Teutoburg Forest AD 9: The destruction of Varus and his legions (Campaign) [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

Events such as the Varian or Kalkriese disaster did not happen to the Roman Empire very often. Indeed few battles in Rome's entire 750 year history can be compared to the battle of the Teutoberg forest in AD 9. Most would agree that Hannibal's unparalleled victory at Cannae and Carrhae in 53 BC are of similar importance, but the Kalkriese disaster seems to have a special resonance even today. Perhaps it is because the battle took place in the middle of Europe, and the victors are still a recognisable nation (whereas the other victors, the Carthaginians and Parthians, are not)?

This Osprey title is a most welcome to the other texts on the subject, not least because of its excellent pictures (by Peter Dennis). In typical Osprey style, it lays out the background to the battle for Germania Magna (the lands to the east of the River Rhine) in the years previous to Kalkriese, the generals who led the opposing armies - Varus and the Cheruscan leader Arminius - the details of their armies and so on, before moving to what is known of the battle itself. Here it should be noted that the descriptions of combat events in the book are NOT historical fact - in fact almost nothing is known of what happened during the real battle. In my mind, this should have been prominently acknowledged. Last of all, it considers the aftermath - the punitive campaigns to recover lost eagles and honour, and the fact that from AD 9, Rome's policy towards Germania Magna was one of containment, rather than offense.

It doesn't mention, however, the 3rd Century AD battlefield deep inside Germania Magna that proves that Rome continued to launch attacks into the area for hundreds of years after Kalkriese (i.e. it wasn't all about containment; see relevant threads on romanarmy dot com.) Nor does it mention the fact that there is NO conclusive proof that the site at Kalkriese is THE battlefield where Varus and his men were annihilated. Many many pointers suggest that it is, but frustratingly, there is nothing concrete to prove absolutely that it is.

Interested readers would undoubtedly enjoy the Ancient Warfare special edition about the Varian Disaster. Find it at ancientwarfare dot com. In my mind, it pips this edition by a decent margin. Another volume well worth reading is Rome's Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest.

Ben Kane, author of The Forgotten Legion.

The destruction of three Roman legions in the Teutoburg Forest in AD 9 has been shrouded in myth and uncertainty for centuries; even the location of the battlefield was unknown until recent times. However in the past two decades, persistent efforts by amateur archaeologists have paid off and revealed not only the location of the battlefield at Kalkriese in Germany, but previously unknown details of the battle. In 2002, a museum opened at Kalkriese and excavations continue. Armed with this new information, Michael McNally pieces together the story of Quinctilius Varus' doomed legions in Osprey's Campaign No. 228. This is a book that literally could not have been written a decade ago, but which benefits from modern battlefield archaeology. McNally provides a superb and vivid description of the campaign - indeed it reads throughout like a novel - and this is not only one of the best Osprey titles of the year (including comparison with my own works), but easily the best Ancient Campaign title done by Osprey. Very strongly recommended.

The author begins with a lengthy introduction that spells out Imperial Roman policy in Germania, as well as modern efforts to research the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest. The nature of Roman policy had a great impact on the campaign, as the author argues that Varus was sent to reinforce the status quo in Germania and solidify alliances with friendly Germanic tribes. He also describes Varus and his bête noir, Arminius. He also provides an interesting 9-page section on the opposing armies. Although the general composition of Varus' army is known (17th, 18th and 19th Legions), unit strengths and auxiliary contributions can only be surmised. The author concludes that Varus started the campaign with about 17,000 troops and was opposed by three German tribes with a total of about 21,000 warriors. Graphically, the volume is extremely attractive, and includes numerous photographs of terrain and exhibits from the Kalkriese museum, as well as three superb battle scenes by artist Peter Dennis that really bring the author's narrative to life. To assist the reader in following the campaign, the author provides six 2-D maps and three 3-D BEV maps. For further reference, the author provides a 2-page bibliography and notes on the battlefield today.

