Sense and Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behaviour [Englisch] [Gebundene Ausgabe]

This book is both a great read, and an informative one, for anyone interested in human behavior, evolutionary theory, and the links between the two. The area of potential evolutionary bases to human behavior has traditionally been filled with much controversy, some fighting, scattered irresponsible speculations and pronouncements that at times have produced tragic effects, and quite often, more heat than light. Laland and Brown have produced a book that is truly a breath of fresh air. One of the things I liked most about Sense and Nonsense is that Laland and Brown had actually sat down to talk with--and listen to--many of the leading proponents of different "schools" of thought. They work hard in Sense and Nonsense to give a fair presentation of each different approach, before moving on in each chapter to provide their own analysis of the approach presented from their own perspective as working scientists. In the midst of an area in which some researchers have been prone to simply shout louder--often literally--at those they disagree with, Laland and Brown have truly taken the time to listen, reflect, and form considered and thoughtful judgements. This is a service to all of us: After reading their book, I know that I will always look reflect differently on researchers' claims of evolutionary bases of human behavior, whether that's hearing them at a conference, or reading a journal article, or the latest best-selling book or TV interview. If you want to improve your understanding of evolution and human behavior, get a guided tour through the area and its controversies by two thoughtful experts, and come out with a changed perspective that will likely always stay with you, then read Sense and Nonsense. Great book.

Sense and Nonsense is a clear, lucid explication of the current landscape of the research on how evolutionary theories are applied to the social sciences. By their own admission often oversimplifying for clarity's sake, they break down the different ways in which evolutionary ideas are used in the social sciences into four categories--human behaiourial ecology, evolutionary psychology, memetics and gene-culture coevolution--and show how these descended, with modification, from sociobiology, and from Darwinian evolution itself.

The book clearly and succinctly describes the methodologies and underlying assumptions that define each approach, and no less clearly do they identify their perceptions of the relevant strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches. Although, as another reviewer states, it might be more interesting in a dramatic sense to see them take a more polemical position, it is difficult to argue with them that each of the approaches has its merits and defects, and that, in a new religion, as it were, no one is served by internecine warfare.

I have two reservations, however. My first is something between a quibble and a small problem: Laland uses primarily gene-culture coevolution models himself, and although he is generally balanced in his assessments, one cannot but come out of the book feeling that gene-culture coevolution is first among equals in the authors' minds. They don't hide their sympathies, exactly, but if you don't know of them up front, you have to be paying pretty close attention to find them out.

My second concern has to do with audience. Whom is supposed to read this? If it is directed toward people in the field (that is, people who apply evolutionary models to the social sciences), another commenter is spot on in saying that it is written at too simple a level. If it is directed toward hostile social scientists who think the whole idea of evolutionary study of the social sciences to be debased, or worse, it isn't going to reach them; the book does not duck the fact that social scientists in general despise evolutionary models, but it makes no real effort to respond to those criticisms directly. As an introduction to the subject to someone outside the field entirely, it suits reasonably well. The authors say in the preface that they are going after all these audiences, but I don't think the same book can do all those things well; they would have been better to narrow down whom they were really speaking to.

Kevin Laland is a prominent researcher in gene-culture coevolution, niche construction (the study of how organisms modify their social and physical environment, and thereby modify their own gene pool) and animal social learning. Gillian Brown is a primatologist who studies parenting behavior. Their book is a study of six strands of evolutionary theory as applied to human behavior: (a) Darwin and his pre-sociobiology followers (including Galton, Spencer, Lorenz, Tinbergen, von Frisch, and Ardrey); (b) the founders of sociobiology, including Dawkins, Trivers, Hamilton, Maynard Smith, and E. O. Wilson; and three offshoots of sociobiology, (c) behavioral ecology (including Hill, Kaplan, Hawkes, and Chagnon); (d) evolutionary psychology (including Cosmides, Tooby, Daly, Margo Wilson, Pinker, Buss); (e) memetics; and (f) gene-culture coevolution (including Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, Boyd and Richerson, and Laland himself).

The title is inspired by the authors' impression that, despite the fact that the academic social sciences have virtually ignored evolutionary approaches, the public finds them very sexy and provocative, to the point where evolutionary research is continually influenced by political and journalistic concerns, and the science tends to be overwhelmed by the junk and the hype. I fully share this impression, and I think they have done a fine job in extracting the "sense" from the "nonsense." They even manage to treat memetics seriously, despite the fact that memetics' attempt to detach culture from reproduction, production, cooperation, conflict, and the other basic activities of social life cannot possibly succeed.

Laland and Brown vigorously defend the early Darwinists and sociobiologists against the many politically motivated attacks against them (they do not deal with religious critiques). While the authors recognize that their ideas have often eclipsed by more contemporary research, they find no major fault in the constitution of these two schools. I think this is a bad mistake. In the century from Darwin to E. O. Wilson, evolutionary researchers managed to isolate themselves from every mainstream social science, including economics, sociology, psychology, political science, and to a lesser extent, anthropology. It is futile to blame this on the mainstream. The fault lies squarely with the evolutionary theorists, who failed to make a convincing case for the position.

This is quite unforgivable, because mainstream social science has made many central contributions that must be integrated into evolutionary theory to provide a solid, scientific body of knowledge concerning human behavior. Laland and Brown give no reason for this isolation of evolutionary theory, except the trivial commonplaces mouthed by virtually everyone in this tradition (traditional social science is ideology, the mainstream is afraid of being tainted with the sins of eugenics and racist genetic determinism, and so on). The major problem facing evolutionary theory today is not to shuck the nonsense, but to account for its failure to become part of the mainstream, I believe, and Laland and Brown do not recognize this.

The very idea of forming schools of thought, such as behavioral ecology, evolutionary psychology, and gene-culture coevolution is an indication of the inability of evolutionary theory to consider itself a science. Scientists seek integration, not fragmentation. Behavioral ecologists, for instance, are anthropologists who study simple societies, while evolutionary psychologists are psychologists who study commonalities in human behavior across all societies. How could they possibly consider themselves "alternative" theories? They very idea is absurd, a capitulation to the natural human tendency to congregate in small groups of "insiders" whose major motivation is to triumph over the many groups of "outsiders" whose strange ways are threatening and unsettling.

This one issue aside, I find Laland and Brown very convincing in adjudicating among the various approaches, and in their plea for tolerance and exchange of information among them. Like the authors, I believe that gene-culture coevolution is the overarching principle that includes the others as subclasses. I also believe that gene-culture coevolution is the most promising basis for the integration of evolutionary with mainstream social science. The authors' only critique of gene-culture coevolution is that it tends to be highly mathematical and does not generate many empirical studies. I do not agree with this critique. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, as well as Boyd and Richerson, have done admirable empirical work, and with the use of experimental game theory in recent years, we will have much more such research in the near future. The true critique of gene-culture coevolutionary theory, in my view, is its ignorance of and contempt for traditional social science. Unless this is overcome, evolutionary social theory will remain marginalized for the foreseeable future.

Of course, most potential readers of this book will have the same prejudices concerning the traditional disciplines as do the authors, and they should find this book a welcome and incisive corrective to the disarray within evolutionary social theory.