Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940-1945 [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

STRUGGLE FOR THE MIDDLE SEA is primarily a reference work focusing on surface naval actions in the Med during WW2. It covers the entire war and all the major powers including Britain, France, Germany and the US but best documents those actions which impacted Italy's maritime war (and so the period from 6/40 to 9/43 is of most interest.)

To some extent this work is meant as an antidote for Anglo-centric (and German) accounts of the naval war in the Med which focus on Italy's failure to win, or even participate in, a decisive surface action in the Nelsonian tradition. O'Hara's thesis is that Italy ground out the naval war of attrition that was best suited to its war aims and limited capabilities. In the Central Med the Regia Marina generally succeeded in achieving it's goal of sea control. The author's view is that while the Royal Navy was certainly successful in winning "sea control victories," strategically speaking it simply had its feet set wrong. His key point is summarized on page 259: "With regard to Italy's mercantile war ... 98 percent of the men and 90 percent of the material that set forth from Italian ports for Libya, Tunisia, of the Balkans arrived safely."

Those who enjoy naval games and simulations will find a lot to like here regardless of whether they agree with O'Hara's overall thesis. By his definition Italian warships (from minesweepers on up to battleships,) participated in 34 of the 55 major surface actions fought in the Mediterranean (including the Red Sea,) during the 5 years of WW2. The accounts of all 55 battles includes an order of battle table listing the ships (by type,) formations, and commanders involved. And, as befits a work with a tactical focus, there are lots of maps and tactical illustrations (27 to be exact,) to help place the operations in perspective. Of course the fights sparked off by Allied attempts to run convoys through to Malta are included but, again, O'Hara's framework ALSO shows the many battles that were fought over Italian convoys etc...

This book strikes me as a perfect complement for Greene and Massignani's THE NAVAL WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1940-1943 or (so I'm told,) De Belot's THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN 1939-1945. The reason I say this is that things like grand strategy, economics, diplomacy, Taranto, special forces and the submarine war are mentioned in perspective but given very little direct focus or analysis in this work. Therefore it shouldn't be your first book on the Med. Overall, however, I think this will be a worthwhile addition to almost anybody's WW2 naval library; most particularly if you are looking for a detailed accounting of tactical surface actions fought by escorts, destroyers and cruisers of the Italian Navy.

Vincent O'Hara's new and excellent essay on the naval war in the Mediterranean Sea - a painstaking analysis of all major surface actions in the theater - is a reading much to be commended for a number of reasons. Some WWII Med war myths (Britain's so-called "moral ascendancy" over the Italians, the Italian admirals as a bunch of incompetent bunglers, etc.) had already been exploded by other authors. Taking a step further, O'Hara sheds light on the strategic dimension and respective achievements in that titanic struggle. Ultimate balance and fairness to all sides involved in the war - contrary to what some prejudiced reviewers may have written, the author doesn't try turning Italian defeats into victories, he just successfully tries to be fair, a seemingly daunting task considering the sheer amount of British chest-beating and Italy-bashing slant in large portions of the literature. In this reviewer's opinion, O'Hara is even overcautious here and there - for instance, in all likelihood the British destroyer Khartoum in the Red Sea sank due to an Italian 100 mm round splinter hitting a torpedo and detonating it. But since unequivocal evidence of that is lacking, O'Hara prudently confines the likely cause of Khartoum's loss to a note. The book's scope and research width and depth: obscure, usually neglected or ignored, yet dramatic French and German surface actions are dealt with. In the light of O'Hara's detailed survey of surface naval combats in the Med, his conclusions deserve credit and attention. All navies in the Mediterranean basin fought well, or very well, on many occasions. But while the Italian, French and German navies more or less achieved their strategic goals, the Royal Navy fought a brilliant war she could not win by her own means - a useless, even noxious (to the British Empire) war at the end of a hugely long supply line, at a staggering cost, in a secondary theater, where victory was out of Britain's reach until the arrival of the American war machine. All in all a very fine, thought-provoking book by a widely acclaimed naval historian.

This book is Vincent P. O'Hara' third in a series, the first two being "The German Fleet at War" and "The U.S. Navy Against the Axis". Each offers MUCH greater detail about naval surface combat than the general histories I have read. O'Hara delves deeply into the strategy and tactics of the combatants, though not so much into equipment. (N.J.M. Campbells' "Naval Weapons of World War 2" fills this void.) I was particularly fascinated by accounts of successful German use of captured Italian torpedo boats ( roughly equivalent to U.S. DE's) after Italy's surrender. I was unaware of engagements in the Red, Adriatic and Ionian seas until I read this work. O'Hara's analysis of Italian intentions and successes at achieving them are interesting.