The campaign narrative is 54-pages long and follows Varus' march to the Weser in the summer of AD 9 and Arminius' feigned loyalty to Rome. Much of the pre-battle narrative is based on three ancient sources (Tacitus, Cassius Dio and Paterculus), which provide the broad outline of Roman operations but with limited detail and a not inconsiderable amount of bias (the author singles out Paterculus' political bias in particular). The author portrays Varus as lulled into a false sense of security by Arminius' flattery, all the while he was plotting to unite the tribes against the Romans and ambush them on their way out of Germania. Once Varus began to march back to the Rhine on 7 September, the Roman situation rapidly deteriorated. Although the author's writing style is very engaging and succeeds in conveying the dread of Varus' doomed legions marching into the gloomy German forests, one can't help but wonder if the author has not engaged in literary license in places. Having read the three main ancient literary sources myself, I know that much of the detail in these pages is not specified in the ancient sources. Comments like "the Cheruscan war leader rose in his saddle and gave the signal.." or "Arminius barked a sharp series of orders" seem contrived to make this volume more interesting to read, but based on the author's mental picture rather than any factual evidence. Even the best ancient sources rarely provide exacting detail about the movements or actions of specific individuals on the battlefield. Furthermore, the author seems to include almost hour-by-hour movements, which is clearly not evident in the ancient sources. That being said, the author's narrative is still marvelous to read, but readers should keep in mind that it is an interpretation of what happened - not necessarily what actually happened. Although he does not mention it since it might distract the reader, there is pretty still a great deal that will be learned about the battle in the decades to come with further excavations. Many specific actions will probably never be known.

According to the author, all three legions were demolished in the course of a four-day battle in the woods and perhaps only a handful of scattered survivors made it to the Rhine River. Virtually all of Varus' Roman troops were killed or enslaved (were any ever rescued by subsequent Roman punitive expeditions under Tiberius and Germanicus?). I think there are some tantalizing angles on the battle that still remain unclear, for example, did the 4,000 Germanic auxiliaries defect or desert Varus? If so, when? Why was it that two cohorts under Lucius Caedicius in the fort at Aliso were able to hold off the tribes and ultimately fight their way back to the Rhine? Usually when armies suffer catastrophic defeat it is due either to their commander making foolish decisions - which this author seems to lean toward - or the enemy adopting some unexpected ruse (also evident in this case). Clearly, if three legions had hunkered down in a fortified camp, the Germans had little hope of successfully assaulting it and would have resorted to siege. Although starvation would have hurt the Romans, it is difficult to imagine 20,000 tribesmen maintaining a siege for any great length of time. If Varus had decided to eat his pack mules and waited for the tribes to disperse, he might have rescued at least a portion of his army. Instead, Roman decisions throughout the campaign appear unusually ill-considered and self-deceiving, which appears inconsistent with some of what we know about the Roman Army in this period (there were plenty of punitive expeditions into Germania before and after Teutoburg Forest, none of which suffered this kind of defeat).

Teutoburg Forest AD 9 by Michael McNally proves to be quite an interesting account of how Rome's three legions and its supporting troops of 20,000 men total, was wiped out by the German tribemen. The author clearly used Tony Clunn's works as well as those from Adrian Murdock and bit from Peter Wells and tried to summarized the best he can on how one of Roman Army's greatest disasters unfolded. This book totally discredit Peter Wells' book Battle that Stopped Rome theory that the battle took only a day. The book follows the basic Osprey Campaign book series format and the key elements focus on two persons. Varus and his nemesis, Arminius and the book more or less supports the fact that the main reason for this disaster took place because of Romans' unfailing trust they had in Arminius and his Cheruscan auxiliary who led them to their destruction. Outside of Clunn and Murdock, the author took a lot of information provided by the Varusschlacht Museum at Kalkriese, Germany. Many of these information were extremely helpful when it come to describing the German ramparts that the natives used to keep the Romans pinned. It was pretty clear by the account of the book that the entire Roman high command structure suffered from the paralyzation from the neck up as the situation went from bad to worst. But from the book, it pretty clear that the professionals of the legions gave as good as they got. Exact count of the German losses will never be known but Arminius never fielded an army as large as he had in this battle again.

It is interesting that in this book, it shows the Roman legionaries wearing both chain mail (lorica hamata) and their segmented plate armor (lorica segmentata) although it has been my understanding that the latter really didn't become a standard issue for the legions until at least the mid-first century. Maybe someone can add more to this question. (Maybe the lorcia segmentata armors were dumped there later in time..by Germans due to high maintenance??)

I found the book to be pretty well researched but the narrative could be better. The maps and illustrations were very nice. I especially like the one on the cover of this book showing the Roman Centurion fending off Germans while his men tries to retreat. (It is not the cover shown here by Amazon.) There are a lot of details here but overall, this book will make an excellent introductory volume to anyone interested in getting into the subject. Of course, reading Tony Clunn's book would be a mandatory after reading this. The book doesn't stray far from the standard mantra of the battle and its description are archaeologically logical. Unlike Peter Wells' book, it does not stretch into fantasy mode. I just wish it was written with more flair but I didn't take any stars away for it.