Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present [Englisch] [Taschenbuch]

van Creveld has written a disappointingly careless, amateurish and derivative book. I read it in anticipation of tackling his more recent and highly regarded "Transformation of War". However, reading this one, which was published in 1989, has made me very reluctant to invest time and energy in the newer "Transformation", no matter how highly regarded it is.

His writing style is bombastic and verbose and his train of thought diffuse. I found myself having to constantly rewrite his sentences in my head in order to make them coherent. Whatever original thoughts he may have, and I don't think there are many, get lost in his digressive style.

He makes some rather curious statements for an expert on military history. He dismisses, for example, the military utility of the oxcart, completely overlooking the very potent military application made of the oxcart by the Afrikaner Voortrekkers in the Zulu Wars, where, at the famous Battle of Blood River, circled oxcarts served admirably as a mobile fortress. (This was of course also common practice during the same time period for immigrants on America's Oregon Trail). He describes the stirrup as "not representing military technology, properly speaking", yet later discusses at length maps and roads as military technology. He may be right about the stirrup, but isn't he then wrong about maps and roads? And why make such a trivially gratuitous statement in the first place?

At another point he casually slanders Winston Churchill (not the first to do so), describing British casualties in the last battle of the Mahdi War in the Sudan as being "victims of an ill-considered charge led by Winston Churchill against the wishes of the expedition's commander, General Kitchener". In fact, Churchill was at the time a lowly subaltern in his early 20's, in charge of less than 25 lancers in the second troop from the rear of his cavalry regiment, and was in no position to lead a charge. The charge was ordered by the regiment's colonel, and may have been an attempt to pre-empt a charge by the Mahdists. In any event, this is how Churchill describes the events in "A Roving Commission". Naturally, we don't know where van Creveld got his version of events because he has no footnotes. He could have easily made his rather obvious point (that, technological differences aside, the Mahdists' tactics were suicidal) without slandering Churchill.

These would be minor details, except that they run on for pages. He reminds me of an undergraduate trying to "B.S." on an essay exam. He throws out lots of "facts", but correlates them poorly, offers little synthesis, and no original insight.

His chapters on terrorism and nuclear war are particularly disappointing, follow the same empty pattern, promising much, delivering virtually nothing.

This is not a scholarly book in any sense, in spite of its pretensions. There are no footnotes, just general references to secondary sources. His "bibliographical essay" is mostly an exercise in self-aggrandizement at the expense of his betters, including everyone from Sun Tzu to Lidell Hart.

I happened to be reading William H. McNeill's "The Pursuit of Power" at the same time as I read van Creveld's book, and noted with surprise that van Creveld appears to have cribbed his outline and much of his narrative directly from McNeill. I can't find language specific enough to accuse van Creveld of direct plagiarism, but it seems pretty clear that van Creveld just superficially reworked sections of McNeill's book, particularly in the early chapters, and then had the nerve in his "bibliographic essay" to say McNeill's proof of his thesis is unsuccessful! McNeill in fact substantiates his somewhat complex thesis quite well, far better than van Creveld does for his own simple-minded ideas. van Creveld got his PhD from the London School of Economics, while McNeill was a world-famous professor of history at the University of Chicago, which is no doubt sufficient explanation for van Creveld's "dog in the manger" attitude toward McNeill.

In my opinion, van Creveld's book is not only unsuccessful, it is disreputable, and shouldn't have been published.

(Van Creveld's November 2004 paper entitled "Why Iraq Will End as Vietnam Did" shows that neither his powers of analysis nor his writing have improved with time.)

