128 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
A bit disappointing 23. Mai 2012
Von Chipper - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Gebundene Ausgabe
Crumpton's expertise and dedication cannot be questioned. The subtitle, though, is more descriptive of the book than the main title. This is not a treatise on The Art of Intelligence. It is, however, about the experience of one CIA officer and team leader, at least to the extent he can discuss his experiences.

What I found most interesting was Chapter 7, about the differences between the approaches and limitations of the CIA versus the FBI. Crumpton is impatient with political leaders who demand more solid proof than his team would need to take drastic action. He is impatient with those who collect evidence instead of "intelligence," which is often a lower standard. He is impatient with the need to justify and to obtain permission when the mission is clear and the available intelligence seems to point to a resolution clear to the CIA.

One thing bothers me about Crumpton's conclusions, in which he seems to be surprised a "how ambivalent, cynical, or ignorant the U.S. public and many policy makers are about intelligence." Really? With an organization that is essentially a secret, with a fairly large budget that is just as largely unaccounted for; with the "I can't tell you where I work or what I do" and "the CIA is necessary, but we can't tell you how or why" constraints (some of which are clearly necessary), it seems not very surprising to me. People - whether members of Congress or the public - tend to distrust what they do not understand, and what will not be explained to them. To suggest that ambivalence, cynicism and ignorance are incredible, is massively naive.

I would rather that the book lived up to its main title - a more in-depth description of the hows and whys of intelligence - instead of "Henry Crumpton's Experience with the CIA." As for historical context, Crumpton could have spent more time on how the CIA was used, despite its actual advice, to help justify the Iraq war, for example.
Still, an interesting book which answers, at least in part, some of the essential questions and discusses the seemingly insurmountable problems and the ways in which the CIA is trying to adapt and to overcome those obstacles.
102 von 124 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Von RJ Parker - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Kindle Edition
THE ART OF INTELLIGENCE: LESSONS FROM A LIFE IN THE CIA'S CLANDESTINE SERVICE by Henry Crumpton dives into the belly of espionage and counter-terrorism. The author was Deputy Director of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center who, after 911, directed his team to find al Qaeda and kill them.

In this fascinating book, Crumpton tells how he learned about insurgencies in his early years from African rebels, and about al Qaeda terrorists and the enemy agents from North Korea who he recruited as spies by supplying money and pornography.

We've all watched movies and read fictional books about the CIA, but this book takes you behind the scenes of real life operatives and covert operations both stateside and on foreign soil. It's an amazing glimpse into the world of one of the most fascinating agencies in the world, the CIA. High recommended and well written.
11 von 11 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
It seems that spies are human as well. 26. Mai 2012
Von Richard C Pearce - Veröffentlicht auf
Format: Kindle Edition Verifizierter Kauf
This book was a phenomenal read. Henry Crumpton describes through personal anecdote the lessons he learned regarding the value of good Intelligence and how good intelligence should be used to form policy. This book should not be treated as a textbook that will outline the step by step process of gathering Intelligence. Rather it provides a glimpse into the workings of the CIA and shed's light on the "murky" world of espionage. In short Crumpton has made spies human again.
Waren diese Rezensionen hilfreich? Wir wollen von Ihnen hören.