Task Force Black
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Produktbeschreibungen
Pressestimmen
A ground-breaking, often chilling account ... remarkable Sunday Times The book the MoD doesn't want you to read Daily Mail With unparalleled access to sources inside the SAS itself, Urban paints a picture of how our finest fighting men could be truly effective ... An essential record of a remarkable military period The Times
Kurzbeschreibung
2003 fielen die Amerikaner und Briten im Irak auf der Suche nach Massenvernichtungswaffen ein. Urban folgt der Frage: Was passierte danach? The explosive true story of the SAS and the secret war in Iraq.
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Buchdeckel | Copyright | Inhaltsverzeichnis | Auszug | Stichwortverzeichnis
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1 von 3 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Format:Taschenbuch
- operational and political review of British and US SF deployments in Irak. An informative report referring the cooperation and the different tactital approach within the coalition.
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25 von 25 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Informative and appears reliable
11. April 2010
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe
This book provides a very interesting account of the British SAS' operations in Iraq in the years after the initial invasion. It covers the activities undertaken by the SAS, Special Boat Service (SBS) and associated US special forces units in a surprising level of detail given the sensitivity and recentness of these operations and is well written throughout. Unlike many writers who've covered the SAS, Urban generally maintains objectivity and discusses the shortcomings of the tactics they used and problems caused by leadership tensions. The material on the negative impact of prisoner abuse on the operations of British and, to a lesser extent, US special forces was particularly interesting. This honest approach greatly strengthens Urban's conclusion that the SAS played a role in Iraq which was out of all proportion to the size of the forces it deployed. The book also includes some interesting photos of SAS troops in Iraq, though these are padded out with generic photos of regular US troops which appear to have been included to illustrate the kinds of terrain the SAS operated in.
For all that, the book does have some weaknesses. Notably, Urban seems to have fallen victim to some SAS chauvinism. The SBS are subjected to what appears to be unwarranted criticism, including what appears to be a rumor that the SAS recovered a SBS rifle which had been captured during the invasion and eventually made it into the hands of Abu-Muab al-Zarqawi - it is stated only that this gun "looked suspiciously like" one of the SBS weapons, but surely this should have been confirmed before it was included in print. Moreover, the criticism of the SBS sits uneasily with the book's statements that individual members of the SBS reinforced the SAS in Iraq (apparently without any problems) and the SBS performed well in Afghanistan during the period the SAS was focused on Iraq. The book also doesn't cover the relationship between the SAS and regular 'ground holding' infantry units in any detail - it's noted that SAS raids could stir up difficulties for the infantry, but the role they played in SAS operations is not explained (eg, could they call in the SAS? did they provide support to SAS operations?). The criticisms of the British Army's performance in southern Iraq also seem over-blown given that these forces were subjected to much tighter political restrictions than the SAS were and the statement that the very small SAS detachment in Basra had the same effectiveness as a regular battalion seems dubious. I would have also liked to have seen some more discussion of the rights and wrongs of the decision to focus the SAS on Baghdad rather than supporting the main British force. Taken together, these shortcomings suggest that Urban did not interview many military personnel outside of the SAS community to seek their perspective on the SAS.
In short, this book is well worth reading and provides interesting insights into the activities of special forces units in Iraq, but is probably not going to be the final word on the subject.
For all that, the book does have some weaknesses. Notably, Urban seems to have fallen victim to some SAS chauvinism. The SBS are subjected to what appears to be unwarranted criticism, including what appears to be a rumor that the SAS recovered a SBS rifle which had been captured during the invasion and eventually made it into the hands of Abu-Muab al-Zarqawi - it is stated only that this gun "looked suspiciously like" one of the SBS weapons, but surely this should have been confirmed before it was included in print. Moreover, the criticism of the SBS sits uneasily with the book's statements that individual members of the SBS reinforced the SAS in Iraq (apparently without any problems) and the SBS performed well in Afghanistan during the period the SAS was focused on Iraq. The book also doesn't cover the relationship between the SAS and regular 'ground holding' infantry units in any detail - it's noted that SAS raids could stir up difficulties for the infantry, but the role they played in SAS operations is not explained (eg, could they call in the SAS? did they provide support to SAS operations?). The criticisms of the British Army's performance in southern Iraq also seem over-blown given that these forces were subjected to much tighter political restrictions than the SAS were and the statement that the very small SAS detachment in Basra had the same effectiveness as a regular battalion seems dubious. I would have also liked to have seen some more discussion of the rights and wrongs of the decision to focus the SAS on Baghdad rather than supporting the main British force. Taken together, these shortcomings suggest that Urban did not interview many military personnel outside of the SAS community to seek their perspective on the SAS.