It has been suggested that several professional historians could live a comfortable and durable professional life working only on correcting the historical mistakes foisted upon the public by Martin Van Creveld. While I personally believe that this is a mild overstatement of the facts, I understand the reasoning behind the sentiment. However, it is perhaps unwise to criticise Van Creveld too harshly. His work undoubtedly brings attention to the field, and with attention flows the filthy lucre that supports legitimate historians in their search for the truth in history.
This book procedes from a single concept, that technology permeates war. Van Creveld's goal in this book is to explore the role that technology has played in the development and transformation of war. Van Creveld wants to explore not just the weapons of war, but the whole of technology as it interacts with war. Although he specifically denies that the book is organized chronologically, this is in fact how the text is arranged. There are four parts to the book, and each part contains five chapters.
In part one, "The Age of Tools from Earliest Times to 1500 AD" the five chapters are "Field Warfare," "Siege Warfare," "The Infrastructure of War," "Naval Warfare," and "Irrational Technology." The unifying concept identified by Van Creveld as the reason for this division is that the motive power behind most technology in this period was the muscles of animals and men. The first two chapters are fairly self explanatory in their titles. "The Infrastructure of War," according to Van Creveld, includes writing, cartography, and logistics. In "Naval Warfare" he focuses upon the weapons used aboard fighting ships and the method of propulsion (oars) used in purpose designed ships. The final chapter, "Irrational Technology" explores those weapons of the period that appear illogical in their design, either by over decoration or extreme size.
Part two, "The Age of Machines, 1500-1800" roughly coresponds with the Military Revolution. Again the first three chapters are "Field Warfare," "Siege Warfare," and "The Infrastructure of War." The last two chapters in this section are "Command of the Sea," and "The Rise of Professionalism." Curiosly, Van Creveld barely notes the existance of the Military Revolution as such. The issue I own is the second, "Revised and Expanded" edition which received copyright in 1991. Timing is therefore not an issue. Although he mentions several of the same concepts, the rise of the artillery and the resulting changes in fortress design, he uses slightly different terminology when he does this. For example, the artillery fortress is called "the italian design" not "trace italienne." Van Creveld acknowledges neither Roberts' original thesis nor Parker's refinement to the concept. Van Creveld does not use footnotes or endnotes in this book. Instead there is a bibliographic essay at the end of the work. None of the material he used appear to be primary source.
Part three, "The Age of Systems, 1830-1945" changes the first two chapters to "Mobilization Warfare," and "Land Warfare." This conceptual shift allows Van Creveld to introduce the larger "system" of national infratructure as a war making technology. The chapter on "Command of the Air" attempts to recount the history of air warfare from the use of balloons all the way through the end of WWII in fourteen pages. He similarly tries to describe the changes in sea warfare from pre-monitor sailing ships through Essex Class aircraft carriers in eighteen pages. The attempts fail.
However, redeeming these shortcomings, one of the best chapters of the book follows these two overambitious portions. "The Invention of Invention" is a chapter which is probably worth a book length examination. Though Van Creveld assigns only seventeen pages to the concept, it does show that at least in some areas he is moving into new territory. His blurring of the line between military history and the history of technology is at its best in this chapter.
The final part, "The Age of Automation, 1945 to Present" covers the smallest period of time. Ironically, it appears that even Van Creveld realizes that even this smaller chunk of time contains too much material to adequately treat within the space allotted. In this portion of the book, the chapters largely divorce from material technology and foucus upon systems and concepts. The first chapter, "Computerized War," deals with the explosion of information in modern war, and the various technological and doctrinal solutions developed to overcome and utilize the information. Chapter seventeen is a short treatsie on "Nuclear War" that one gets the impression he only included because he knew critics would castigate him if he ignored the subject. The chapter "Integrated War" is actually quite decent.
Still, overall I wouldn't buy this book a second time.

The two other reviews of this book printed here pretty much skewer van Creveld on multiple levels. Everyone is entitiled to his opinion, of course, but my own opinion is that they are wrong about both van Creveld and the value of this book.

One critic felt that van Creveld's writing style was "bombastic and verbose and his train of thought diffuse," a comment that I find preposterous. The writing style is coherent and to the point. I have published four books myself, helped to edit two more, and also published over 150 magazine articles (none are even remotely close in terms of topic to what van Creveld has done, but the point is that I have written a lot and have dealt with editors), and so I am pretty sure I can recognize coherent writing, and van Creveld is an exemplary writer. The same critic complains about a "digressive style," with various sections following "the same empty pattern, promising much, delivering virtually nothing," but anybody who can read will have to dispute such claims. Van Creveld is dealing with a serious topic, but in several places within the text he interjects some subtle humor that shows he is much more adept at skillful writing than these two critics.

The same reviewer also claims that van Creveld essentially has Winston Churchill leading an "ill-considered" attack on the Mahdi's forces in Sudan. Admittedly, the reviewer may be correct that Churchill was not the leader of the 400-man charge, but was just following orders and only involved as a participant. This is essentially nit picking, and it is not uncommon at all for those looking to attack a writer will pick out details from an expansive text and then point out that a detail here or there was wrong - thereby impughning incompetence on the part of the writer. Virtually every history or historical analysis book ever written is going to have some erroneous details that can be cherry picked by critics as a way to prove that the writer was incompetent on a broad scale. Actually, one of the most impressive things about the book is van Creveld's very skillful ability to make points by stacking up meaningful examples that add considerable clarity. That shows an encyclopedic ability to tie details together, even though they may be decades, or even centuries, apart. Very impressive.

The same reviewer also takes van Creveld to task for a bibliographic essay at the end of the book that he felt was "mostly an exercise in self-aggrandizement at the expense of his betters, including everyone from Sun Tzu to Lidell Hart." I feld that this "at the expense of his betters" comment was another cheap shot, because the essay was no such thing.

As to the topic itself, I do have to admit that I read the 1989 edition of the book (purchased at a used book store), and so I do not know what the new edition offers. However, it appears that it just carries things a bit further into the future. If so, then what I read easily applies to the new edition.

After reading the two other reviews, particularly the one that assigned only one star in the rating, and basically said that the book "is not only unsuccessful, it is disreputable, and shouldn't have been published," I get the impression that there are motivations for the reviewer opinions that go well beyond this book. The first reviewer, for example, takes van Creveld to task for his opinions in a magazine article about the Iraq war, and that van Creveld felt that the Iraq war was going to turn out like the Viet Nam war. I think that history is starting to prove van Creveld correct. Ditto for Afghanistan.

This is a fine book, and the only reason I could not give it five stars is that my copy is the 1989 edition, and so I cannot judge what showed up in the revised version.

Howard Ferstler