Unlike a lot of the scholarship out their debating standards for judicial review, Dworkin's work is both moderate, clearly argued, and intellectually compelling. He argues that many constitutional rights and clauses have strong moral components to them, and as such it is these moral principles judges should interpret. This is in contrast to originalism, which tries to enforce the policy preferences of the founders, not just the concepts they left us with. However, Dworkin also states it might contradict some liberal excesses, particularly judges who substitute their own policy preferences in for faithfulness to the constitution. Throughout, Dworkin is clear in his assumptions, direct in his writing, and tries to engage the reader in a serious conversation (rather than speaking over the readers' heads). I'm not sure I personally would go as far as Dworkin, or even agree with him, but it's nice to finally see a strong argument in defense of a liberal theory of constitutional interpretation.