In short, this book is well worth reading and provides interesting insights into the activities of special forces units in Iraq, but is probably not going to be the final word on the subject.
11 von 14 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
The next iteration of Phoenix
15. April 2010
Format:Kindle Edition
Mark Urban: Task Force Black
Mark Urban has a journalist's eye for finding the important issues in the muddied waters of reporting modern warfare. While the overt purpose of the book is to relate the British Special Forces' experiences in Iraq, the standout hero is the American general Stan McChrystal, who re-wrote the special warfare manual.
Vietnam taught the world that external military forces cannot win a war against a determined enemy that occupies the ideological, nationalistic or religious high ground. The Phoenix Program was launched in Vietnam in 1967 to counter the Communists, using the terror tactics. Intelligence identified the communist cadres who were embedded in village structures and they were neutralised. The black clad operators dressed as the Vietnamese communists and if communist retribution in 1975 is a measure of effectiveness, the program was successful, although it had received bad press as an assassination program.
McChrystal faced a massive problem in Iraq as competing groups fought for control. He developed the next iteration of Phoenix, and worked out a program of removing the opposition leadership, and those responsible for allied deaths. So, what was different? McChrystal was able to utilise massive intelligence collection strategies that included Humint and Sigint. The ubiquitous cell phone was the Achilles' heel for many of the opposition, which the Americans milked dry. Computer technology allowed surreptitious vehicle tracking, while the predators relayed real-time vision.
Urban was able to recount the sensitivities that the British faced in Iraq, when working with the Americans. It was sad that the relationship often boiled down to personalities.
This is an excellent book, and Urban's clever writing accommodates the requirements of a diverse range of readers.
Mark Urban has a journalist's eye for finding the important issues in the muddied waters of reporting modern warfare. While the overt purpose of the book is to relate the British Special Forces' experiences in Iraq, the standout hero is the American general Stan McChrystal, who re-wrote the special warfare manual.
Vietnam taught the world that external military forces cannot win a war against a determined enemy that occupies the ideological, nationalistic or religious high ground. The Phoenix Program was launched in Vietnam in 1967 to counter the Communists, using the terror tactics. Intelligence identified the communist cadres who were embedded in village structures and they were neutralised. The black clad operators dressed as the Vietnamese communists and if communist retribution in 1975 is a measure of effectiveness, the program was successful, although it had received bad press as an assassination program.
McChrystal faced a massive problem in Iraq as competing groups fought for control. He developed the next iteration of Phoenix, and worked out a program of removing the opposition leadership, and those responsible for allied deaths. So, what was different? McChrystal was able to utilise massive intelligence collection strategies that included Humint and Sigint. The ubiquitous cell phone was the Achilles' heel for many of the opposition, which the Americans milked dry. Computer technology allowed surreptitious vehicle tracking, while the predators relayed real-time vision.
Urban was able to recount the sensitivities that the British faced in Iraq, when working with the Americans. It was sad that the relationship often boiled down to personalities.
This is an excellent book, and Urban's clever writing accommodates the requirements of a diverse range of readers.
2 von 2 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich
Surprisingly boring
22. August 2011
Format:Gebundene Ausgabe
I found it hard to believe that a book about commando missions could be so boring. The author uses far too much jargon and is simply not a good story-teller. None of the characters come to life at all--and these are very brave, colorful men. The diagrams of the missions are in a group at the front, rather than with the descriptions of the missions, and very poorly done. I also doubt the SBS are as vastly inferior to the SAS as portrayed here.
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