"Rogue Nation" examines a host of issues on which the U.S. has found itself at odds with the world: free trade agreements, global warming, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the treaty to eliminate land mines, the creation of an International Criminal Court, the war on Iraq, and more. The book is valuable regardless of whether or not the reader agrees with Prestowitz's politics (he's a longtime conservative and a former Reagan administration official) or his opinions on environmental, economic, and foreign policy concerns. Indeed, it's often hard to pinpoint the author's place on the ideological spectrum. For example, many conservatives will disagree with his support of several international agreements discarded by the Bush administration. Both conservatives and liberals will be dissatisfied about his ambivalence on the need for the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Many liberals will be turned off by his statement that, as of March 2003, "there is little choice for the United States and whatever partners it can gather to overthrow Saddam and occupy Iraq."
What troubles Prestowitz, however, is not America's international policies per se but the manner in which we pursue those policies--a manner that may not always meant to be arrogant but certainly seems to be to the rest of the world. What especially distresses him are certain unilateralist principles proposed and implemented by "neoconservatives" like Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz.
In a way, it's too bad that Prestowitz chose such a deliberately provocative title, since the book itself, while undeniably opinionated, makes considerable effort to present both sides of every issue. Yet he correctly acknowledges that much of the international community regards the United States as a "rogue nation"--whether we are in fact or not. Likewise, the author contends that, although we are not technically an empire, we often behave like one--or, just as important, appear to others to have imperial pretensions. In a world where perception is reality, Prestowitz argues, it is foolish not to be concerned about international opinion, since we depend on other nations as much as they depend on us for both economic well-being and domestic security.
Above all, Prestowitz proposes that America's people and its leaders become better listeners--and Prestowitz himself is an astute listener. He has interviewed an impressive number of foreign diplomats, ambassadors, and government officials, and he faithfully presents their views even when he seems not to concur. What matters less to the author is how accurate international opinion is about American intentions or plans. Instead, he strives to understand how they arrive at contrary judgments: he provides historical context for various controversies and describes events, blunders, and misunderstandings that tend to support such mistrust.
He also contends that Americans often seem to treat other nations as inherently inferior or, even more insultingly, that we seem to feel that other cultures would be better off if they became just like us. As Prestowitz notes, "Nations are very much like individuals. More than desire for material gain or fear or love, they are driven by a craving for dignity and respect, by the need to be recognized as valid and just a valuable as the next person or country." Rather than forcibly imposing our lifestyle on reluctant populations, we would be far more productive in providing a model worthy of admiration, "a city on a hill"--especially since most of the world's peoples greatly admire Americans themselves while they regard our government's policies with increasing suspicion.
Prestowitz's treatise is enhanced by a riveting journalistic style, an impressive array of evidence, and a lucid synthesis of a variety of foreign policy issues. I don't always agree with his views or his conclusions. For example, while I support his argument that we should greatly lessen our military presence in the Persian Gulf, I don't buy his assertion that shrinking our dependence on Arab oil would cut off funding for terrorism. (Although a reduction in oil imports would offer many other benefits, the implication that boycott or impoverishment would reduce terrorism seems questionable.) Yet, even when one disagrees, the book is still informative and challenging, and I found his overarching thesis to be irrefutable: America cannot survive this century on its own, and we cannot continue to act as if we can.