The Army and Vietnam: Amazon.de: Andrew F. Krepinevich: Englische Bücher

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Kurzbeschreibung

Erscheinungstermin: 1. M�rz 1988

Many senior army officials still claim that if they had been given enough soldiers and weapons, the United States could have won the war in Vietnam. In this probing analysis of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, career army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., argues that precisely because of this mindset the war was lost before it was fought. The army assumed that it could transplant to Indochina the operational methods that had been successful in the European battle theaters of World War II, an approach that proved ill-suited to the way the Vietnamese Communist forces fought. Theirs was a war of insurgency, and counterinsurgency, Krepinevich contends, requires light infantry formations, firepower restraint, and the resolution of political and social problems within the nation. To the very end, top military commanders refused to recognize this. Krepinevich documents the deep division not only between the American military and civilian leaders over the very nature of the war, but also within the U.S. Army itself. Through extensive research in declassified material and interviews with officers and men with battlefield experience, he shows that those engaged in the combat understood early on that they were involved in a different kind of conflict. Their reports and urgings were discounted by the generals, who pressed on with a conventional war that brought devastation but little success. A thorough analysis of the U.S. Army's role in the Vietnam War, this book demonstrates with chilling persuasiveness the ways in which the army was unprepared to fight- lessons applicable to today's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

#outer_postBodyPS { display: none; } #psGradient { display: none; } #psPlaceHolder { display: none; } #psExpand { display: none; } Many senior army officials still claim that if they had been given enough soldiers and weapons, the United States could have won the war in Vietnam. In this probing analysis of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, career army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., argues that precisely because of this mindset the war was lost before it was fought. The army assumed that it could transplant to Indochina the operational methods that had been successful in the European battle theaters of World War II, an approach that proved ill-suited to the way the Vietnamese Communist forces fought. Theirs was a war of insurgency, and counterinsurgency, Krepinevich contends, requires light infantry formations, firepower restraint, and the resolution of political and social problems within the nation. To the very end, top military commanders refused to recognize this. Krepinevich documents the deep division not only between the American military and civilian leaders over the very nature of the war, but also within the U.S. Army itself. Through extensive research in declassified material and interviews with officers and men with battlefield experience, he shows that those engaged in the combat understood early on that they were involved in a different kind of conflict. Their reports and urgings were discounted by the generals, who pressed on with a conventional war that brought devastation but little success. A thorough analysis of the U.S. Army's role in the Vietnam War, this book demonstrates with chilling persuasiveness the ways in which the army was unprepared to fight- lessons applicable to today's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Produktinformation

Taschenbuch: 344 Seiten
Verlag: Johns Hopkins Univ Pr; Auflage: Reprint (1. M�rz 1988)
Sprache: Englisch
ISBN-10: 0801836573
ISBN-13: 978-0801836572
Vom Hersteller empfohlenes Alter: Ab 22 Jahren
Gr��e und/oder Gewicht: 14,7 x 2 x 22,9 cm
Amazon Bestseller-Rang: Nr. 1.195.146 in Englische Bücher (Siehe Top 100 in Englische Bücher)

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Pressestimmen

A story the moral of which Americans will ignore-are ignoring-at their peril. -- William L. Hauser New York Times Review of Books [Krepinevich] has focused on the U.S. Army, assessing its ability to meet the challenges posed by our military involvement in Vietnam from 1959 to 1975... From the Army perspective the account is certainly accurate, and devastating. -- William E. Colby Washington Monthly

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Amazon.com: 4.8 von 5 Sternen 13 Rezensionen

