This piece is essentially a modern analysis of the causes of the Japanese defeat in the great Battle of Midway. It is more an analysis of Japanese defeat than American victory which, while fascinating, only tells part of the story of the greatest naval battle in American history, and one of the great battles of all time.
The main thrust of this work is to refute the common wisdom that a major cause of the Japanese defeat was that American dive bombers hit three Japanese aircraft carriers while these vessels were in the process of loading bombs onto their own dive bombers and torpedo planes on their flight decks. Here, the authors are persuasive. They give detailed accounts which convince the reader that Japanese doctrine would have had the planes being refit below decks. Further, the authors claim with convincing evidence that the incessant American attacks throughout the morning kept the Japanese fleet largely on the defensive, as it tried to augment its Combat Air Patrol with additional launchings of fighter aircraft. This is a new perspective on the battle, and this appears to be the major finding of this book.
Beyond these tactical considerations, the authors further argue that Japan lost the battle for other more strategic reasons. The authors argue that Yamamoto's Midway strategy lost sight of the principles of Mass and Objective. The principle of Massing of Forces (Mass) was violated as the Japanese dropped one aircraft carrier from the battle due to moderate damage that it suffered at the Battle of Coral Sea (first) and, even more importantly, diverted one carrier group to support a simultaneous sideshow in the Aleutians, which diverted a considerable number of planes from the main battle which was to take place at Midway. These planes could have been decisive in the great battle that was to occur. Further, the Japanese lost sight of the principle of the Objective--were they there to defeat the American fleet or invade Midway and the Aleutians, or both? The Japanese strategy was a hodgepodge of conflicting objectives, and indeed the conflict as to whether they should strike Midway or turn to engage the American fleet that seemed to lurk on their flank plagued the Japanese fleet at a decisive moment.
By contrast, the Americans, as the authors point out, "moved heaven and earth" to put the Yorktown back into the battle, after that carrier was heavily damaged after the Coral Sea battle. So badly damaged was Yorktown that the Japanese never dreamed that the US Navy could produce her at the Midway showdown. As the authors put it, the US Navy simply "wanted the win" more desperately than did the Japanese. The Japanese, argue the authors, where overconfident after years of victories over both Asian and Western adversaries, and had contempt for their American foe.
I found the authors' arguments largely persuasive, but also incomplete. This book is told almost entirely from the Japanese perspective in that it focuses mainly on what the Japanese did wrong. It tells the reader much less about what the US Navy did right. The American victory at Midway largely turned on the decisions of one man, the great Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance. Spruances' decision to launch early, at long range, to get in the first blows against the Japanese was decisive, especially if we apply and accept the authors' analysis. Even though, at this early stage of the war, the American torpedo bombers were not very competent (none of them struck Japanese targets and they were slaughtered by Japanese fighers) and the launchings of the coordinated attacks did not come off well, this early strike that Spruance ordered kept the Japanese on the defensive after the first Japanese strike against Midway. This set the stage for the deadly-competent American dive bombers to strike. This is the very point that the authors make, but this was not due to Japanese incompetence, but rather to a carefully thought-out strategy by Admiral Spruance. Spruance then wisely protected the fleet, avoided exposing it, and kept it in position to protect Midway if necessary. He came in for savage insider's criticism even during the battle as well as thereafter. This criticism was incorrect, as history has judged. Unlike the Japanese, Spruance never forgot his objective (protect the fleet, defend Midway), and always applied the principal of Mass as he struck a lethal blow at the heart of the Japanese Navy with everything he had. While the American Navy at the Battle of Midway had not yet shook off all of the peacetime inertia, it executed its well thought-out doctrine against the Japanese under Spruance's leadership, and won a great victory. Victory was won by the US Navy at Midway, not lost by the Japanese.
"Shattered Sword" is an excellent analysis of the Battle of Midway which all readers with an interest in this great battle will want to read. Its main strength is its analysis of the Japanese side and its command of detail in this regard. Recommended