Although Enderlin's book was published in 2003 it is important and timely. Its importance resides in the fact that the author, as Bureau Chief of France 2 (the French equivalent of PBS), had direct access to most of the principal actors in the peace-process and his location in Jerusalem as well as his dual French-Israeli citizenship provide for unbiased reporting.
The timeliness of the book results from two aspects. One: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to fester with no end in sight and influences U.S. political decisions in regard to the rest of the Middle East especially: Syria, Iraq and Iran. Two: Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, both former prime Ministers, are again candidates by their respective parties for the Prime Ministership in Israel's next election. Knowing a person's past behavior allows, to a certain extent, a reasonable prediction for the future. Enderlin shows us the character flaws of both individuals and how these have led to the collapse of the peace process.
In contrast to the propaganda Americans are still exposed to in regard to the failure of the Camp David II negotiations, which places the blame exclusively on Yasir Arafat, Enderlin shows that the process was doomed from the start. The confidence building measures namely adherence to the Wye River agreement, which had been negotiated previously by Netanyahu, were not observed by Barak who instead insisted that everything would be solved by this final status agreement. Arafat thought that it would be impossible to do so in a hastily arranged two week meeting for a conflict on which the partners show wide disagreements. The most egregious ones were: the borders of the Palestinian state, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, the fate of the settlements and Jerusalem which both sides regard as their capital. The Jerusalem problem is compounded by the question of sovereignty over the Temple Mount which, as Haram al Sharif, is the third holiest site of the Muslim world. The American failure to understand that Arafat could not single handedly make decisions on this vital topic, without agreement by the other Arab nations, was an important aspect for the failure of the talks.
For these reasons Arafat did not want a meeting which was supposed to be the "end all and be all." He agreed to come only after he had received President Clinton's assurance that he would not be blamed if the talks were to collapse. As we know Clinton did not keep this promise.
There were numerous reasons why the actual talks failed: Barak never negotiated with Arafat personally and even refused to engage in private conversations with him during dinner; there was no fixed agenda and no protocols were kept, everything was negotiated orally; the "American" proposals had to be vetted by the Israelis before they could be presented to the Palestinians; sessions went on throughout all hours of the night rather than on a fixed timetable. As everybody knows, when people are sleep deprived tempers tend to flare and agreements become difficult to achieve. The fact that the American negotiators were for the most part Jewish was also a hindrance. Although Enderlin doesn't mention it Swisher's book The Truth about Camp David, which should also be consulted, pointed out that Hillary Clinton was during that time locked in a race for the vacant New York Senate seat. This was an additional factor which prevented Bill Clinton from "leaning" on the Israelis even if he had wanted to do so.
Under these circumstances it is remarkable that a considerable rapprochement of views was actually accomplished upon which further negotiations could and did in fact proceed. They were however thwarted by the political process. In the U.S. Clinton's term of office was over and the Bush administration was not interested. In Israel Barak ruled with a minority government and had to call for elections against Sharon who was violently opposed to any concessions towards the Palestinians. Within Palestine the people had not seen any improvement in their lives during the prolonged peace process and to the contrary had to watch more of their land being expropriated for settlement building. They had become increasingly furious and the second Intifada erupted which provided the pretext for ending all negotiations.
Since the accuracy of Enderlin's presentation is vouched for by Israeli as well as Palestinian negotiators the book can be highly recommended to anyone who is interested in this vital topic. The book should also be required reading for all presidential office seekers as well as members of Congress.