35 von 36 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich

4.0 von 5 Sternen Army unprepared for war in Vietnam 22. Januar 2001

Von Gregory D PetersonGREGORYP75@aol.com - Ver�ffentlicht auf Amazon.com

Format:Taschenbuch

This is an excellant book that should be read by every military professional and anybody interested in civil-miltary relationships and what happened in Vietnem. The authors premise is that the Army was unprepared for a war in Vietnam. Krepinevich states that Army training, doctrine and organization was geared toward a conventional conflict like what had happened in WWII and Korea. The Army was not prepared to fight a counterinsurgency against a foe that was only going to fight when they had to and when the circumstances and odds were in their favor. The senior leadership of the Army thought the war would be won be killing VC and NVA. According to Krepinevich this is all wrong. To defeat an insurgency you must protect and convince the people of the country you are trying to save that their fortunes lay in siding with you. If the people aren't going to back you then you will lose. It doesn't matter how many VC you kill. The Army's senior leadership did not want to deal with the pacification programs that would have won the war. Many in the military like to lay the blame for the loss in the war at the feet of the politicians in Washington. And there is justification for that. But Krepinevich makes a strong arguement that the war would have still been lost due to the poor/lack of strategy by our military leaders. Reading this book really angered me. Prior to this I had just finished reading "Street Without Joy" by Bernard Fall and I could not help but note the similarities between the failed French efforts and our own. It was like reading the same book over again except the units and the names of the leaders were different. There were almost no lessons learned by our senior leadership from the French debacle.

37 von 39 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich

5.0 von 5 Sternen Most Interesting book I've read on the Vietnam War 3. Februar 2004

Von William Nathan Alexander - Ver�ffentlicht auf Amazon.com

Format:Taschenbuch

This book deserves to be far more widely read than it is--and I have no idea why it isn't. Krepinivich's thesis is a brilliant one--the US army was "conceptually" unprepared to fight the Vietnam war: it brought a cold war mentality to the jungles of Vietnam and spent the first seven or eight years of the war trying to "find" this war. The US army imagined that the Viet Cong was a variant of the Soviet army--they "must" have been controlled by a central organization and "must" have had "hidden armies" lurking in the jungle. Decively defeating them would, the Army believed, end the war.

In fact, Krepinivich convincingly argues, the VC was not in the jungle at all--but in the cities along the coast. "We should have done less 'flit'in' and more 'sit'in'", he says.

The war was actually fought more effectively after US troop reduction prevented the "jungle search" strategy from being implemented. This was something akin to what the Marines performed in I Corps: rather than participate in large scale jungle sweeps, troops were divided up and put in small villages with radios. The strategy was more hazardous as troops, because of their small numbers might be overrun. However, it was more effective because it allowed allied forces to prevent the VC from retaking a village after they had withdrawn from their major operation.

This book should eventually allow for US military operations in the first part of the war to be put in the context of greater US cold war culture. The "willing blindness" of the US military during much of the sixties came from what amounts to a cultural fixation on a way power was imagined to function. Even in '71, Nixon believed that the Vietnamese communists was controled by a "COSVN", which functioned like a sort of "tumor": nip the tumor and the body will fall. This, Krepinivich proves, was all part of the American imaginary. Our blindness went far beyond the generals: it was part of our culture.

24 von 25 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich

5.0 von 5 Sternen The best book on Vietnam 17. Mai 2006

Von Art - Ver�ffentlicht auf Amazon.com

Format:Taschenbuch

Krepinevich has a cult following among professors and students at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. After reading his work I understand why. It is rare that ones comes across a book that radically changes the way one looks at military history. Thousands of books have been written on Vietnam and the movies "Platoon" and "Apocalypse Now" brought the war to millions of Americans. Until I read this book, I thought I understood the causes and conduct of the war. Krepinevich brilliantly analyzes how the U.S. Army planned for and conducted the war. How it tried to fight the war it wanted to fight, vice the war as it actually existed. Army leadership brought their conventional mindset to the jungles of Vietnam. The inability to adapt to change proved a greater threat to the U.S. Army than the North Vietnamese Army. The book rises above the personal narrative style that dominates most Vietnam books. Instead, the book is based on solid military analysis. Even more telling was how the U.S. Army failed to grasp the lessons of counter-insurgency following Vietnam and quickly returned to the conventional mindset it preferred. The writing is crisp and powerful. The lessons of this book remain vital today as the U.S. continues to struggle on how to best defeat America's latest enemies.

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