This excellent book is by an Israeli journalist who was able to get remarkable access to Mossad. One might think this would result in a one-sided presentation, but Klein has done an excellent job of being extremely objective and analyzing the twin motivations of revenge and deterrence that underlay the strike-back assassinations after Munich. The only point on which he isn't objective (and with good reason) is in his unreserved condemnation of the action, inaction, negligence, and callousness (not to mention stupidity) of the German officials during the 21 hours or so of the hostage crisis. The book is worth reading for his thorough account of that one day in September.
Klein's analysis of the Mossad reaction is unsparing, especially in the disaster and tragedy at Lilliehammer, when Mossad agents killed an innocent man whom they should have realized was not Ali Hassan Salameh ("The Red Prince"). Six Mossad operatives were actual imprisoned in Norway for this crime, and the fact that "Munich" never makes mention of this incident is sufficient refutation to those who ridiculously claim that Spielberg and Tony Kushner were insufficiently sympathetic to Israel. While he wrote the book in Hebrew, Klein makes it clear this is not an apologia for Mossad. He sternly questions the rightness of the process in which Palestinian terrorists were identified and "prosecuted" in "show trials" before Israeli Prime Ministers who issued death sentences. People identified as "architects" of Munich often had little if any direct connection to the tragedy. He also carefully analyses the deterrence claim. While Black September terror largely faded after the strike-back assassinations, this appears to have had much to do with the PLO's attempt for legitimacy (Arafat addressing the U.S. in 1974, etc.) and reluctance to incur the wrath of potentially friendly European governments by continuing to execute terror strikes in their countries. Klein also explodes the myth of Mossad invincibility, pointing out with great irony that two of the actual Munich terrorists are still alive, and neither of the actual planners of the mission (Abu Daoud and Abu Ehyad) died at Mossad's hands. Abu Daoud is, in fact, still alive, and Abu Ehyad was assassinated by an extremist Abu Nidal follower because Abu Ehyad had become "soft" on the destruction of Israel.
Don't confuse this book with the movie "Munich," however. "Munich" is based on a different book, George Jonas's "Vengeance," based on the recollections of a Mossad agent. There have been some criticisms and questions of "Avner"'s story in "Vengeance." Klein's account, however, shows that the initial 3 assassinations and the Spring of Youth assassinations in Beiruit were generally very accurately portrayed in "Munich." I see "Munich" as more of a philosophical question about the human cost of the eye-for-an-eye approach, and the ultimate futility of translating ideology into direct and violent action, especially when it means undertaking violent action that is dangerously similar to the type of action undertaken by your enemy. Klein's book is more of a thoughtful policy analysis of what Mossad did, and whether it was effective. While Klein claims that moral judgments are far beyond the scope of his book, they are an inevitable consequence of evaluating the remarkable research that he has compiled.